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Article
The New Habeas
by
KATHLEEN PATCHEL*

"Procedure is the blindfold of Justice."'
Introduction
In Spring 1990, the United States Supreme Court did a little spring
cleaning, and one thing it finally decided to throw out was federal
habeas corpus review of state court constitutional determinations regarding criminal procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) states that
[t]he Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district
court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 2
In 1953, in Brown v. Allen,3 the Court determined that Congress intended federal habeas to be a mechanism for de novo review of state
prisoner's constitutional claims in order to ensure federal courts the
"final say" with regard to federal constitutional issues: "The State
court cannot have the last say when it, though on fair consideration
and what procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have misconceived a federal constitutional right. ' 4 This view was confirmed ten
years later in Fay v. Noia,5 in which the Court stated that the habeas
statute always had evidenced a "clear congressional policy of afAssistant Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. J.D. 1981, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law; LL.M. 1987, Yale Law School. This Article
is dedicated to The Honorable Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Judge, United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, who taught me to "look to the Pole Star." Thanks also to the "worry
beads"-Dan, David, and Vince-and to Professors Lea Brilmayer and W. Michael Reisman of
the Yale Law School-they know why.
1. Curtis & Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727, 1728 (1987) (quoting R. CovwR,
0. Fiss & J. REsNix, PRoCEDuRE ch. 5, at 1231-32 (1988)).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988).
3. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
4. Id. at 508 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
5. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
*
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fording a federal forum for the determination of the federal claims
of state criminal defendants." 6 The Court thus concluded that habeas
jurisdiction "is conferred by the allegation of an unconstitutional reby anything that may occur in the state
straint and is not defeated
' '7
court proceedings.
In 1990, in Butler v. McKellar,8 the Court determined that federal
habeas is a mechanism for validating "reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though
they are shown to be contrary to later decisions. ' 9 Given such a reasonable, though "wrong," state court interpretation, habeas is available only if the petitioner can establish that her constitutional claim
alleges that either punishment of her conduct or the particular penalty
imposed is beyond the power of the state or that her claim is one of
those extremely rare 'watershed rules of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." 10 The Butler Court dealt with the same statutory language
as the Courts in Brown and Fay, yet the Butler majority did not mention, much less overrule, either of those decisions. Nevertheless, the
habeas of Butler clearly is not the habeas of Brown and Fay.
More than time separates the decisions in these cases: they reflect
fundamentally different views of federalism, of the role of federal
courts, and, ultimately, of constitutional adjudication itself. The "old"
habeas-the habeas of Brown and Fay-was the procedural counterpart to the Warren Court's expansion of the constitutional protections afforded state criminal defendants, an expansion accomplished
through selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment.'" The broad scope of the old habeas provided a
federal mechanism for imposing those new procedural rights upon the
states.12 The new habeas provides the mechanism for a new agenda:
the return of control over criminal procedure to the states.
Although in Butler the Rehnquist Court apparently delivered the
final blow to the old habeas, its demise was a gradual one. The rejection of the vision it embodied was the result of a war of attrition
that began long before the Rehnquist Court. Indeed, in true tragic
6. Id. at 418.
7. Id. at 426.
8. 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
9. Id. at 1217.
10. Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1263 (1990) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
311 (1988)).
11. Cover & Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism:Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J.
1035, 1036-37 (1977).
12. Id.
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fashion, the seeds of its destruction were sown almost at the time of
its inception-in Fay and the retroactivity doctrine the Warren Court
employed to ameliorate the impact of its new criminal procedure requirements.
In this Article, I explore the process by which the habeas of Brown
and Fay became the habeas of Butler. I first review the philosophical
background that provided proponents of the new habeas with the
analytical weapons with which to wage the battle against the old habeas and the cases in which those weapons were used. I then look
at the characteristics of the new habeas that emerge from these cases
and the way in which the new habeas structures federal-state relations
in the area of state criminal procedure. Finally, I look at some of the
broader consequences of the process the Court employed in developing the new habeas. Ultimately, I conclude that by restricting, habeas, the Court de facto has returned the development of constitutional
restrictions on criminal process to the states, and that it has done so
through a process that has profound and troubling implications for
the future of constitutional adjudication.
I.

The Philosophical Grounding of the New Habeas:
Bator and Friendly

The philosophical background of the new habeas is found in two
extremely influential law review articles: Professor Paul Bator's Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners3 and Judge Henry Friendly's Is Innocence Irrelevant?Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments.14 The arguments presented in
these articles were instrumental in developing the new habeas, although in very different ways. Bator established the test for finality
used by the Court to restrict the scope of habeas; 15 Friendly provided
the rhetoric necessary to make the concomitant restriction of federal
constitutional rights palatable. 16
A.

Professor Bator's Functional Analysis of Habeas Review

Professor Bator's article explores the circumstances in which federal habeas review of federal constitutional claims previously adju13. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
HARv. L. REv. 441 (1963).
14. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on CriminalJudgments, 38 U. Cm.

L. REv. 142 (1970).
15. See Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and
Change in CriminalProcedure, 80 CoLTJM. L. REv. 436, 458 (1980).
16. Id.
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dicated in state criminal proceedings is justified. 7 His analysis begins
with two important assumptions. First, he assumes that the scope of
habeas jurisdiction must be justified in terms of some unique procedural function that habeas review serves, rather than in terms of
whether review is necessary to guarantee correct results in given cases.'"
This assumption follows from Bator's position that it is a "funda-

mental epistemological error"'

9

to assume that a court can make a

determination, either of law or fact, that is correct in some ultimate

sense. 20 Both as to determinations of fact and determinations of law,
"[a] court cannot any more than any other human agency break down
the barrier between appearance and reality. ' 2' Thus, he rejects any
attempt to justify the scope of federal habeas in terms of the need
to correct state court decisions that are "wrong" or to vindicate rights
that exist as a matter of "ultimate reality."' Because finality never
will occur naturally through discovery of the "truth," it must be created artificially by allocating final authority to decide whether error
has occurred to "some complex of institutional processes ... even
though in the very nature of things no such processes can give us

ultimate assurances. "23
Therefore, the choice between allowing relitigation through habeas review or holding the state determination final must be based
on "functional, institutional and political considerations," rather than
on the need to correct error. 24 Thus, the initial inquiry as to whether
17. Bator, supra note 13, at 443.
18. Id. at 449.
19. Id. at 450.
20. Id. at 446-50.
21. Id. at 447 (quoting Jaffe, Judicial Review: Constitutional and JurisdictionalFact, 70
HItARv. L. REv. 953, 966 (1957)).
22. Bator, supra note 13, at 450.
23. Id. at 447.
24. Id. at 449. According to Bator, the task "is to define and create a set of arrangements
and procedures which provide a reasoned and acceptable probability that justice will be done,
that the facts found will be 'true' and the law applied 'correct."' Id. at 448. The goal is a set
of institutional arrangements that provide "an assurance of justice deemed acceptable by society."
Id.
Bator's epistemological observations about our ability to know truth are, of course, widely
shared in modern society, and can be viewed as providing a rationale for many of the finality
doctrines that we have incorporated into our procedural system. For instance, the following
famous rationale for res judicata reflects much of Bator's argument:
Courts to determine the rights of parties are an integral part of our system of
government. It is just as important that there should be a place to end as that there
should be a place to begin litigation. After a party has his day in court, with opportunity
to present his evidence and his view of the law, a collateral attack upon the decision
as to jurisdiction there rendered merely retries the issue previously determined. There
is no reason to expect that the second decision will be more satisfactory than the first.
Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938). Another famous passage, disagreeing with Brown's
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to allow habeas review must examine "whether the complex of arrangements and processes which previously determined the facts and
applied the law validating detention was adequate to the task at
hand." 2s That is, was adjudication through the state court system a
sufficient "set of institutional arrangements ' 26 such that society can
be satisfied with giving finality to the determination of that court
system, or are there "functional, institutional or political
considerations" 27 that indicate that federal review is required as well?
Bator's second assumption relates to allocating the burden of
persuasion with regard to access to a federal habeas forum. According
to Bator, the presumption should be against relitigation because "if
a job can be well done once, it should not be done twice."' ' Given
that no amount of relitigation can ensure freedom from error, conservation of resources suggests that proponents of redetermination of
the merits should bear the burden of providing "some reasoned institutional justification''29 for not granting finality to the first proceeding, which was decided on the merits through processes "fitted
to the task in a manner not inferior to those which would be used
in a second proceeding." 30
Bator believes the costs of "[m]ere iteration of process" also
support the presumption against relitigation. 31 The state judge's sense
of responsibility can be subverted by "an indiscriminate acceptance
32
of the notioh that all the shots will always be called by someone else."
The deterrent and rehabilitative functions of the criminal law also
may be impaired. 33 Deterrence requires that those violating the law
be subject to swift and certain punishment. That threat will be undermined if "we so define the processes leading to just punishment
that it can really never be finally imposed at all."' 34 Rehabilitation also
requires that a prisoner recognize she is subject to sanction and needs
rehabilitation. According to Bator, this "cardinal moral predicate"
expansive interpretation of the scope of habeas review, also reflects this view: "We are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
25. Bator, supra note 13, at 449.
26. Id. at 448.
27. Id. at 449.
28. Id. at 451.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. Bator suggests that the "important functional and ethical purposes" served by
allowing appeal offset this cost, but that "[tihe acute question is the effect it will have on a trial
judge if we then allow still further recourse where these purposes may no longer be relevant."
Id.
33. Id. at 452.
34. Id.
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will be missing "if society itself continuously tells the convict that
[s]he may not be justly subject to reeducation and treatment in the
first place." 35 Finally, relitigation denies society the repose that is "a
psychological necessity in a secure and active society.' '36 One aim of
a procedural system should be "to devise doctrines which, in the end,
do give us repose, do embody the judgment that we have tried hard
'37
enough and thus may take it that justice has been done."
Thus, Bator denies that proceedings are based on "correct" determinations of law and fact. Further, he rejects that mere redundancy of process serves any value that justifies relitigation absent some
functional need for federal court redetermination of issues already
38
decided in state court proceedings.
Bator's functional analysis of habeas review leads him to conclude that relitigation serves a function beyond mere reconsideration
of the merits in only two situations: when there is either failure of
process or lack of jurisdiction. In these instances, the state court system is not a sufficient "set of institutional arrangements" for society
to be satisfied with giving finality to the result. Although Bator finds
the precedent in this area somewhat unclear, he also believes that these
39
situations constitute the historic boundaries of habeas jurisdiction.
According to Bator, "it is always an appropriate inquiry whether
previous process was meaningful process, that is, whether the conditions and tools of inquiry were such as to assure a reasoned probability that the facts were correctly found and the law correctly
applied. "40 Failure of process includes circumstances in which no opportunity was provided in the initial proceeding to litigate a relevant
question and those in which the previous litigation opportunity was
tainted, for instance, through mob domination of the trial, bribery
of the judge, or a coerced guilty plea. 41 In these situations, the habeas
court does not review the case for substantive error of fact or law,
"but [inquires] whether the processes previously employed for de35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation,
22 WM. & MARY L. Ray. 639, 654 n.51 (1981).
39. Bator, supra note 13, at 498-99 ("There can be no doubt that when Brown v. Allen
reached the Court in 1952, the central thrust of the law was ... [that] for purposes of habeas
corpus a detention was not to be deemed 'unlawful' if based upon the judgment of a competent
state court which had afforded full corrective process for the litigation of questions touching on
federal rights.") (citation omitted).
40. Id. at 455 (emphasis omitted).
41. Id. Bator also considered denial of the constitutional right to counsel to be an example
of failure of process. Id. at 458.
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termination of questions of fact and law were fairly and rationally
adapted to that task." 42 Thus, the habeas court is not engaging in
mere reiteration of process; the alleged deficiency goes to the heart
of the state court's ability to make legitimate determinations at all.
Accordingly, "supervisory jurisdiction should exist to test the question whether the processes 3 furnished by the previous tribunal were
'4
meaningful and rational.
Permitting relitigation in the context of lack of jurisdiction simply requires an application of the black-letter rule that a judgment
by a court that does not have jurisdiction or competence to decide
the issue before it may be attacked collaterally. 44 Thus, the habeas
court can appropriately "deny conclusive effect to a state judgment
of conviction" if federal law made the state incompetent to deal with
the case.45
In contrast, to these two historic functions of habeas, Bator finds
the broad habeas jurisdiction of Brown v. Allen 46 (which allows relitigation of all federal constitutional questions decided in the state
court) is not justified by either history or some functional, institutional or political need beyond mere reiteration of process. 47 In light
of the costs incurred through relitigation and the resulting presumption against it, Bator finds all of the justifications offered to support
an expansive view of habeas jurisdiction unpersuasive.
Bator readily rejects most of the traditional structural arguments
in favor of habeas review. He does not believe that habeas review of
state prisoners' constitutional claims is a function of the supremacy
clause. The substantive superiority of federal law "does not automatically tell us that it is better for federal judges to pronounce it
than state judges, much less that once a state judge has done so on
a fair and rational investigation, this should be disregarded and done
over again by a federal judge. ' 4 Nor is habeas justified on the ground
that a state prisoner is entitled to have federal claims heard by a fed42. Id. at 455 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 456 (citation omitted). All that is required to correct a failure of process, however,
is "one forum concededly unbiased using procedures concededly rational." Id. at 456 n.26.
Although that forum could be a state appellate court, Bator believed that normally habeas review
would be required because the process of the state appellate courts is likely to have been affected
by the error as well. Id.
44. Id. at 460-61. Although the decision may not be erroneous, "allowing it to 'count'
would violate the political rules allocating institutional competencies to deal with various matters."

Id. at 461.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 461.
344 U.S. 443 (1953).
Bator, supra note 13, at 463-65.
Id. at 505.
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eral tribunal. 49 State prisoners have no constitutional right to a federal
forum to determine the merits of their constitutional claims.50 Moreover, state courts routinely finally determine federal issues in civil
cases and in criminal cases that do not involve detention, in which
the only federal recourse is discretionary certiorari review in the Supreme Court. Neither is habeas review justified by the need to supplement the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction to hear state
prisoners' constitutional claims.51 Bator does not believe that cases
involving constitutional rights and imprisonment can be distinguished
sufficiently from civil and non-detention cases such that a right to
a federal forum is appropriate in that context although not recognized
in the others.5 2 According to Bator, just because a state court's decision on a prisoner's claim is couched in terms of constitutional law,
it "does not logically tell us anything about the underlying importance
of the actual issue canvassed." ' 53 If the constitutional issue is, in fact,
significant, it already falls within the purpose of the certiorari ju54
risdiction of the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, because of his epistemological position, Bator finds
''no intrinsic reason'' 55 why a federal court's determination of the
state prisoner's constitutional claim would be more "correct" in an
49. Id. at 507.
50. Id. Bator believed this proposition necessarily followed from Congress' constitutional
powers to control the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; and to control the very
existence of the lower federal courts. Id. see U.S. CONST. art. III. Bator does recognize that civil
cases raising federal questions on the face of the complaint are subject to removal by thl
defendant to federal court, but states that this "does not qualify the point that if the state court
is left to adjudicate the case, it is allowed to adjudicate all the questions, federal and state, in
it, and the litigants have no right to a federal-court disposition of the merits of the federal issues
therein." Bator, supra note 13, at 507 n.190.
51. Bator, supra note 13, at 507-08.
52. Id. at 507-08.
53. Id. at 508.
54. Id. Bator also notes the irony of considering a constitutional issue important enough to
require relitigation in a federal forum simply because it is constitutional when the key factual
issue of innocence or guilt cannot be relitigated:
If a state prisoner claims that he confessed after he was interrogated for six hours,
not (as the state court found) for four, the law says he may relitigate the issue and,
perhaps, gain release as a consequence, even though the evidence of guilt may be
overwhelming. But if a defendant is convicted of murder and ten years later another
person confesses to the crime, so that we can be absolutely certain that the defendant
was innocent all the time, the law says that he must rely on executive clemency. Why?
Why should we pay so little attention to finality with respect to constitutional questions
when, in general, the law is so unbending with respect to other questions which,
nevertheless, may bear as crucially on justice as any constitutional issue in the case?
Id. at 509. One cannot help feeling that Judge Friendly highlighted this particular passage in his
copy of Bator's article. See infra text accompanying note 91.
55. Bator, supra note 13, at 509.
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ultimate sense than the state court's determination.5 6 Although he recognizes that federal judges have certain advantages as decisionmakers
over state court judges by virtue of their insulation from political
pressures, their presumed sympathy to federal law, and their differing
perspective with regard to federal constitutional issues, Bator con57
cludes that these are insufficient to support broad habeas review.
Federal law is necessarily a part of state law and "deciding federal
questions is an intrinsic part of the business of state judges. ' 58 Thus,
implicit in the structure of federalism is "the need for confidence that
the state courts will conscientiously apply to a case the whole of the
applicable law, including the federal law." 59 Bator thus refuses to
accept that "state-court judgments about federal rights bearing on
state cases should be automatically ignored on the basis of rather nebulous and open-ended assumptions about their inadequacy."' 6 For
Bator, the ability of the habeas court to review state prisoner claims
of failure of process
sufficiently protects against the possibility of
61
state court abuse.
Finally, Bator addresses whether a broad habeas jurisdiction is
needed as the procedural counterpart to the expansion of substantive
doctrines limiting the power of the states in their administration of
criminal justice. Proponents of broad habeas jurisdiction argue that
it is necessary to ensure that new federal rights are not "subtly eroded"
by state courts that pay "verbal respect ...

to the principles [while]

56. Id. at 509, 513-14.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
he finds

Id. at 510-11.
Id.
Id. at 511.
Id.
Id. Bator distinguishes federal question jurisdiction, which is supported by the rationales
unpersuasive in the habeas context-independence and objectivity of federal judges, as

well the ability to provide "specialized and knowledgeable tribunals with procedural and remedial
tools which may be more effective in enforcing federal rights than those available in the state
system." Id. at 512. Federal question jurisdiction, either as an original matter or through removal,
involves a totally different "calculus" because it deals with the question of "whether an entire
lawsuit involving federal issues should originally be adjudicated by a federal or state court." Id.
According to Bator,

mhe

calculus which tells us that these advantages justify giving litigants the option to

have their lawsuits tried entirely in federal court is surely a different one than where
the question is whether a suit which is and must be tried in state court should then

be reopened to allow the redetermination of federal questions by a federal judge. The
whole point is that in the latter situation we have already made the fundamental

decision that we do want the state courts to decide the case. And it is this 'decision
that creates the special problems of waste of resources, strain in federal-state relations
and damage to the fabric of criminal law which bear so acutely on the decision whether
we should superimpose collateral review on the Supreme Court's direct supervisory
jurisdiction.
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the substance [is] robbed of meaning through a stringent and unsympathetic application." ' 62 Although Bator is troubled by the prospect that state courts might not apply the spirit as well as the letter
of federal law, 6 3 he rejects this argument based on his belief that a
remedial system "must be tailored for tomorrow as well as today." 64
Bator argues that substantive law will stabilize in the foreseeable future and the distrust of state court constitutional interpretations then
will no longer be justified. 65 For the present, the power of federal
habeas courts to consider claims of failure of process provides a federal mechanism to ensure that procedures exist in state courts to vindicate federal rights. 66 Bator questions whether federal habeas review
should address the further problem that federal court supervision of
state process cannot "guard against cases where there has been the
appearance of fairness but not its inner essence." ' 67 Indeed, he speculates that this type of "inner conscientiousness" might be "a byproduct not only of supervision from above but also of responsibility," and, therefore, may not be served by removing responsibility
68
from state judges.
Ultimately, Bator concludes that the proper verdict on the case
for expansive habeas jurisdiction is "not proven ' 6 9 because the
doubtful nature of any institutional necessity for a broad habeas jurisdiction is outweighed by its costs. 70 Further, for Bator, a broad
habeas jurisdiction does not promote reform of state criminal procedures, but rather discourages it by making those reforms irrelevant
to whether relitigation occurs. 7 1
Bator does not, however, reach his conclusion easily. In particular, he remains troubled by the argument that federal habeas review
is necessary to ensure compliance with the spirit as well as the letter
of federal law:
62. Id. at 523.
63. Id. at 525.
64. Id. at 523.
65. Id. at 524. Thus, Bator asserts that the scope of habeas should not be "premised on
unceasing and revolutionary change" and the lack of sympathy found in state courts for federal
law.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 524-25.
69. Id. at 525.
70. These costs include what Bator terms the "abrasions and conflicts created by federal
interference with the states' administration of criminal justice" and the "very real claims which
the need for finality and repose .. .make on the criminal process," particularly in light of the
"philosophically faulty premises about justice which are often at the heart of the demand that
we repeat inquiry endlessly to make sure that no mistake has been made." Id.
71. Id.
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Nevertheless, I cannot pretend that the case the other way is weightless. Our traditional doctrines of judicial review do rest on the premise of good-faith judging. Whenever good faith is questioned, strain
is put on the ordinary rules of review; and maybe untraditional and
extraordinary accommodations should therefore be made. There is
surely appeal in the notion, and perhaps it makes sense at a time
when there still is a justified suspicion and distrust of state-court
rulings as to federal constitutional rights, to have a jurisdiction with
a large and roving commission "to prevent a complete miscarriage
of justice" .... 72
Bator suggests it may be "well that a writ the historic purpose of
which is to furnish 'a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint' ..

.

should be left fluid and free from the definiteness

appropriate to ordinary jurisdictional doctrines. ' 73 Perhaps there is
a need for a broad grant to the federal courts of the power "to redetermine the merits to assure that covert unfairness does not lurk
behind the appearance of fairness." 74 If Bator's verdict is that the case
for broad habeas jurisdiction has not been proven, this passage con75
a substantial modification of his opinion upon rehearing.
stitutes
Bator
believes that the power to act as a "roving commission"
for justice would give the federal district courts a function similar to
that intended to be served by executive clemency, a power that he
notes the states have failed to utilize.76 If the habeas court serves as
a federal substitute for state executive clemency, a body to prevent
the miscarriage of justice in individual cases, then its decision should
be based not only on whether a redetermination of the merits of the
case would suggest error in the state court decision, 77 but also on
whether "the district judge can be morally assured that [the petitioner] was guilty." '78 Because Bator views this "roving commission"
function as the only convincing institutional justification for a broad
habeas jurisdiction, he suggests:
If Brown v. Allen is to remain the law, it should be modified to make
clear that where a federal constitutional question has been fully canvassed by fair state process, and meaningfully submitted for possible
72. Id. (citation omitted).
73. Id. (quoting Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 187 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
74. Id. at 526.
75. This passage also forms one of the bases of Friendly's article, for Bator suggests that,
if avoidance of injustice is to be the rationale for habeas review, "all the factors which bear on
justice should be put on the scales," id. at 527, including whether the defendant is in fact guilty
as charged. Id. See infra text accompanying note 91.
76. Id. at 525-26.
77. Id. at 526.
78. Id. at 527. Bator suggested, "what is called for.., is a decision, based on all the-facts,
whether justice really does call for release in the particular case." Id.at 526.
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Supreme Court review, then the federal district judge on habeas,
though entitled to redetermine the merits, has a large discretion to
decide whether the federal error, if any, was prejudicial, whether
justice will be served by releasing the prisoner, taking into account
in the largest sense all the relevant factors, including his conscientious appraisal of the guilt or79innocence of the accused on the basis
of the full record before him.
Thus, despite his previous finding that the costs of a broad habeas jurisdiction outweigh its benefits, Bator cannot completely convince himself of his own conclusion. Even though he admonishes that
ensuring the "accuracy" of state court determinations of federal constitutional rights cannot support a procedural system, he is unable to
resist presenting what he considers the blueprint for such a system.
At first glance, it seems rather odd that Bator finds an argument
based on the difference between appearance and reality more persuasive than more traditional institutional arguments for federal habeas review. One can certainly argue that Bator has fallen into his
own "epistemological error," as the essence of his argument closely
resembles one that he rejected out of hand: that federal habeas review
is needed to ensure "correct" interpretations of federal constitutional
law. Bator would respond that his concern is not that a state court
determination was "incorrect," but rather that it was the product of
a hidden bias and, therefore, suffers from a defect closely akin to
a failure of process. Ultimately, however, the apparent strict dichotomy between Bator's focus on process and his proposal for use
of the federal courts as a roving commission is illusory: rather than
presenting a dichotomy, the concepts of a state court's erroneous legal
determination and its failure to provide adequate corrective process
for the vindication of federal rights at some point merge.8 0 Nevertheless, the idea that a federal district judge can be "morally assured"
as to a petitioner's guilt is fundamentally inconsistent not only with
the idea that truth is unknowable, but also with Bator's central focus
on the importance of process to which his basic epistemological position led him.
79. Id. at 527-28.
80. Professor Seidman makes this point in his discussion of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
482 (1975), which held that federal habeas is not available to challenge fourth amendment claims
when the state court has provided the petitioner with a full and fair hearing on the issue.
Seidman, supra note 15, at 459 n.133. He argues that a state's legal judgment regarding a fourth
amendment claim is erroneous because it is an inadequate mechanism for the vindication of
fourth amendment rights. Id. If a state court announced that it no longer would honor fourth
amendment claims as a matter of law, it clearly would be unable to provide an adequate corrective
mechanism for fourth amendment violations; why should the result differ if the state court's
refusal is limited to a narrow category of fourth amendment claims? Id.
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Bator's article was published just as the Court rendered its de-

cision in Fay v. Noia, 81 which reaffirmed that federal habeas jurisdiction extends to any allegation of unconstitutional restraint. 2 Bator
later described this article as having "had the strange history of being
pronounced dead almost as soon as it was written, only to enjoy a
mysterious recent resurrection." 83 That description was more apt than

Bator could have known, for although Bator's arguments for a limited habeas jurisdiction were rejected by the holding in Fay, the limits
on habeas he proposed in his article profoundly influenced the subsequent course of the Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence. Indeed,
while Bator may have lost the battle with the rejection of limited habeas in Fay, his ideas as to the appropriate scope of habeas won the
84
war with the decision in Butler v. McKellar.

B. Judge Friendly's Innocence Standard

Judge Friendly's article, written seven years after Professor Bator's, relies heavily on Bator's arguments, although it employs them
to support a very different proposal as to the proper scope of habeas
jurisdiction. 5 In his article, Friendly agrees with Bator that habeas
has expanded beyond its historic application to cases of failure of
process and lack of jurisdiction.86 Like Bator, he believes that ex81. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
82. Id. at 426.
83. Bator, The State Courts and FederalConstitutionalLitigation, 22 Wm. & MARY L. REv.
605, 613 (1981).
84. 110 S. Ct. -1212 (1990).
85. Friendly acknowledges that he has "drawn heavily" upon Bator's article. Friendly, supra
note 14, at 146 n.15. Friendly also relies heavily on arguments made by Justice Black in Kaufman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969) (Black, J. dissenting). In dissenting from the Kaufman
Court's refusal to hold that fourth amendment search and seizure claims were not cognizable in
federal collateral proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the federal prisoner counterpart of § 2254,
Justice Black stated that he "wruld always require that the convicted defendant raise the kind
of constitutional claim that casts some shadow of a doubt on his guilt." Id. at 242 (Black, J.,
dissenting). This test for habeas review is based on Black's assertion that "the great historic role
of the writ of habeas corpus has been to insure the reliability of the guilt-determining process,"
and, therefore, it is the "element of probable or possible innocence that ... should be given
weight in determining whether a judgment after conviction and appeal and affirmance should be
open to collateral attack." Id. at 234 (citation omitted). Because fourth amendment claims are
not guilt-related, Justice Black would have limited the availability of federal collateral proceedings
for both state and federal prisoners alleging search and seizure violations to those situations in
which special circumstances, such as the inability to have the claim adequately considered in the
former proceedings, could be shown. Id. at 241-42 & 242 n.11. This approach to habeas review
of fourth amendment claims later was adopted by the Court in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1975). See infra Part II. A.
86. Friendly, supra note 14, at 142, 151.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42

panded habeas "carries a serious burden of justification ' 87 because
of its related costs: impairment of the deterrent and rehabilitative
functions of the criminal law; loss of reliability in factual determinations (both on habeas and on retrial because of delay in filing for
collateral relief); drain on resources of judges, prosecutors, and attorneys; difficulty in separating meritorious from frivolous petitions
because of the volume of filings; and lack of respect for criminal
judgments.8 8 Finally, like Bator, he believes that neither the constitutional label carried by rights subject to habeas review under Brown
and Fay nor the life and liberty interests at stake in criminal proceedings provide an adequate justification for the lack of finality resulting from such broad habeas review.8 9 According to Friendly, the
expansion of constitutional rights through selective incorporation of
the Bill of Rights did away with the validity of
the assumption that simply because a claim can be characterized as
"constitutional," it should necessarily constitute a basis for collateral attack when there has been fair opportunity to litigate it at trial
and on appeal. Whatever may have been true when the Bill of Rights
was read to protect a state criminal defendant only if the state had
acted in a manner "repugnant to the conscience of mankind," the
rule prevailing when Brown v. Allen was decided, the "constitutional" label no longer assists in appraising how far society should
go in permitting relitigation of criminal convictions. It carries a connotation of outrage-the mob-dominated jury, the confession extorted by the rack, the defendant deprived of counsel-which is
wholly misplaced when, for example, the claim is a pardonable but
allegedly mistaken belief that probable cause existed for an arrest
.... A judge's overly broad construction of a penal statute can be

much more harmful to a defendant than unwarranted refusal to
compel a prosecution witness on some peripheral element of the case
to reveal his address. If a second round on the former is not permitted, and no one suggests it should be, I see no justification for
87.

Id. at 146.

88.

Id. at 146-49.

89. Friendly believes that the costs of broad habeas
are not at all answered by the Supreme Court's conclusory pronouncement: "Conventional notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake
and infringement of constitutional rights is alleged." Why do they have no place? One
will readily agree that "where life and liberty are at stake," different rules should
govern the determination of guilt than when only property is at issue.... I would
agree that even when he has had [the benefit of these rules] at trial and on appeal,
"[tihe policy against incarcerating or executing an innocent man ... should far
outweigh the desired termination of litigation." But this shows only that "conventional
notions of finality" should not have as much place in criminal as in civil litigation,
not that they should have none.
Id. at 149-50 (citations omitted).
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one on the latter in the absence of a colorable showing of innocence. 9o

While Bator argues that the scope of federal habeas review should
be limited by allowing review only to assure the adequacy of state

process, Friendly argues that habeas should be limited by allowing
review only to prevent the incarceration or execution of the innoceit.
Thus, Friendly's central thesis is that, with the exception of four types
of cases, the petitioner must supplement her constitutional claim with

"a colorable claim of innocence" in order to obtain federal habeas
review of a criminal conviction. 9'
This test is not satisfied merely by a showing that a defendant
would not have been convicted in the absence of the admission of
evidence that allegedly was unconstitutionally obtained. 9 Friendly thus
does not envision the innocence standard as being a form of harmless
error doctrine. 93 Instead, the petitioner must establish
a fair probability that, in light of all the evidence, including that
alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any
unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly
excluded or to have become available only after the trial, the trier94
of the facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt.

This test thus suggests an individualized inquiry into the actual,
factual guilt of each petitioner as the jurisdictional threshold for habeas review of her claim. Such an approach is consistent with Bator's
"roving commission" rationale for broad habeas jurisdiction. Friendly
90. Id. at 156-57 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
91. Id. at 142. Friendly's proposal is not limited to federal habeas review: he proposes that
innocence be made the test for access to any form of collateral attack, state or federal,. and,
within the federal system, for both review of federal and state convictions. Moreover, his proposal
is not limited to review of constitutional error: he would apply this "exception to the concept
of finality where a convicted defendant makes a colorable showing that an error, whether
'constitutional' or not, may be producing the continued punishment of an innocent man." Id.
at 160.
92. Id.
93. The harmless error doctrine permits a conviction to stand despite a constitutional error
if the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the outcome of the
case. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1969). Friendly states that, while harmless
error "affords relief against constitutional claims on immaterial points, the test on collateral
attack generally should be not whether the error could have affected the result but whether it
could have caused the punishment of an innocent man." Friendly, supra note 14, at 157 n.81.
94. Friendly, supra note 14, at 160. As the triers of fact already have failed to entertain a
reasonable doubt about the petitioner's guilt, this would seem to limit challenges to those
concerning wrongly excluded or newly discovered evidence, or those in which evidence was not
only illegally admitted, but also unreliable. Friendly gives as an example the situation of axi
involuntary confession, suggesting that collateral review should be allowed if the prosecution had
no other substantial evidence in the case. Review would be denied, however, if the state had so
much other evidence, even if some were obtained as a result of an involuntary confession, as to
eliminate any reasonable doubt of guilt. Id. at 163-64.
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refers elsewhere in the article, however, to the relevance of whether
the claim is 'the kind of constitutional claim that casts some shadow
of doubt' upon the defendant's guilt." 95 Thus there is some ambiguity
as to whether the inquiry under Friendly's innocence standard should
be individualized or categorical. 96 As discussed in Part II of this Article, the Supreme Court has utilized it in both forms.
Despite his general belief that innocence should be the touchstone
for habeas review, Friendly proposes four exceptions to this rule: (1)
"cases where the attack concerns the very basis of the criminal process," including "all those in which the defendant claims he was without counsel to whom he was constitutionally entitled;" ' 97 (2) cases in
which the denial of constitutional rights is based on facts outside of
the record whose "effect on the judgment was not open to consideration and review on appeal;" 98 (3) cases "where the state has failed
to provide proper procedure for making a defense at trial and on
appeal;" 99 and (4) cases based on new constitutional developments
relating to criminal procedure that the Supreme Court has held should
have retroactive application.0 Beyond these "four important but limited lines of decision"' 01 1 collateral attack would be justified only if
10 2
invoked by one whose innocence was in doubt.
Commentators have noted that the basic approaches advocated
by Bator and Friendly are fundamentally inconsistent. 0 3 Bator's ap95. Id. at 163 (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 242 (1969)).
96. See Seidman, supra note 15, at 457 n.126.
97. Friendly, supra note 14, at 152. Other examples cited by Friendly include allegations of
racial discrimination in jury selection and claims that the jury was subjected to improper influences
by a court officer or had been overcome by excessive publicity. In these cases "the criminal
process itself has broken down; the defendant has not had the kind of trial the Constitution
guarantees." Id. at 151.
98. Id. at 152. Examples of situations- in which
[t]he original judgment is claimed to have been perverted, and collateral attack is the
only avenue for the defendant to vindicate his rights ... are convictions on pleas of
guilty obtained by improper means, or on evidence known by the prosecution to be
perjured, or where it later appears the defendant was incompetent to stand trial.
Id. (citations omitted).
99. Id. at 153.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 154.
102. The first three of these categories basically overlap with Bator's limitation of the writ
to situations involving failure of process and lack of jurisdiction. Bator's analysis does not
indicate how retroactive application of new constitutional rules would fit into his functional
analysis of the scope of the writ, although he certainly is aware of the retroactivity problem,
and, in fact, suggests that his "roving commission" justification for habeas might be useful as
a way to deal with that problem. See Bator, supra note 13, at 527 n.220. The Court had not
yet adopted its retroactivity doctrine at the time of Bator's article. See infra text accompanying
notes 262-269.
103. Seidman, supra note 15, at 458; see also Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1077-78
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proach focuses on process and argues that habeas relief should be
"geared to only those instances where the state's own mechanism for
adjudicating the claims presented in the habeas petition has been inadequate. ' ' 1 His theory constitutes a general attack on the idea of
relitigation: it is "a plea for certainty, finality and efficiency understood in linear terms," which is content free, and thus says nothing
about the nature of rights that are to exist or their relative ordering. 0 5
Friendly's approach focuses on result. It assumes "the basic goal of
the criminal justice system is to separate the guilty from the innocent
and that the flood of habeas petitions raising claims that are not guiltrelated is interfering with the realization of that goal." 10 6 It focuses
on the substance of claims presented and would substitute "for the
universal scope of Fay's solicitude for constitutional rights a preference for rights which are related to a trial's truth-finding proc07
ess."'1
The distinctive means and ends focuses of Bator and Friendly are
the products of the authors' differing positions regarding the ability
to determine truth. Bator makes his epistemological position explicit,
while Friendly's logically follows from his proposal:
whereas Judge Friendly wishes to limit habeas to questions of ultimate fact, Professor Bator wishes to limit habeas because questions
of ultimate fact are ultimately unanswerable. Whereas Judge Friendly's preoccupation with result leads him to denigrate the importance
of procedural regularity, Professor Bator's epistemological skepticism leads him to focus wholly on procedure. Judge Friendly's result
orientation argues for a willingness to relitigate factual determinations supporting a conviction; Professor Bator's doubt that any
procedures will ever resolve such issues to everyone's satisfaction
argues for the virtues of finality. For Judge Friendly, the petitioner's
factual guilt or innocence is crucial; for Professor Bator, it is unknowable and, therefore, in the end, irrelevant. 108
Yet, despite the inconsistency of their fundamental approaches
and their very different epistemological assumptions, the tension between a process-oriented approach and a result-oriented approach that
exists between the theories of Bator and Friendly is found within each
theory as well. As discussed above, Bator's "roving commission" justification for habeas is inconsistent with his own epistemological as(discussing inconsistency between the guilt versus innocence approach of Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1975), and the waiver approach of Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), and
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976)).
104. Seidman, supra note 15, at 458; see also Bator, supra note 13, at 455-59.

105. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1077.
106. Seidman, supra note 15, at 457.
107. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1077-78.
108.

Seidman, supra note 15, at 458.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42

sumptions because it assumes that habeas can be justified in terms
of the need to reach a "correct" result.'09 Similarly, Friendly's four
exceptions to his innocence requirement reflect a concern with process
that is not consistent with protection of the innocent as the purpose
of habeas jurisdiction."10
The logical inconsistency of Bator's and Friendly's proposals also
has not prevented the Court from combining them as rationales for
its decisions limiting habeas. Thus, an intellectual irrationality lies at
the heart of the Supreme Court decisions creating the new habeas.
Yet, to the extent this irrationality is hidden, the Court has used the
fundamental inconsistency of the two theories to its advantage. The
focus of the one theory on process and the other on result means that
decisions can be justified by the combination of the two theories in
a way that will satisfy those to whom either of those values is important. At the same time, the practical inconsistency between the two
positions means that their combination into a single test for the scope
of habeas jurisdiction allowed the Court to narrow habeas jurisdiction
much more than the use of either test alone would permit. Thus, the
Court's decisions in this area have a "have your cake and eat it too"
quality about them. Finality of state court determinations is achieved,
but through a rationale that appears to place value on assuring that
"justice," defined in terms of "innocence," is not lost in the process.
II.

The Cases: The Rhetoric of Innocence and the
Result of Finality

In a series of cases decided from 1975 to 1990, the Court chipped
away at, and eventually destroyed, the broad habeas jurisdiction of
Brown v. Allen"' and Fay v. Noia."12 Although the Burger Court's
first foray into this area focused on the nature of the right being asserted on habeas, the Burger Court's primary focus became eliminating constitutional claims from habeas review because of some
procedural defect in the way the claims were raised. Ultimately, it was
left to the Rehnquist Court to come up with a theory that would restrict habeas across-the-board through the formulation of a new retroactivity doctrine. Thus, the cases developing the new habeas are not
tied together by the legal doctrine they use to restrict habeas. What
binds them and makes them steps in a process of development is their
109.
110.
111.
112.

See
See
344
372

supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
Seidman, supra note 15, at 457 n.127.
U.S. 443 (1953).
U.S. 391 (1963).
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consistent use of the rhetoric of innocence to achieve the result of
finality of state court determinations of state prisoners' constitutional
claims.
A. Stone v. Powell and Guilt-Related Claims
The dual rationales of finality and innocence first were employed
3
by the Court to limit the scope of habeas review in Stone v. Powell.
In Stone, the Court held that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim,
the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial. ' 114 Justice
Powell's opinion for the Court focused on the nature of the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule as "a judicially created remedy designed
to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect,"1 15 rather than "a personal constitutional right. 11 6 As a remedial device, its application should be limited 'to those areas where
its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,"' 7 and
that determination should be made by "weighing the utility of the
exclusionary rule against the costs of extending it to collateral review
' 8
of Fourth Amendment claims.
The costs of the exclusionary rule stem from its role in thwarting
the truth-finding process: it deflects the truth-finding process by div~rting attention "from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence
that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding" and excludes evidence that "is typically reliable and often the most probative
information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant.""19
Thus, while the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful
police activity, the disparity "between the error committed by the
police officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the rule''120 in particular cases can generate instead disrespect "for the law and administration of justice."' 2'
To these costs of the exclusionary rule, the Stone Court added
the costs of federal habeas review itself. The majority found these
113.
114.

428 U.S. 465 (1975).
Id. at 482.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 486-87 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
Id. at 486.
Id. at 486-87 (quoting Calandra,414 U.S. at 348).
Id. at 489.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 491.
Id.
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costs substantial, especially when habeas review is used "for purposes
other than to assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty.' ' 22 The Court believed that federal habeas
review causes "serious intrusions on values important to our system
of government,' ' 23 including: "'(i) the most effective utilization of
limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials,
(iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state systems
balance upon
of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional
24
founded.""11
is
federalism
of
doctrine
the
which
The Court balanced these costs with the utility of the exclusionary rule, which the Court determined lay in its deterrent function. 25 Although it noted the "absence of supportive empirical
evidence" regarding the efficacy of the exclusionary rule, the Court
assumed that the exclusion of evidence has the immediate effect of
discouraging fourth amendment violations and, more importantly,
the long-term effect of encouraging those who formulate and implement law enforcement policies "to incorporate[] Fourth Amendment
1' 26
ideals into their value system.'
The Stone majority concluded that on balance these purposes are
sufficient to support application of the exclusionary rule at the trial
and appellate levels, but are insufficient to support its application in
federal habeas proceedings in light of the costs "to other values vital
to a rational system of criminal justice." 1 2 7 While acknowledging that
each consideration of a fourth amendment claim might increase
awareness of the values underlying the fourth amendment, the Court
did not believe that either the "overall educative effect" of the rule
or "any specific disincentive" created by the risk of exclusion of ev28
idence would be enhanced by application of the rule on habeas.
Similarly, the majority concluded that the need for habeas review
of fourth amendment claims was outweighed by the costs of that re122. Id. at-491 n.31.
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring)).
125. Id. at 492.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 493-94.
128. Id. at 493. According to the majority, it was "a dubious assumption [to think] that law
enforcement authorities would fear that federal habeas review might reveal flaws in a search or
seizure that went undetected at trial and on appeal." Id. "As the exclusionary rule is applied
time after time, it seems that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of diminishing
returns, and beyond that point its continued application is a public nuisance." Id. at 493 n.34
(quoting Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378,
389 (1964)).
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view. According to the Court, the costs of broad habeas review are
tolerated because of fear that an innocent party will suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty. 129 In the typical fourth amendment case,
however, "a convicted defendant is usually asking society to redetermine an issue that has no bearing on the basic justice of his incarceration." 30
Finally, the Stone Court rejected the argument that habeas review
of fourth amendment claims was necessary to assure a federal forum
for hearing ,those claims. Echoing Bator, the majority asserted that
this argument was based on "a basic mistrust of the state courts as
fair and competent forums for the adjudication of federal consti3
tutional rights," a mistrust that the Court did not share.1 '
The Stone holding results from an amalgam of Friendly's focus
on innocence and Bator's test for finality. The rhetoric of innocence
permeates the opinion: it supplies the "costs" of the exclusionary
rule, as well as the justification for habeas review. As Professor Seidman points out, however, the innocence focus fails to explain why
the Court should except fourth amendment claims in which the state
has not provided the opportunity for full and fair litigation of the
claim. 32 The failure of the state to provide an opportunity to litigate
the claim in state court does not change the fact that fourth amendment claims are not guilt-related. Nor can that exception be explained
in terms of the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule: it is unlikely
that a police officer would be more willing to commit a fourth amendment violation because she hoped that the state courts might subsequently fail to provide an opportunity to litigate the issue. 33 The
"full and fair litigation" exception articulated in the Stone majority
opinion is a process, not a result-oriented, rationale for habeas review. It is pure Bator. 34 Indeed, if one focuses on the result in Stoneno federal habeas corpus review of a claim, unless the state has failed
to provide an adequate process for its adjudication-then one can
easily see why Stone has been described as a combination of "Judge
' 35
Friendly's rhetoric with Professor Bator's test for finality.'
129.
130.
131.
attitude

Stone, 428 U.S. at 491 n.31.
Id.
Id. at 493 n.35. "Despite differences in institutional environment and the unsympathetic
to federal constitutional claims of some state judges in years past, we are unwilling to

assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in
the trial
132.
133.
134.
135.

and appellate courts of the several States." Id.
Seidman, supra note 15, at 456.
Id.
See id.at 458.
Id. Seidman states that the hearing requirement comes from Bator's idea that the
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In his dissenting opinion in Stone, Justice Brennan expressed concern that the majority's holding "portends substantial evisceration of
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. '1 3 6 Stone was in fact followed by
the predictable series of cases arguing that enforcement of other rights
in habeas proceedings should be restricted by analogy to Stone, 3 7 but
ultimately, a majority of the Court never coalesced to extend Stone
in a manner that would block habeas review of any other constitutional right. Nevertheless, Justice Brennan was not wrong in his prediction, for Stone represented a significant step toward the new habeas.
The Stone Court's use of a cost-benefit analysis to determine the
effective scope of habeas jurisdiction was a clear break with the manner in which habeas jurisdiction had been analyzed in the past. The
Court in Brown v. Allen 3 8 viewed relitigation of constitutional claims
raised in state criminal proceedings as the necessary consequence of
the congressional mandate that federal courts have the last say on
constitutional issues. 39 Congress could have left enforcement of federal constitutional rights exclusively to the state courts, as those courts
have the same duty to uphold the Constitution as the federal courts;
however, by extending habeas to defendants held in state custody as
a result of a state court judgment, Congress instead chose to give this
power ultimately to the federal courts. 40 According to the Brown
Court, the wisdom of that decision was for Congress to consider, not
the Court: "it is for th[e] Court to give fair effect to the habeas corpus
4
jurisdiction as enacted by Congress."' '
In Brown, concern for state interests could not alter this basic
duty. The Court noted that although the "[a]buse of the writ may
undermine the orderly administration of justice and therefore weaken
the forces of authority that are essential for civilization,' 4 42 abuses
by law enforcement agencies also occur and go unchecked even by
"central role for habeas corpus is not to assure that federal questions are correctly decided, but
to assure that they are decided by procedures calculated to reach a correct decision." Id. The
Stone Court's unwillingness to substitute federal judgment for that of the state stems from
"Bator's view that ultimate truths such as guilt and innocence can never be authoritatively
established and that federal oversight must therefore be limited to the assurance of fair procedures"
rather than "Judge Friendly's reluctance to use judicial resources for the benefit of a guilty
defendant." Id. at 459.
136. Stone, 428 U.S. at 503 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
137. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (ineffective assistance of counsel);
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (discrimination in selection of grand jury foreman); Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (insufficiency of the evidence).
138. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
139. Id. at 499-500 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
140. Id. at 499.
141. Id. at 500.
142. Id. at 512.
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the highest state courts. 143 The writ of habeas corpus thus serves a
144
critical function for "the moral health of our kind of society."'
Further, although most constitutional claims by state prisoners were
meritless and most were dealt with adequately by the state courts,
these facts did not indicate that redetermination of the merits of claims
should not be allowed. The fact that most habeas petitions were frivolous could not be a justification for establishing procedures that in
effect assumed that all were frivolous: "[t]he meritorious claims are
few, but our procedures must ensure .that those few claims are not
stifled by undiscriminating generalities." 45 The guilt of the petitioner'
also could not overcome the congressional mandate:
For surely it is an abuse to deal too casually and too lightly with
rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, even though they involve limitations upon State power and may be invoked by those
morally unworthy. Under the guise of fashioning a procedural rule,
we are not justified in wiping out the practical efficacy of a jurisdiction conferred by Congress on the District Courts. Rules which
in effect treat all these cases indiscriminately as frivolous
do not fall
46
far short of abolishing this head of jurisdiction.'
Similarly, the Court in Fay v. Noia'47 viewed habeas jurisdiction as
evidencing "a clear congressional policy of affording a federal forum
for the determination of the federal claims of state criminal defendants."' 4 Habeas jurisdiction was invoked by the mere allegation of
49
a violation of a constitutional right.
While the decisions in Brown and Fay focused on congressional
intent and enforcement of rights, Stone focused on discretionary judicial control and utilitarian justification of rights. The rule established in Stone was "not concerned with the scope of the habeas corpus
statute as authority for litigating constitutional claims generally," and
did not "mean that the federal court lacks jurisdiction over such a
claim, but only that the application of the rule is limited to cases in
which there has been both such a showing and a Fourth Amendment
violation.' 150 Stone thus established a discretionary doctrine, similar
to an abstention doctrine, that left the congressional mandate un143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 510-12.
Id. at 512.
Id. at 497-99.
Id. at 498-99.
372 U.S. 391 (1963).
Id. at 418.
Id. at 426. The availability of "habeas corpus in the federal courts for persons in the

custody of the States offends no legitimate state interest in the enforcement of criminal justice
or procedure." Id. at 440.
150. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 495 n.37 (1975) (emphasis omitted).
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touched, but also irrelevant. This focus on discretionary limits on
habeas jurisdiction subsequently became a hallmark of the Court's
decisions limiting the scope of habeas review. As discussed in Part
IV, this technique allowed proponents of the new habeas to place
effective limits on habeas jurisdiction without directly addressing the
inherent inconsistency between those limits and the Court's previous
interpretations of the congressional intent behind 28 U.S.C. § 2254
in Brown and Fay.'5
Further, the Stone Court demanded a utilitarian justification before a right would be enforced in habeas proceedings: if the right did
not further the truth finding process, then its enforcement on habeas
must further some other goal, such as deterrence, in order to rationalize the attendant infringement upon state interests caused by the
enforcement of constitutional rights in habeas proceedings. 5 2 The
Stone analysis thus represented a shift in focus from the discourse
of rights, to the discourse of interests;15 3 a shift in focus that was
borne out in the Court's subsequent decisions with serious conse54
quences for the Court's philosophy of rights.'
Stone also rejected the idea that "federal habeas relief is available
to redress any denial of asserted constitutional rights, whether or not
denial of the right affected the truth or fairness of the factfinding
process."' 55 Instead, its view of habeas as primarily intended to protect innocent defendants seems to "be based upon the idea that the
remedial form-habeas corpus-has a substantive integrity;"' 5 6 that
habeas protects the innocent, while other constitutional values are
protected by other remedial devices-in the case of the fourth amend151. See id. at 519-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Stone went against the import of decisions
like Brown, Fay, and Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), which considered and
rejected the policies relating to judicial resources and federalism relied upon by the Court.).
Justice Brennan stated:
[These were] reasoned decisions that those policies were an insufficient justification for
shutting the federal habeas door to litigants with federal constitutional claims in light
of such countervailing considerations as "the necessity that federal courts have the
'last say' with respect to questions of federal law, the inadequacy of state procedures
to raise and preserve federal claims, the concern that state judges may be unsympathetic
to federally created rights, [and] the institutional constraints on the exercise of this
Court's certiorari jurisdiction to review state convictions" as well as the fundamental
belief "that adequate protection of constitutional rights relating to the criminal trial
process requires the continuing availability of a mechanism for relief."
Id. at 520 (citations omitted).
152. See id. at 490-95 (majority opinion).
153. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1091.
154. See infra Part IV.
155. Stone, 428 U.S. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
156. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1086.
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ment, by state court enforcement and the Court's certiorari jurisdiction on direct review. 157 This denial of the trans-substantive nature
of habeas review in favor of tests based on the nature of the constitutional claim also characterizes the new habeas and has had serious
consequences for the concept of the- neutrality of procedure. 5
Stone thus became a precedent to be dealt with. It neither has
been extended nor overruled. Instead, it has been distinguished and
confined to situations coming within its particular holding.' 5 9 Yet, in
distinguishing it, the Court was forced to deal with its "gravitational
force" and to'explain why subsequent cases were not "like cases"
that should come within its rule. '6 Thus, through the very act of distinguishing it, the Court dealt with Stone on its own terms, thereby
confirming its basic premises, so very different from those of Brown
and Fay. Stone therefore fundamentally altered the analysis of the
scope of habeas jurisdiction and set the stage for the new habeas. The
Court used the methodology developed in Stone in its subsequent decisions to limit habeas review. Use of the rhetoric of innocence to
reach the result of finality through the development of discretionary
limits on habeas review became the standard mode of analysis utilized
by proponents of the new habeas.
B. Factual Innocence and Waiver
Stone made innocence relevant with regard to the nature of particular constitutional claims: the Court disfavored fourth amendment
claims because they did not further the truth-finding process. Although the Court doubted that defendants asserting fourth amendment claims were innocent, it made no individualized inquiry to
determine if that was in fact the case. Judge Friendly's proposal, however, focused on whether the prisoner raising the constitutional claim
was in fact innocent, not on whether the constitutional claim raised
was guilt-related. Proponents of the new habeas used this factual innocence approach to limit habeas review in cases involving both procedural bar and successive habeas petitions.
(1) ProceduralBar
Both Professor Bator and Judge Friendly developed their theories
in the context of a defendant petitioning a federal court to relitigate
157.
158.

Id.
See infra Part IV.

159. See supra text accompanying note 137.
160. See R. Dwoaxw, TAKmNG Rxmois Smuousl.y 111-13 (1977) (precedent has not only an
enactment force, based on the interpretation of its precise holding, but a gravitational force
grounded in the fairness of treating like cases alike).
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a constitutional claim that was decided against her on the merits in
the state courts. 161 Another significant issue that arises in federal habeas review of state court proceedings is the appropriateness of federal review of the merits of constitutional claims when state courts
have refused to consider the merits because the claims were waived
under state law through failure to comply with state procedural rules
governing the manner in which they should be raised. Should federal
habeas review of the merits of constitutional claims be affected by
a state court's refusal to consider the claims because of the petitioner's procedural default under state law?
6 2
The Court addressed this question in Fay v. Noia.1
The petitioner in Fay was denied relief in the state courts because he failed
to pursue an appeal of his conviction. 63 The Fay Court held that the
state's refusal to hear the merits of a claim based on procedural default did not affect the jurisdiction of the federal habeas court to
consider the merits of the constitutional claim. 164 The Court stated
that "conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be
permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review,' ' 6 5 and "[s]tate
procedural rules plainly must yield to this overriding federal pol66
icy.'1'
Nevertheless, the Fay Court recognized a limited discretion in the
federal habeas court to decline consideration of the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim based on principles of comity, equity, and
federalism. 167 The Court therefore held that "the federal habeas judge
may in his discretion deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately
by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing
has forfeited his state court remedies.' 16 8
The Court believed that this deliberate by-pass standard was sufficient to meet the "exigencies of federalism" in the form of the state's
interest in the orderly administration of its criminal process:
A man under conviction for crime has an obvious inducement to
do his very best to keep his state remedies open, and not stake his
161. Bator expressly stated that he did not plan "to deal with the vexing question whether a
state prisoner who fails to raise his federal contentions in accordance with state procedural law
loses his right to raise them on federal habeas corpus." Bator, supra note 13, at 444.
162. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
163. Id. at 394, 399.
164. Id. at 434.
165. Id. at 424.
166. Id. at 426-27.
167. Id. at 424-26.
168. Id. at 438.
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all on the outcome of a federal habeas proceeding, which, in many
respects, may be less advantageous to him than a state court proceeding. And if because of inadvertence or neglect he runs afoul of
a state procedural requirement, and thereby forfeits his state remedies, appellate and collateral, as well as direct review thereof in this
Court, those consequences should be sufficient to vindicate the State's
valid interest in orderly procedure. Whatever residuum of state interest there may be under such circumstances is manifestly insufficient in the face of the federal policy, drawn from the ancient
principles of the writ of habeas corpus, embodied both in the Federal
Constitution and in the habeas corpus provisions of the Judicial Code,
and consistently upheld by this Court, of affording
an effective rem69
edy for restraints contrary to the Constitution.
Although the Court never has departed from Fay's holding that
federal habeas courts have the power to hear defaulted constitutional.
claims, it subsequently rejected the Fay intentional by-pass standard
as the appropriate standard for the federal habeas court's exercise of
its discretion to deny review. In Wainwright v. Sykes, 170 the Court
held that a petitioner whose constitutional claim was held procedurally barred in the state courts could not obtain federal habeas review
of the defaulted claim unless he could show both cause for the default
17
and actual prejudice as a result. 1
The Sykes Court found that the intentional by-pass standard accorded too little respect to state procedural rules and might encourage
lawyers to sandbag-to "take their chances on a verdict of not guilty
in a state trial court with the intent to raise their constitutional claims
in a federal habeas court if their initial gamble does not pay off."' 72
Failure to enforce state procedural rules in habeas proceedings also
detracted from the state court trial "as a decisive and portentous
event" in the criminal process, as the time and place at which society's
resources are concentrated to decide the defendant's guilt or innocence. 7 1 State procedural rules such as the contemporary objection
rule invoked in Sykes encourage "the result that those proceedings
be as free of error as possible" and, thus, are "thoroughly desirable." 1 74 The stricter cause and prejudice standard would "have the
salutary effect of making the state trial on the merits the 'main event'
... rather than a 'tryout on the road' for what will later be the de175
terminative federal habeas hearing."'
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 433-34.
433 U.S. 72 (1977).
- Id.at 87.
Id.at 89.
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id. The Sykes Court expressed its confidence that the cause and prejudice standard
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Sykes and Stone share a preference for finality based on concern
for the interests of the state. Sykes also echoes the rhetoric of innocence, both in the Court's emphasis on the need for a stricter procedural bar rule to ensure that the trial as to guilt or innocence is the
focus of the criminal proceedings, and in its emphasis on state procedural rules as furthering the goal of error-free proceedings. Yet, the
concept of waiver that underlies procedural bar is inconsistent with
the idea that habeas protects against incarceration of the innocent.
Waiver is a general attack on the idea of relitigation and is content
free-it bars claims without regard to their relation to the defendant's
guilt. 176 As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Sykes, the Court's
emphasis on guilt in Stone was inconsistent with allowing "an unintentional procedural default . . . to stand in the way of vindication
of constitutional rights bearing upon the guilt or innocence of a de177
fendant."
Thus, in the procedural bar cases the focus on finality seems predominant. Further, the definition of finality created by application
of the Sykes rule reflects Bator's test for finality. The Sykes Court
indicated that to establish "cause" for a procedural default, the petitioner must establish either ineffective assistance of counsel or "some
external impediment preventing counsel from constructing or raising
the claim.' ' 7 8 Therefore, although the Court has not limited "cause"
to situations of failure of process, 79 the general concept behind
"cause" is similar to Bator's philosophy: finality of state court determinations should be disturbed only when there is some justification
for doing so beyond mere reconsideration of the decision made by
the state court.
Despite the predominance of finality, the innocence standard has
found its way into the Court's procedural bar cases as well. In Murray
8 0 the
v. Carrier,
Court confirmed that the cause and prejudice standard "is fully applicable to constitutional claims that call into question the reliability of an adjudication of legal guilt."'' Yet Carrier
also established a connection between procedural bar and innocence,
would "afford an adequate guarantee ... that the rule will not prevent a federal habeas court
from adjudicating for the first time the federal constitutional claim of a defendant who in the
absence of such an adjudication will be the victim of a miscarriage of justice." Id. at 90-91.
176. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note I1, at 1077.
177. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 110 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986).
179. See, e.g., Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1984) ("where a constitutional claim is so
novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel, a defendant has cause for his
failure to raise the claim in accordance with applicable state procedures").
180. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
181. Id. at 495; accord Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982).
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as the Court acknowledged that '[i]n appropriate cases' the principles of comity and finality that inform the concepts of cause and
prejudice 'must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally
unjust incarceration."1 8 2 The CarrierCourt expressed its confidence
that those whose incarcerations were the result of 'a fundamental
miscarriage of justice would meet the cause-and-prejudice standard,"'
but also recognized that this would not always be the case.'83 Therefore, the Court stated that "in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one
who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ
even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default.' ' 8 4 Thus, while a claim related to the reliability of the determination of "legal guilt" would not excuse compliance with the Sykes
cause and prejudice test, a showing of the probability of actual innocence would.
This focus on the factual innocence of particular. petitioners has
consequences significantly different from those that arise from use
of the categorical approach of Stone v. Powell.18 While the categorical approach, if applied affirmatively, would allow consideration
of habeas claims that Bator would not have allowed because there
was no failure of process in the state courts' adjudication, the categorical approach is consistent with Bator's epistemological position
that the truth is unknowable. It simply involves prioritizing the rights
that will receive a certain amount of process. 8 6 Further, because these
"guilt-related" constitutional rights are themselves rights governing
the procedure by which states must conduct their process of criminal
adjudication, the very existence of these rights underlines and affirms
a belief in the importance of process. A categorical approach, however, eliminates the innocence standard's chief attraction because, if
availability of habeas turns on the nature of the claim, "it can no
longer be said that the Writ has been reserved for those who are factually innocent.' 1 87 Innocent defendants could be denied relief if they
raised the wrong kind of constitutional claim, whereas guilty defendants could obtain relief if they raised a guilt-related claim. 188
182.
183.
184.
185.

Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495 (quoting Engle, 456 U.S. at 135).
Id.
Id. at 496.
428 U.S. 465 (1975).

186. Cf. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1089-90 (If the categorical approach is utilized,
the concern would be "with the systemic relations of rights to guilt/innocence judgments" and
would "entail drawing distinctions between alternative formulations of rights which either do or
do not have the requisite connection to guilt/innocence.").
187. Seidman, supra note 15, at 457 n.126.
188.

Id.
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On the other hand, an inquiry into the actual, factual innocence
of a particular state prisoner is entirely contrary to both Bator's epistemological position and his concomitant focus on the adequacy of
process. The underlying assumption of a factual innocence standard
is that the truth can be discovered, and, therefore, that finality need
not be created artificially by satisfactory process, but will result from
a decision that is true in some ultimate sense. A factual innocence
standard thus rejects the notion that an inquiry into the fairness of
legal determinations must focus on the adequacy of process because
a court is simply incompetent to ever know whether the result reached
is "adequate." Indeed, the innocence standard denigrates the importance of process by suggesting that, although a prisoner has been
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after a process that the Court
considers adequate, the prisoner still can prove her innocence.
The shift in the procedural bar cases from a focus on process
to a focus on result (accomplished by shifting attention from the guiltrelatedness of claims to the factual innocence of petitioners) is a masterful rhetorical manoeuvre on the Court's part. After all, the procedural bar cases deal with situations in which process for the
adjudication of the merits of constitutional claims is completely denied. The state courts have refused to adjudicate the merits of the
petitioner's constitutional claims because of her failure to comply with
state procedural rules. The federal courts will refuse to hear the claims
as well-even if the claims are meritorious, even if they are guilt-related, and even if the result of the trial might have been different if
the alleged constitutional error had not occurred-unless the petitioner also can establish cause for her attorney's failure to raise the
claims in the appropriate manner in the state proceedings.8 9 Further,
what probably is the most common cause of such failures-attorney
mistake or inadvertence-is insufficient to establish cause, unless it
rises to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel, ' 9 a level to which
relatively few such mistakes ascend.' 9' Thus, if the Court provides an
189. Cf. Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. Rav. 837, 891 (1984) ("Be the judgments of defense
attorneys, judges, prosecutors, or police good or bad; be the processes by which state courts and
their police, judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys arrive at decisions constitutional or
unconstitutional; federal courts today are generally not permitted to consider a state prisoner's
claim of constitutional error unless the prisoner had the foresight or luck to be represented by
an informed attorney who raised a claim of illegality at trial.").
190. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986).
191. Cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 104 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("any realistic
system of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction must be premised on the reality that the ordinary
procedural default is born of the inadvertence, negligence, inexperience, or incompetence of trial
counsel," a reality Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), recognized by refusing "to credit what is
essentially a lawyer's mistake as a forfeiture of constitutional rights").
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"out" for the petitioner that focuses on the result of hearing the claims
of the innocent, that seems to make what otherwise appears to be an
extremely harsh forfeiture rule much more palatable.
Use of the factual innocence standard, however, has its problems.
First, a focus on factual innocence is inconsistent with the habeas
court's jurisdictional grant, which extends only to allegations of custody in violation of the Constitution. 192 What if the Court determined
that the petitioner was innocent, heard her constitutional claim, and
determined that it was without merit? What does the Court do then?
Create a constitutional right not to be convicted if innocent? "If...
the result ought to turn on the ultimate question of factual guilt, then
it is hard to see why the availability of relief should depend on the
fortuity of a procedural violation."' 193
Second, how does a federal district court on habeas, let alone
the Supreme Court on certiorari review, determine the factual innocence of a petitioner who has been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury of her peers? In other words, by what other
means than accepted adjudicatory process or gut feeling can one determine the truth? Bator's epistemological skepticism 'is sufficiently
ingrained in our world view that we are unlikely to think that a federal
district judge or five members of the Supreme Court necessarily have
a better handle on ultimate truth than a twelve-person jury. It is simply impossible to think of factual determinations that have legal import outside the context of an accepted process for reaching them.
Would the standard require the federal district court considering the
habeas petition to conduct a second trial "with federal judges redetermining questions of ultimate fact traditionally thought to be the
exclusive province of state juries"? 194 This hardly would comport with
either the goal of finality or the comity considerations upon which
procedural bar is based.
More likely, the inquiry "would degenerate into a weaker variant
of the harmless error rule, [as t]he Court's focus would almost certainly be upon the particular facts and the weight of the evidence."' 95
This seems to be what Friendly had in mind. 196 This type of inquiry,
192. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988).
193. Seidman, supra note 15, at 457 n.126.
194. Id.; cf. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 471 n.7 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(The factual innocence standard "requires the federal courts to function in much the same
capacity as the state trier of fact-the federal courts must make a rough decision on the question
of guilt or innocence. This requirement diverts the federal courts from the central purpose of
habeas review-the evaluation of claims that convictions were obtained in violation of the

Constitution.").
195.
196.

Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1089.'
See supra text accompanying notes 91-96.
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however, would not be an inquiry into actual innocence, but rather
into the adequacy of the record to convict. 197 It thus would move the
inquiry back into the realm of process. Further, while the inquiry
might be similar to that for harmless error (except with its focus on
the likelihood of innocence rather than on the likelihood of a different
result) it differs from the harmless error inquiry in two important
respects. First, if Friendly's test were followed, any evidence admitted
as a result of the alleged constitutional error would be considered in
making the determination; and second, and more importantly, instead
of the state having to establish the harmlessness of the error beyond
a reasonable doubt, the petitioner would have the burden of proof
to show factual innocence. 198
Finally, the factual innocence standard shares with its categorical
cousin an assumption that the only values worthy of habeas protection are those relating to the reliability of the determination of guilt,
although other values in fact exist. 99 Thus, for instance, the factual
innocence standard cannot be applied in any meaningful way to challenges that relate not to the determination of guilt, but to constitutional errors occurring in the sentencing phase of a death penalty
case. In those cases, the sentence imposed-not the conviction-is
challenged, and the relief sought would not require retrial of the petitioner, but rather resentencing. "Guilt or innocence is irrelevant in
that context; rather, there is only a decision made by representatives
of the community whether the prisoner shall live or die. ' ' 200 Thus, the
actual guilt of the petitioner seems totally inappropriate as the standard for determining whether manifest injustice will occur if the Court
denies federal habeas review of a petitioner's challenge to her death
sentence.
197. The Court has stressed that the actual innocence concept relates to "actual," not "legal"
innocence. Smith-v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986).
198. Cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 98 (1977) (White, J., concurring). Justice White
argues that the prejudice prong of the Sykes test is not needed because of the harmless error
doctrine and expresses concern that the prejudice requirement shifts the burden of proof to the
defendant: "I see little if any warrant, having in mind the State's burden of proof, not to insist
upon a showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt," for "[als long as there
is acceptable cause for the defendant's not objecting to the evidence, there should not be shifted
to him the burden of proving specific prejudice to the satisfaction of the habeas corpus judge."
Id. This distinction between the harmless error doctrine and the innocence standard was brought
to my attention by Professor Joel H. Swift.
199. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 545 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Court's
exaltation of accuracy as the only characteristic of 'fundamental fairness' is deeply flawed"
because "[o]ur criminal justice system, and our Constitution, protect other values in addition to
the reliability of the guilt or innocence determination, and the statutory duty to serve 'law and
justice' should similarly reflect those values.").
200. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 471 n.7 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Despite these problems with the factual innocence standard, the
Court has continued to apply it as the standard for manifest injustice,
and in Smith v. Murray,201 did so in the context of a death sentence
challeige. The petitioner in Smith invoked the fifth amendment right
-against self-incrimination to challenge the introduction at the sentencing phase of his capital trial of testimony of a psychiatrist to whom
the petitioner had talked without being informed that what he said
subsequently could be introduced against him. 20 2 After determining
that Smith had failed to establish cause for his attorney's failure to
raise the claim on appeal, the Court considered whether failure to
hear the merits of Smith's claim would result in a fundamental injustice under the factual innocence standard. 20 3 While acknowledging
that the concept of actual innocence "does not translate easily into
the context of an alleged error at the sentencing phase of a trial on
a capital offense," the Court nevertheless applied that standard to
find that no fundamental miscarriage of justice would result. 204 The
Court rejected
the suggestion that there is anything "fundamentally unfair" about
enforcing procedural default rules in cases devoid of any substantial
claim that the alleged error undermined the accuracy of the guilt or
sentencing determination. In view of the profound societal costs that
attend the exercise of habeas jurisdiction, such exercise "carries a
serious burden of justification." When the alleged error is unrelated
to innocence, and when the defendant was represented by competent
counsel, had a full and fair opportunity to press his claim in the state
system, and yet failed to do so in violation of
a legitimate rule of
205
procedure, that burden has not been carried.
Smith thus established a test for the actual innocence standard
that looked at whether "the alleged error undermined the accuracy
of the guilt or sentencing determination."' 206 That test, however, returns the focus of inquiry to the type of error alleged, a result that
201.

477 U.S. 527 (1986).

202. Id. at 530.
203. Id. at 536-37.
204. The Court stated:
There is no allegation that the testimony... was false or in any way misleading. Nor

can it be argued that the prospect that [the psychiatrist] might later testify against him
had the effect of foreclosing meaningful exploration of psychiatric defenses .... In

short, the alleged constitutional error neither precluded the development of true facts
nor resulted in the admission of false ones. Thus, even assuming that, as a legal
matter, [the] testimony should not have been presented to the jury, its admission did
not serve to pervert the jury's deliberations concerning the ultimate question whether
in fact petitioner constituted a continuing threat to society.
Id. at 537-38 (citations omitted).
205. Id. at 538-39 (qtioting Friendiy, supra note 14, at 146).

206. Id.
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is not surprising, given the epistemological and other difficulties inherent in a standard that focuses instead on an individual determination of ultimate fact. But a focus on the type of claim alleged
ultimately returns one to a focus on process.
In Dugger v. Adams,20 7 the Court once again addressed the question of what constitutes a fundamental miscarriage of justice that will
allow consideration of an alleged error in the sentencing phase of a
capital case. While the Smith Court emphasized that "the alleged constitutionalerror neither precluded the development of true facts nor
resulted in the admission of false ones,' '208 in finding no fundamental
miscarriage of justice, the Adams Court made it clear that, whatever
the factual innocence test might mean, it was not satisfied by a constitutional claim that challenges the reliability of the sentencing determination.
In Adams, the constitutional claim was that the state trial judge
had misinformed the jury as to its role in the sentencing process. The
judge told the jurors that he was free to disregard the jury's recommendation with regard to life or death, when in fact he could overturn the jury's determination only if he found that no reasonable jury
could have reached that conclusion as to the appropriate sentence. 2°9
The sentencing decision had been a close one, with the trial judge
finding an equal number of aggravating and mitigating circumdissented on
stances. 210 Further, two state supreme court justices had
21
direct appeal from imposition of the death sentence.
Prior to its decision in Adams, the Court in Caldwell v.
Mississipp 22 had held it constitutionally impermissible under the eighth
amendment to rest a death sentence on a determination by a sentencer
who has been led to believe that responsibility for determining appropriateness of the death sentence rests elsewhere. 213 The Caldwell
Court found that the false belief that responsibility for the sentence
rested elsewhere created "substantial unreliability as well as bias in
favor of death sentences, ' 2 1 4 and, thus, an "unacceptable risk that
the death sentence may have been 'meted out arbitrarily or capriciously." 2 15 The court of appeals had found a clear violation of Cald216
well in Adams's case.
207. 489 U.S. 401 (1989).
208. Smith, 477 U.S. at 538 (emphasis added).
209. Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526, 1528 (11th Cir. 1986).
210. Adams, 489 U.S. at 423 n.14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
211. Id.
212. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
213. Id. at 328-29.
214. Id. at 330.
215. Id. at 343 (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999 (1983)).
216. Adams, 489 U.S. at 413 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court found the court of appeals erred in holding
that Adams had established cause for the failure to raise his claim
in state court. 2 17 It then summarily rejected the argument that, because
a Caldwell violation goes to the reliability of the jury's determination
that the petitioner should be sentenced to death, a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from failure to hear the claim. Noting
that cases in which a writ is granted in spite of a procedural default
were intended to be "extraordinary," and the "difficulty of translating the concept of 'actual' innocence from the guilt phase to the
sentencing phase of a capital trial," the Court stated:
We do not undertake here to define what it means to be "actually
innocent" of a death sentence. But it is clear to us that the fact that
the trial judge in this case found an equal number of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances is not sufficient to show that an alleged
error in instructing the jury on sentencing resulted in a fundamental
miscarriage of justice.
The dissent "assumes arguendo" that a fundamental miscarriage of justice results whenever "there is a substantial claim that
the constitutional violation undermined the accuracy of the sentencing decision." According to the dissent, since "the very essence
of a Caldwell claim is that the accuracy of the sentencing determination has been unconstitutionally undermined," the standard for
showing a fundamental miscarriage of justice necessarily is satisfied.
We reject this overbroad view. Demonstrating that an error is by
its nature the kind of error that might have affected the accuracy
of a death sentence is far from demonstrating that an individual
defendant probably is "actually innocent" of the sentence he or she
received. The approach taken by the dissent would turn the case in
which an error results in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the
"extraordinary case," into an all too ordinary one. 218
The Court thus indicated that somehow a petitioner challenging
her death sentence must make a factual demonstration that she is
probably "actually innocent" of that sentence, although the Court
did not give any guidance as to how a petitioner could make that
showing. Whether the petitioner committed the crime with which she
is charged is a question of fact that has, at least theoretically, one
true, discoverable answer. The decision whether the petitioner's crime
was sufficiently heinous that she should die, although made in light
of facts, is not, other than in some technical sense, a decision of ultimate fact at all. Rather, it is a moral judgment of the community. 219
How can one possibly suggest this moral judgment is wrong in any
217. 'd. at 406.
218. Id. at 412 n.6 (quoting id. at 415 n.4, 423 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
219. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2947 (1989) (quoting California v. Brown,
479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)) (" 'the sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned
moral response to the defendant's background, character, and crime' ").
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way other than by showing an error in the process by which it was
made?
The dissenters in Adams argued that the Court in effect had overruled the test for factual innocence established in Smith. 220 Certainly,
it is hard to reconcile that test with the result in Adams. As Justice
Blackmun pointed out, "the very essence of a Caldwell claim is that
the accuracy of the sentencing determination has been unconstitutionally undermined," and thus it would appear that Adams's claim
necessarily would meet the Smith requirements. 22, Indeed, the error
alleged by Adams concerned "a detailed and repeated explanation of
the jury's [lack of] responsibility ... in the sentencing process," and
thus was "global in scope: it necessarily pervades the entire sentencing
222
process" and "could not help but pervert the sentencing decision."
The Adams majority opinion does not respond to this argument;
223
indeed, it does not even attempt to reconcile Smith and Adams.
While the Court notes "the difficulty of translating the concept of
'actual' innocence from the guilt phase to the sentencing phase of a
capital trial," it feels no need to "undertake here to define what it
means to be 'actually innocent' of a death sentence. ' 224 Indeed, the
225
Court's entire discussion of this issue is contained in a footnote.
Further, the rationale that the Court does give is a blatant exercise in instrumentalism. The existence of an unacceptable level of
unreliability in the sentencing decision when a Caldwell violation has
occurred does not result in a miscarriage of justice because, if the
Court held that it did, that would allow federal habeas courts to hear
too many defaulted claims. As the Court states, it "would turn the
of justice,
case in which an error results in a fundamental miscarriage
'226
the 'extraordinary case,' into an all too ordinary one.
The Adams Court in effect takes the weaknesses of the factual
innocence standard as a measure for when a fundamental miscarriage
220. Adams, 489 U.S. at 424 (Blackmun, J., dissenting joined by Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens, JJ.).
221. Id. at 423-24.
222. Id. at 423.
223. Indeed, it seems the only way to reconcile these two decisions would be to say that a
miscarriage of justice occurs at the sentencing stage if a constitutional error results in the exclusion
of a particular piece of relevant evidence or the inclusion of false evidence, but does not occur
when, instead of perverting the consideration of one factual detail, the error perverts the entire
decisional process. A test for a fundamental miscarriage of justice that leads to these results is
illogical.
224. Adams, 489 U.S. at 412 n.6.
225. See id.
226. Id. One wonders how any case can be ordinary when it involves an unacceptable level
of unreliability as to the decision to execute a human being.
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of justice occurs and, by refusing to address these weaknesses, turns
them to its advantage. The difficulty of making the requisite innocence showing, because of the epistemological difficulties and lack
of any rational relationship between actual innocence and error in the
sentencing phase of a death penalty case, makes the standard all the
more effective in achieving the finality that lies at the heart of waiver
doctrines. As Justice Blackmun explains:
By refusing to apply [the Smith] standard, the Court today effectively discards its own opinion in Smith. Yet, in also refusing to
define "actual innocence" in the sentencing context, the Court offers nothing in its place. In this way, the Court both leaves the law
in shambles and reinstates respondent's death sentence without ever
bothering to determine what legal principle actually governs his
case.227
As in Stone v. Powell,-8 the Court in the procedural bar cases has
combined Bator's focus on process and Friendly's focus on innocence
to achieve the result of finality through the rhetoric of innocence.
(2) Successive Petitions
A plurality of the Court also has proposed the factual innocence
standard as the test for determining when a successive habeas petition
should be heard. A successive petition is one that "raises grounds
identical to those raised and rejected on the merits on a prior petition.'' 229 The standard for determining whether to hear a successive
petition was established in 1963 in Sanders v. United States.230 In Sanders, the Court held that a successive petition need not be entertained
if the "ends of justice" would not be served by reconsideration of
the claim. 231 The Sanders Court did not attempt to define "ends of
justice"; instead, it left this determination "to the sound discretion
of federal trial judges"232 because of the Court's belief that the phrase's
meaning should not be "too finely particularized."' 233
In Kuhlmann v. Wilson,24 a plurality of the Court proposed that
"ends of justice" should be given a more definite content-the ends
of justice should require a federal court to entertain a successive petition only "where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim
227. Id. at 424 n.15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

428 U.S. 465 (1975).
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6 (1986).
373 U.S. 1 (1963).
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 17.
477 U.S. 436 (1986).
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with a colorable showing of factual innocence. ' 23 5 Unlike the majority in Murray v. Carrier,23 6 which did not attempt to justify adoption of factual innocence as the standard for manifest injustice, the
Kuhlmann plurality engaged in a balancing approach similar to the
37 to justify equation
one utilized in Stone v. PowelP
of the ends of
justice with actual innocence.
Justice Powell, writing for the Kuhlmann plurality, argued that
both Stone and Fay v. Noia238 supported the proposition that the Court
had never "defined the scope of the writ simply by reference to a
perceived need to assure that an individual accused of crime is afforded a trial free of constitutional error. ' 23 9 Rather, the Court "has
performed its statutory task through a sensitive weighing of the interests implicated by federal habeas corpus adjudication of constitutional claims determined adversely to the prisoner by the state
courts. "240 According to Justice Powell, the Court in Fay, as much
as in Stone, engaged in 'a practical appraisal of the state interest'
... . weighing that interest against the other interests implicated by
federal collateral review. ' 241 That the Fay Court's appraisal led it to
adopt "an expansive reading of the scope of the writ does not un' 242
dercut the fact that it did so by balancing competing interests.
Justice Powell's weighing of the interests led him to conclude that the
petitioner's interest in having a claim reconsidered outweighed the
state's interest in maintaining finality of the prior judgment only when
the petitioner could make a colorable showing of factual innocence
to supplement her constitutional claim. 243
Like the Carriermajority, the Kuhlmann plurality sought to employ the innocence standard to further the interests of finality of state
court determinations. Petitioners do not file successive habeas petitions because they are innocent; indeed, as discussed above, innocence
is not a ground for obtaining habeas relief. Rather, successive petitions are filed because of changed circumstances that could alter the
habeas court's previous determination of the issue: newly-discovered
evidence or, as in Kuhlmann, a change in the applicable legal standards. 2" Thus, like the Carriermajority, the Kuhlmann plurality was
235. Id. at 454.
236. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
237. 428 U.S. 465 (1975).
238. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
239. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 447-48.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 448 n.8 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 433 (1963)).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 454.
244. See id. at 442.
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seeking to establish as the sole measure for habeas review a standard
that had little or no relevance to the issue at hand.
Further, in both Carrier and Kuhlmann the Court utilized the
rhetoric of innocence to eliminate the equitable discretion of the district courts in the guise of merely channeling it. Justice Brennan's
dissent in Kuhlmann noted that the plurality was not seeking to elucidate the ends of justice standard enunciated in Sanders v. United
States,245 which had been purposefully left open-ended in that decision, but rather to "replace discretion with a-single legal standardactual innocence." 2 He might have gone on to point out that, because that single standard was one essentially unrelated to the issue
at hand, the standard was likely to leave the district courts with no
choice other than the result of finality in most cases.247
245. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
246. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 462, 463 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
247. Use of an innocence standard when a new claim is presented for the first time in a
second petition was proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital
Cases. Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed the committee, with retired Justice Powell as its chair,
"to inquire into 'the necessity and desirability of legislation directed toward avoiding delay and
the lack of finality' in capital cases in which the prisoner had or had been offered counsel."
Comm. Rep., Ad Hoc Comm. on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 45 Crim. L. Rep.
(BNA) 3239, 3239 (Sept. 27, 1989) [hereinafter Powell Commission Report]. The underlying
premise of the Powell Commission's recommendations, issued on September 21, 1989, is that
"[clapital cases should be subject to one complete and fair course of collateral review in the
state and federal system, free from the time pressure of impending execution, and with the
assistance of competent counsel for the defendant," and "[w]hen this review has concluded,
litigation should end." Id. at 3240. As part of the proposed legislative scheme to carry out'this
purpose, the Powell Commission Report proposed § 2257, which would limit the federal habeas
court's ability to hear a second petition by a death penalty prisoner to situations meeting three
requirements: (1) the claim raised was one not previously presented in the state or federal courts;
(2) the failure to raise the claim in the first petition was the result of unconstitutional action by
the state, Supreme Court recognition of a new federal right that is applicable retroactively, or
subsequent discovery of facts that could not have been discovered previously through reasonable
diligence; and (3) "[t]he facts underlying the claim would be sufficient, if proven, to undermine
the court's confidence in the jury's determination of guilt on the offense or offenses for which
the death penalty was imposed." Id. 3242-43. The Powell Commission acknowledged that
requiring a claim to call into doubt the petitioner's guilt would exclude any challenges to the
sentencing phase in a death penalty case:
In the Committee's view, if there is any doubt about the sentencing phase of a capital
case, it should be raised during a state prisoner's initial attempt to obtain postconviction review. Often factual guilt is not seriously in dispute. Both the prisoner and
his counsel have every incentive to ask whether all relevant information in mitigation
of punishment was presented and whether the sentencing phase of the trial was otherwise
conducted in a constitutionally fair manner. Given the clear incentive to do this, the
Committee does not believe that the federal courts should have to consider a second
petition under section 2254 which challenges only the sentencing phase in a capital
case. As subsection (c) reflects, the only appropriate exception is when the new claim
goes to the underlying guilt or innocence of the state prisoner under capital sentence.
Id. at 3244.
As in Kuhhnann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986), the rationale for this section totally ignores
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Sykes, Carrier, and their progeny mark a second significant step
on the way to the new habeas. The procedural bar doctrine established
in Sykes served to remove a significant class of cases from consideration on the merits by the federal courts-those in which the inadvertence or mistakes of counsel had resulted in loss of the ability
to have the claim considered in the state courts. With regard to these
cases, Sykes returned the "final say" on their disposition to the state
courts. If the state court decided the issue was one it should hear
under its own guidelines for forgiving procedural waivers, then a federal court would be free to hear the merits as well; if not, then, because attorney inadvertence short of incompetent assistance was not
sufficient to establish cause for the default, a federal court could not
consider the merits of the constitutional claim either.
The "manifest injustice" exception was a potentially significant,
albeit rhetorically necessary, loophole in this scheme. It carried the
potential for allowing federal consideration of this type of case at the
discretion of the federal district judges, a discretion that one suspects
these judges would exercise when the underlying constitutional claim
appeared to have merit. Carrierclosed up this significant loophole.
It made it clear that procedural bar applied without regard to the
nature or merit of the underlying claim 248 and provided a standard
for the exercise of the district court's discretion so stringent that it
amounted in most cases to a de facto denial of review.
Waiver doctrine, however, returned only one category of cases
to the states. Unless habeas jurisdiction was defined in a manner that
limited consideration of claims actually litigated in the state courts,
the lower federal courts would continue to play a very important role
in the articulation and development of principles of constitutional law
the actual reasons second petitions are filed. Second petitions raising new claims may be filed
because of newly discovered facts giving rise to the claim or because attorney error resulted in
the failure to raise the claim in a previous petition. Cf. Resnik, supra note 189, at 932 (frequent
absence of counsel makes it a plausible assumption that failure to include claim in first petition
is due to a prisoner's lack of legal knowledge or inadvertence). Neither of these reasons suffices
to allow consideration of the claim under an innocence standard. Further, a new claim often is
presented because the Supreme Court has issued a new decision. In the death penalty context,
these decisions often relate to the growing body of eighth amendment law protecting the reliability
of the capital sentencing determination. Use of an innocence standard to eliminate the ability of
the federal courts to entertain a second habeas petition related to the sentencing determination
thus would eliminate a significant number of eighth amendment challenges based on new Supreme
Court precedent. As in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), and Kuhlmann, the innocence
standard once again would serve as an effective rhetorical device for reaching the result of
finality.
248. Cf. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) ("We have declined to make the application
of the procedural default rule dependent on the magnitude of the constitutional claim at issue
or on the State's interest in the enforcement of its procedural rule.") (citations omitted).
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applicable to the state criminal process, and thus would continue to
"interfere" with that process.
Stone v. PowelP49 was an initial attempt at this type of approach.
While it had worked with regard to the controversial fourth amendment exclusionary rule, and certainly afforded a valuable precedent,
it ultimately had proven a dead end as a means of significantly limiting habeas review. Its focus on the nature of the constitutional right
involved as a means of limiting the remedies for its deprivation was
simply too pointed. The Court was not willing to abandon the idea
that procedural rights could serve values other than innocence. In that
context then, the amalgam of inconsistent principles resulting from
the combination of Bator's test for finality and Friendly's rhetoric
of innocence worked against finality: even if a right was not guiltrelated, it still could be found structurally necessary in order to ensure
adequate process.
0 the Court rejected apThus, for instance, in Rose v. Mitchell21
plication of Stone to an equal protection claim alleging racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreman.2 1 In many ways,
the grand jury discrimination claim involved in Rose was a better
candidate for application of the innocence standard than the fourth
amendment claim involved in Stone itself. Challenges to selection of
the grand jury, like the fourth amendment challenges held barred from
habeas review in Stone, do not affect the accuracy of the trial on the
merits. Beyond this, however, a challenge to the grand jury selection
does not even affect the subsequent verdict of the petit jury. Therefore, the claimant cannot even assert the type of prejudice involved
in a fourth amendment claim-that the result of the trial would have
been different. The lack of prejudice to the claimants in Rose was
even more evident because Rose involved only an allegation of discriminatory selection of the jury foreman, who had not voted on the
claimants' indictments at all. Thus, the grand jury discrimination
claims involved in Rose involved neither innocence nor trial prejudice3. 2
Nevertheless, the Rose Court refused to bar consideration of these
claims simply because they were not guilt-related. Grand jury claims
protected values that the Court found equally important: "discrimination on account of race in the administration of justice strikes at
the core concerns of the fourteenth amendment and at fundamental
249. 428 U.S. 465 (1975).
250.

443 U.S. 545 (1979).

251.

Id. at 559-61.

252.

Seidman, supra note 15, at 454.
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values of our society and our legal system" and is "at war with our
basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government. ' 253 Further, because such claims challenge actions of the state
courts themselves, the Rose Court believed that state courts provided
25 4
an inadequate forum for their final determination.
In 1989, in Teague v. Lane, 25 5 the Court began to revolutionize
its retroactivity doctrine as applied to claims raised in habeas proceedings, a process it completed during its 1990 Term. With the development of this new retroactivity doctrine, proponents of the new
habeas at last found a means of limiting the substantive scope of habeas without directly attacking the substance of rights. Retroactivity
doctrine allows a court to control the impact of its decisions on finality, not by limiting the content of rights or by limiting the available
remedies, but by limiting in temporal terms the class of individuals
who will be granted relief for violation of the constitutional rights
those decisions announce. It is thus roughly similar in operation to
a statute of limitations. The retroactivity doctrine limits both the
practical efficacy of rights and the avenues available for their vindication while theoretically leaving both right and remedy untouched.
In the hands of the Rehnquist Court, it has proven a potent weapon
for returning control of the development of constitutional law relating
to state criminal process to the states.
C. Beyond Innocence: Teague v. Lane and the New Retroactivity
Justice Harlan recognized long ago that a primary cause of the
tension between habeas jurisdiction and finality is the problem of
change in the law.2 5 6 If interpretation of extant legal principles remained constant, and the universe of legally recognized rights remained static, the existence of federal habeas jurisdiction would be
insignificant. Attorneys have a professional responsibility not to raise
completely meritless claims. Even prisoners proceeding pro se have
only so much ingenuity. Further, despite the belief of some Justices
to the contrary, 2 7 it also seems highly unlikely, given human nature,
that prisoners will sit on known and potentially meritorious claims
for years while languishing in prison. Prisoners have every incentive
to pursue as quickly as possible all avenues that might lead to their
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

443 U.S. at 564 (citations omitted).
Id. at 561.
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
See infra text accompanying notes 258-259.
See infra note 551.
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release. Thiis, if the law did not change, most prisoners would raise
and exhaust all their known claims as quickly as possible and there
would be an end to litigation.
In reality, however, law continually is evolving. Moreover, in a
time of relatively rapid evolution, such as that of the Warren Court
era in the criminal procedure area, the existence of a procedure for
collateral attack of final convictions has a significant impact on finality concerns. Convictions valid under constitutional interpretations
accepted at the time they became final remain subject to reconsideration based on new and different interpretations subsequently
adopted.
Change in the law is inevitable; its impact, however, can be ameliorated in one of three ways: by curtailing the substance of the right
through consideration of the potential impact on finality concerns
when determining the appropriate rule to apply at the outset, by limiting the scope of application of the rule, or by curtailing the remedies
available for its enforcement.
Harlan believed that the impact of change in the law traditionally
had been controlled by the limited scope of habeas jurisdiction. Thus,
he argued that it was only with the expansion of the scope of the writ
in Brown v. Allen 58 that the retroactive application of new constitutional rules became an issue: "[p]rior to Brown v. Allen, it must
have been crystal clear that the 'retroactivity' of a new constitutional
rule was a function of the scope and purposes of the habeas.corpus
writ," for "[a]bsent unusual circumstances, a new rule was not cognizable on habeas simply because of the limited scope of the writ. '259
Underlying the Rehnquist Court's new retroactivity doctrine is the
insight that the reverse of Harlan's proposition is also true-the scope
of habeas jurisdiction can become a function of the retroactive application of constitutional doctrine.
The Warren Court, however, was not interested in limiting either
right or remedy. A broad habeas jurisdiction was a crucial part of
the remedial structure of its extension and expansion of procedural
rights applicable to the states. That Court also was committed to an
expansive interpretation of those substantive rights. 260 Nevertheless,
the Warren Court was not unaware of the practical impact of expansive rulings on the concerns protected by finality. Therefore, instead of focusing on curtailment of either right or remedy, the Warren
258. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
259. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 684 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
260. See generally W. LAFAvE & J. LSRAEL, CRnmNAL PRoca nuar § 2.7 (West 1985) (discussing
the preference for expansive readings).
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Court chose to develop a flexible doctrine that would allow the Court
to curtail the application of its new constitutional rules, thereby leaving the remedial structure of habeas intact as well as providing the
Court with more freedom to determine the substance of the new rules
free of concerns as to their practical impact. 26'
(1)

The Warren Court's Retroactivity Doctrine

In Linkletter v. Walker,262 the Supreme Court considered whether
Mapp v. Ohio, 26 which overruled prior case law and held that the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule was applicable to the states,
2 64
should apply to convictions that had become final before Mapp.
The Linkletter Court found that "the Constitution neither prohibits
nor requires retrospective effect," and that the retroactivity decision
should be made by weighing "the merits and demerits in each case
by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose
and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard
its operation. ' 265 Subsequent cases indicated that Linkletter had established a three-prong balancing test that looked to "(a) the purpose
to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by
law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect
on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new

standards.'

'266

261. See id. § 2.9, at 68. Compare Harlan's statement that the retroactivity doctrine
was the product of the Court's disquietude with the impacts of its fast-moving pace
of constitutional innovation in the criminal field. Some members of the Court ...
initially grasped this doctrine as a way of limiting the reach of decisions that seemed
to them fundamentally unsound. Others rationalized this resort to prospectivity as a
"technique" that provided an "impetus ... for the implementation of long overdue
reforms, which otherwise could not be practicably effected."
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 676 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213,
218 (1969)).
262. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
263. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
264. 381 U.S. at 619-20.
265. Id. at 629.
266. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). The nature of the constitutional rule as one
affecting the integrity of the fact-finding process was always an important part of this threeprong test. In denying retroactive application to Mapp, the Linkletter Court distinguished previous
cases that had applied new rules retrospectively on the basis that the new procedural rules
announced in those cases "went to the fairness of the trial-the very integrity of the fact-finding
process," while the fourth amendment exclusionary rule only related to the admission of evidence
"the reliability and relevancy of which is not questioned." Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 639. Subsequent
retroactivity cases placed primary importance on the purpose of the rule, finding that a rule
whose primary purpose was to "overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs
its truth-finding function" and "raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts"
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Although the Linkletter Court drew a distinction between direct
and collateral review, 267 the subsequent course of the Court's retroactivity doctrine led to its application without regard to the pro-

cedural posture of the case in which application was considered.268
Instead, the doctrine was applied on an ad hoc basis that led to differing decisions as to the importance of the criteria and to differing
points in time as the starting point for non-retroactive application. 269
(2) Justice Harlan'sProposal

In Mackey v. United States,270 Harlan proposed a different model
for retroactivity, which focused not on the nature of the new constitutional rule and the competing interests of the state, but on the
procedural posture of the case. He argued that new constitutional

rules should be given full retroactive effect in all cases not yet final
at the time the rule was announced, but, with two exceptions, should
not be given retroactive effect in cases on habeas review. 271 The Court

in Teague built on this proposal in developing its new retroactivity
doctrine.

According to Harlan, the failure to, give a new rule full retroactive effect with regard to convictions that were not final was fun-

damentally inconsistent with the basic justification for judicial review
itself, pursuant to which courts "announce new constitutional rules
... only

as a correlative of [their] dual duty to decide those cases

over which [they] have jurisdiction and to apply the Federal Constitution as One source of the matrix of governing legal rules. "272 Harlan stated that
[i]f we do not resolve all cases before us on direct review in light
of our best understanding of governing constitutional principles, it
almost invariably would be applied retroactively. W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 260, § 2.9,
at 70. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969) ("Foremost among these factors is
the purpose to be served by the new constitutional rule."). But cf. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 297-300
(finding that new rule did not sufficiently enhance truth-determining process to outweigh reliance
placed on prior rule and disruption to administration of justice that retroactive application would
entail). The second and third prongs of the test took into account state interests in the form of
reliance on the previous rule and the disruption to the administration of justice that would result
from reopening cases to apply the new rule. The Warren Court's retroactivity doctrine is thus
in some respects an antecedent of the type of balancing approach later adopted in Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1975), for determination of the scope of habeas jurisdiction.
267. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 627.
268. See, e.g., Stovall, 388 U.S. at 300; Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 732 (1966).
269. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 302-05 (1989). See generally W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
supra note 260, § 2.9, at 70-72.
270. 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
271. Id. at 681, 692 (Harlan, J.,concurring).
272. Id. at 678-79.
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is difficult to see why we should so adjudicate any case at all. If
there is no need for an anti-majoritarian judicial control over the
content of our legal system in nine cases precisely like that presented
• ..it is hard to see the necessity, wisdom, or justification for imposing that control in [that] case itself. In truth, the Court's assertion of power to disregard current law in adjudicating cases before
us that have not already run the full course of appellate review, is
quite simply an assertion that our constitutional function is not one
of adjudication but in effect of legislation. We apply and definitively
interpret the Constitution, under this view of our role, not because
we are bound to, but only because we occasionally deem it appropriate, useful, or wise. 273
In an earlier opinion, Harlan also had pointed to the need to treat
like cases alike on direct review as a rationale for full retroactivity
when a case was in that procedural posture:
We do not release a criminal from jail because we like to do so, or
because we think it wise to do so, but only because the government
has offended constitutional principle in the conduct of his case. And
when another similarly situated defendant comes before us, we must
grant the same relief or give a principled reason for acting differently. We depart from this basic judicial tradition when we simply
pick and choose from among similarly situated defendants those
who alone
will receive the benefit of a "new" rule of constitutional
274
law.
For Harlan, "a proper perception of [the Court's] duties as a court
of law, charged with applying the Constitution to resolve every legal
dispute within [its] jurisdiction on direct review, mandates that [it]
'27
1
apply the law as it is at the time, not as it once was.
Harlan based his differing view of retroactive application on habeas review on what he believed to be the fundamentally different
nature of habeas review from that of appellate review:
While the entire theoretical underpinnings of judicial review and
constitutional supremacy dictate that federal courts having jurisdiction on direct review adjudicate every issue of law, including fed273. Id. at 679. Harlan argued that the Linkletter doctrine also discouraged the lower courts
from sharing the responsibility of developing and interpreting the Constitution and discouraged
criminal defendants and their attorneys from asserting rights based on constitutional interpretations
different from those currently prevailifig. Id. at 680. It also tended "to cut [the] Court loose
from the force of precedent, allowing [it] to restructure artificially those expectations legitimately
created by extant law and thereby mitigate the practical force of stare decisis, a force which
ought properly to bear on the judicial resolution of any legal problem." Id. at 680-81 (citations
omitted).
274. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258-59 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); cf. Mackey,
401 U.S. at 679 ("Simply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a
vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar
cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule constitute [sic] an indefensible departure
from this model of judicial review.").
275. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 681 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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eral constitutional issues, fairly implicated by the trial process below
courts have never had a
and properly presented on appeal, federal
27 6
similar obligation on habeas corpus.
On habeas, Harlan argued that the issue of retroactive application
should be decided by reference to the purpose served by habeas jurisdiction. He argued that retroactivity had always been "a function
of the scope and purposes of the habeas corpus writ.1 277 Pre-Brown
v. Allen278 this was so because new rules normally were not cognizable
on habeas because of the limited scope of habeas jurisdiction; postBrown, although habeas jurisdiction was expanded, "the retroactivity
problem remain[ed] analytically constant," and thus, the scope of
retroactive application of new rules should be consistent with "the
reasons for the provision, in our federal legal system, of a habeas
corpus proceeding to test the validity of an individual's official confinement."279

In a functional analysis strikingly similar to that subsequently
used by Justice Powell in Stone v. Powell,20 Harlan considered whether
the purposes of habeas would be served by retroactive application of
new rules on habeas, and whether the benefits from such application
outweighed the costs incurred through the loss of finality. For Harlan,
the primary purpose served by habeas was deterrence: habeas provided "a quasi-appellate review function, forcing trial and appellate
courts in both the federal and state system to toe the constitutional
mark. '281 Harlan believed this deterrent purpose could be accom28 2
plished without applying new rules on habeas.
Further, consideration of the competing policies of providing a
forum for relitigation of claims in light of new constitutional principles versus the need for finality weighed in favor of applying "the
law prevailing at the time a conviction became final.' '283 According
to Harlan, the policies favoring relitigation on the basis of intervening
changes in constitutional law were that such a system
276. Id. at 682. According to Harlan, habeas is "a collateral remedy, providing an avenue
for upsetting judgments that have become otherwise final," and "[tihe interest in leaving concluded
litigation in a state of repose ... may quite legitimately be found by those responsible for
defining the scope of the writ to outweigh in some, many, or most instances the competing
interest in readjudicating convictions according to all legal standards in effect when a habeas
petition is filed." Id. at 682-83.

277. Id. at 684.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

344 U.S. 443 (1953).
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 684.
See supra Part II. A.
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 687.
Id.
Id. at 688-89.
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tends to assure a uniformity of ultimate treatment among prisoners;

provides a method of correcting abuses now, but not formerly, perceived as severely detrimental to societal interests; and tends to promote a rough form of justice, albeit belated, in the sense that current
constitutional notions, it may be 28hoped,
ring more "correct" or
4
"just" than those they discarded.
Although these interests had some "force," Harlan believed they were
"too easily overstated. ' 285 First, he believed that "[slome discrimination must always exist in the legal treatment of criminal convicts
within a system where the governing law is continuously subject to
change. '286 Second, Harlan believed that convictions under former
law still had a minimum level of fairness because "it has been the
law, presumably for at least as long as anyone currently in jail has
been incarcerated, that procedures utilized to convict them must have
been fundamentally fair, that is, in accordance with the command of
the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 28 7 Finally, in an argument reminiscent
of Bator's claim of epistemological error, Harlan asserted that "constitutional updating is necessary in order to assure that the system
arrives only at 'correct' results" and the concomitant idea that the
decision of a court "cognizant of the Federal Constitution and duty
bound to apply it" is "somehow forever erroneous because years later
this Court took a different view of the relevant constitutional command carries more emotional than analytic force. ' 288
The competing interests in finality noted by Justice Harlan were
the same as those highlighted by Bator and Friendly, both of whom
Harlan cites: the need for an end to litigation before the rehabilitative
process can effectively begin; the drain on "the very limited resources
society has allocated to the criminal process" caused by relitigation;
and the disruption to the state's enforcement of the criminal law caused
by retrial of successful habeas petitioners, which may occur at a time
9
when witnesses' memories have dimmed.M
On balance, Harlan concluded that, with two exceptions, the interests in relitigation pursuant to current constitutional norms were
outweighed by the need for finality. 29° The two times when Harlan
284.
285.

Id. at 689.
Id.

286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 689-90.
289. Id. at 690-91.
290. Justice Harlan stated, that, "while the case for continually inquiring into the current
constitutional validity of criminal convictions on collateral attack is not an insubstantial one, it
is by no means overwhelming," because "[m]ost interests such a doctrine would serve will be
adequately protected by the current rule that all constitutional errors not waived or harmless are
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believed the balance should come out in favor of retroactive appli-

cation on habeas were when the new rule: (1) was one placing "as
a matter of constitutional interpretation, certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe"; or (2) was one involving a claim "of
nonobservance of those procedures that... are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' ' 291 The Court in earlier cases already had

viewed the first of these exceptions as requiring automatic retroactivity. 292 The second exception, drawn from the pre-selective incorporation case of Palko v. Connecticut,293 was a throw-back to the
"fundamental fairness" standard that the Court applied in determining the scope of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-

ment prior to the Court's adoption of selective incorporation of
294
provisions of the Bill of Rights.
In his earlier dissenting opinion in Desist v. United States,295 Harlan had suggested that new rules that "significantly improve the precorrectable on habeas and by defining such errors according to the law in effect when a conviction
became final," and because "[t]hose interests not served by this intermediate position are ...
largely overridden by the interest in finality." Id. at 691-92.
291. Id. at 692-93 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
292. W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 260, § 2.9, at 4 (Supp. 1989). Harlan stated that
this type of new rule
represents the clearest instance where finality interests should yield. There is little
societal interest in permitting the criminal process to rest at a point where it ought
properly never to repose. Moreover, issuance of the writ on substantive due process
grounds entails none of the adverse collateral consequences of retrial .... Thus, the
obvious interest in freeing individuals from punishment for conduct that is constitutionally protected seems to me sufficiently substantial to justify applying current notions
of substantive due process to petitions for habeas corpus.
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693.
293. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
294. W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 260, § 2.9, at 4 (Supp. 1989). With regard to this
exception Harlan stated:
Typically, it should be the case that any conviction free from federal constitutional
error at the time it became final will be found, upon reflection, to have been
fundamentally fair and conducted under those procedures essential to the substance of
a full hearing. However, in some situations it might be that time and growth in societal
capacity, as well as judicial perceptions of what we can rightly demand of the
adjudicatory process, will properly alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural
elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction. For
example, such, in my view, is the case with the right to counsel at trial now held a
necessary condition precedent to any conviction for a serious crime.... Hence, I
would continue to apply [Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)] itself on habeas,
even to convictions made final before that decision was rendered. Other possible
exceptions to the finality rule I would leave to be worked out in the context of actual
cases brought beforeus that raise the issue.
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693-94.
295. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
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existing fact-finding procedures" should be applied retroactively to
further the purpose of habeas and "assure that no man has been incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large
risk that the innocent will be convicted. ' 296 In Mackey, however, Harlan expressly rejected this guilt-relatedness exception:
First, adherence to precedent ... must ineluctably lead one to the

conclusion that it is not a principal purpose of the writ to inquire
whether a criminal convict did in fact commit the deed alleged. Additionally, recent decisions of this Court ... have revealed just how

marginally effective are some new rules purportedly aimed at improving the factfinding process. I cannot believe that the interest in
finality is always outweighed by the interests protected in [these decisions]. I believe Palko more correctly marks the tipping point of
finality interests, not only in terms of divining which new rules should
apply on habeas, but also in its reminder that a particular rule may
be more or less crucial to the fairness of a case depending on its
own factual setting. Finally, I find inherently intractable the purported distinction between those new rules that are designed to improve the factfinding
process and those designed principally to further
297
other values.

(3) The Development of the New Retroactivity
In Griffith v. Kentucky, 298 the Court adopted Justice Harlan's
position as to cases not yet final. 299 The Court agreed with Harlan's
conclusion that prospective application in these situations was inconsistent with the nature of judicial review and violated "the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same." 3 °°
In Teague v. Lane,30 1 a majority of the Court purported to adopt
the second half of Harlan's proposal, rejecting the three-prong test
of Linkletter and its progeny in favor of a rule that normally would
not give retroactive effect to a new constitutional rule in cases that
had become final before the new rule was announced. 0 2 The Teague
296.
297.

Id. at 262 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 694-95.

298. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
299. The Court held that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be
applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final." Id.
at 328. The holding in Griffith was the last step in a series of cases in which the Court had
moved away from the use of the three-prong test for deciding retroactive application of new
rules with regard to cases pending on direct review. See id. at 324-26 (discussing United States
v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982), and Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51 (1985)); W. LAFAvE & J.
ISRAEL, supra note 260, § 2.9, at 1-3 (Supp. 1989).
300.

Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322-23.

301. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
302. Id. at 310 (plurality opinion). The Teague Court did not produce a majority opinion
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plurality generally followed Harlan's analysis: the problem of retroactivity is really one of the scope of habeas; 30 3 the purpose of habeas

is deterrence, which is served by the habeas court applying the prevailing law at the time the conviction became final; 304 and the costs
imposed on states by retroactive application outweigh the benefits of
applying new rules on habeas in most cases. 305 The specifics, however,
of the Teague plurality's new retroactivity approach, as adopted and

elucidated by a majority of the Court this past Term, differ from
Harlan's proposals in three crucial respects. As discussed below, these
differences make the Teague brand of retroactivity a considerably
different doctrine than that contemplated by Harlan. They also constitute the final steps in the development of the new habeas.
a. The Teague Exceptions
The first difference is in the exceptions that the Teague Court

found justified consideration of a new rule on habeas. Justice Harlan
believed that a new rule should be applied on habeas only if the new
rule was one placing "as a matter of constitutional interpretation,
certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power
of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe," or involved a
claim "of nonobservance of those procedures that ... are 'implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty. ' ' 3 s Although the Teague Court

adopted the first of these exceptions, 30 7 it did not adopt the second.
Instead, the plurality "combine[d] the accuracy element" from Haron the issue of retroactivity. A majority of the justices, however, agreed with Harlan's general
position that the three-prong test should be abandoned in favor of a rule that new constitutional
rules normally should not be applied retroactively to cases that had become final before they
were announced. See W. LAFAvE & J. IsRau, supra note 260, § 2.9, at 3 (Supp. 1989).
303. Teague, 489 U.S. at 308-09.
304. Id. at 306.
305. Id. at 310. The plurality compared the costs imposed by retroactive application of new
constitutional rules on habeas to the costs that led the Court to develop the Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971), abstention doctrine:
In many ways the application of new rules to cases on collateral review may be more
intrusive than the enjoining of criminal prosecutions .... for it continually forces the
States to marshall resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and
appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional standards. Furthermore .... "[s]tate
courts are understandably frustrated when they faithfully apply existing constitutional
law only to have a federal court discover, during a [habeas] proceeding, new constitutional commands."
Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 n.33 (1982)).
306. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692-93 (1971) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
307. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
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lan's earlier Desist °5 opinion 30 9 "with the Mackey requirement that
the procedure at issue must implicate the fundamental fairness of the
trial ' 310 to come up with a hybrid second exception. The new second
exception only applies when a new rule both requires "the observance
of 'those procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered

liberty"' 31' and creates a procedure "without which the likelihood of
'312
an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.
The Teague plurality believed that this departure from Harlan's
theory was warranted because use of the Palko v. Connecticut"3
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" idea alone would "import[] into a very different context the terms of the debate over incorporation," and thus would "be unnecessarily anachronistic." 3 4 As
to its adoption of the "accuracy" element from Desist, the plurality
noted that "since Mackey was decided, our cases have moved in the
direction of reaffirming the relevance of the likely accuracy of convictions in determining the available scope of habeas review, ' ' 3 5 and
that "Justice Harlan's concerns about the difficulty in identifying
both the existence and the value of accuracy-enhancing procedural
rules can be addressed by limiting the scope of the second exception
to those new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate
conviction is seriously diminished. ' 316 The plurality stressed the narrowness of its hybrid second exception, stating
[b]ecause we operate from the premise that such procedures would
be so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt, we
believe it unlikely that many such components of basic due process
have yet to emerge. We are also of the view that such rules are "best
illustrated by recalling the classic grounds for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus-that the proceeding was dominated by mob violence; that the prosecutor knowingly made use of perjured testi308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
See supra text accompanying notes 295-297.
Teague, 489 U.S. at 312.
Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693).
Id. at 313.
302 U.S. 319 (1937).

314. Teague, 489 U.S. at 312.
315. Id. at 313. The plurality cited the plurality opinion in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S.
436, 454 (1986), which would require "a colorable claim of factual innocence" before a successive
habeas petition could be entertained; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986), in which the
Court found that the fundamental fairness exception to procedural bar should be equated with
situations when the constitutional violation "probably resulted in the conviction of one who is
actually innocent"; and Justice Powell's statement in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491-92 n.31
(1975), that removal of fourth amendment claims from habeas did not create any danger of
denying a "safeguard against compelling an innocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of
liberty." Teague, 489 U.S. at 313.
316. Teague, 489 U.S. at 313-14.
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mony; or that the conviction was based 31on
a confession extorted
7
from the defendant by brutal methods."

This second Teague exception is, of course, the familiar amalgam
of the views of Bator and Friendly. The Mackey half of the formula
corresponds to Bator's view of the times when a failure of process
in the state courts requires relitigation in the federal courts. Indeed,
in describing the narrowness of the second exception, the Teague plurality used as examples the same types of conduct that Bator used
to describe when there had been a failure of process: mob domination
of the trial, knowing use of perjured testimony, and a confession extorted by brutal methods.318 The Desist half of the test is based on
Friendly's idea that the main purpose of habeas should be to protect
the innocent 3 1 9 an idea that Harlan himself had subsequently rejected
in Mackey.
The amalgam of the Mackey and Desist exceptions to create the
Teague second exception greatly narrows the number of cases that
fall within that exception. The category of new rules that will apply
on habeas under Teague is much smaller than that which would be
created by application of either the Mackey or the Desist exception
alone. In fact, the very inconsistency of the two principles makes it
likely that almost any proposed rule can be excluded under one or
the other prong. Thus, for instance, a rule that the fifth amendment
bars police-initiated interrogation with regard to a separate charge
once the right to counsel has been invoked320 does not come within
this exception because its violation "would not seriously diminish the
likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination" and "indeed,...
may increase that likelihood. ' 321 On the other hand, the rule in Caldwell v. MississippP"2 that the eighth amendment prohibits the imposition of a death sentence by a sentencer who has been misled as
to her responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the death
sentence because false information of this type creates an impermissible risk of "substantial unreliability as well as bias in favor of death
sentences ' 323 also does not come within this second exception. In Saw317.
318.
319.

Id. at 313 (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 544 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
See Bator, supra note 13, at 457.
See Friendly, supra note 14, at 142 (proposing innocence standard); see also Desist v.

United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969), (Harlan, J., dissenting) (one purpose of habeas is that
"it seeks to assure that no man has been incarcerated under a procedure which creates. an

impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be convicted").
320. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
321.
322.
323.

Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1218 (1990).
472 U.S. 320 (1985).
Id. at 328-30.
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yer v. Smith 24 the Court determined that while the Caldwell rule does
enhance the accuracy of capital sentencing, it is not "an absolute prerequisite to fundamental fairness" because the conduct it prohibits
5
also can be challenged under the due process clause itself.1
b.

The Teague/Butler "Dictated" Test

A second significant departure from Harlan's proposal, and a
crucial one for use of retroactivity doctrine to complete the devel324. 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
325. Id. at 2832. The Sawyer Court stated:
In Teague, we modified Justice Harlan's test to combine the accuracy element of the
Desist test with the Mackey limitation of the exception to watershed rules of fundamental fairness. It is thus not enough under Teague to say that a new rule is aimed
at improving the accuracy of trial. More is required. A rule that qualifies under this
exception must not only improve accuracy, but also "alter our understanding of the
bedrock procedural elements" essential to the fairness of a proceeding.
Id. at 2831 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311). The Sawyer Court rejected the argument that the
second exception should be modified in the death penalty context to include new rules of capital
sentencing that "preserve the accuracy and fairness of capital sentencing judgments" for much
the same reason that it had rejected a Caldwell claim as satisfying the miscarriage of justice
exception to procedural bar in Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401 (1989): recognizing that exception
would allow too many claims to be heard, because all of the Court's "Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence concerning capital sentencing is directed toward the enhancement of reliability and
accuracy in some sense," and "petitioner has not suggested any Eighth Amendment rule that
would not be sufficiently 'fundamental' to qualify for the proposed definition of the exception."
Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2831-32; see supra text accompanying note 226. Recognition of this
exception thus would go against the Teague plurality's observation that "it is 'unlikely that many
such components of basic due process have yet to emerge."' Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2832 (quoting
Teague, 489 U.S. at 313). Justice Marshall's dissent pointed out the "hubris" involved in such
a statement, noting that "[tihe majority cannot bind the future to present constitutional understandings of what is essential for due process." Id. at 2839 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He argued
that "the notion that we have already discovered all those procedures central to fundamental
fairness is squarely inconsistent with our Eighth Amendment methodology, under which 'bedrock'
Eighth Amendment principles emerge in light of new societal understandings and experience."
Id. at 2840. The Court in fact had modified the first Teague exception for rules that remove
primary conduct from the reach of the criminal law in recognition of the difference in death
sentence challenges to include new rules "prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a
class of defendants because of their status or offense." Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2953
(1989).
Because it is hard to imagine a requirement more fundamental to the fairness of imposition
of the death penalty than that the determination not be made by a sentencer biased in favor of
imposing death, it seems likely that the second Teague exception as interpreted in Sawyer means
that eighth amendment sentencing challenges held to constitute new rules will be cognizable in
federal habeas proceedings only if they come within the first exception. Cf. Sawyer, 110 S. Ct.
at 2837 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 333) ("Caldwell rests on the
view that any strong, uncorrected, and unequivocal prosecutorial argument minimizing the jury's
sense of responsibility for its capital sentencing decision 'presents an intolerable danger that the
jury will in fact choose to minimize the importance of its role' and "Caldwell thus tells us that
a capital trial in which the jury has been misled about its sentencing role is fundamentally
unfair").
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opment of the new habeas, is the Court's definition of what constitutes a new rule. That determination is critical, as the retroactivity
issue only arises when a new rule is involved. In Desist, Harlan devoted a significant portion of his opinion to describing when a rule
should be considered a new rule of law. For Harlan, the question of
what the "prevailing law" was at the time of a habeas petitioner's
conviction required the determination of "whether a particular decision has really announced a 'new' rule at all or whether it has simply
applied a well-established constitutional principle to govern a case
which is closely analogous to those which have been previously considered in the prior case law.' '326
Thus, it would be "very difficult to argue against the application
of [a] 'new' rule in all habeas cases" if "one could never say with
any assurance that th[e] Court would have ruled differently at the
time the petitioner's conviction became final. ' 327 On the other hand,
if there was a point in time when one could say with assurance that
the Court would have ruled differently, then the new rule should not
apply to convictions final at that point because "[a]lthough the threat
of collateral attack may be necessary to assure that the lower federal
and state courts toe the constitutional line, the lower courts cannot
be faulted when, following the doctrine of stare decisis, they apply
the rules which have been authoritatively announced by this Court. ' ' 328
Justice Harlan made it clear, however, that stare decisis "cannot
always be a complete answer to the retroactivity problem" because
the concept of "prevailing law" required the state and lower federal
courts to do more than simply apply the principles explicitly announced by the Supreme Court. 329 Indeed, he believed that even a new
decision explicitly overruling an old one, such as the decision involved
in Desist itself, should apply retroactively on habeas when the precedent it overruled clearly had been discredited prior to its actual overruling. 330 In that situation, the new rule announced in the overruling
decision should be considered to have been the prevailing law from
the point at which the old rule had become discredited, for at that
326.

Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263 (1969). Justice Harlan stated:

One need not be a rigid partisan of Blackstone to recognize that many, though not
all, of this Court's constitutional decisions are grounded upon fundamental principles
whose content does not change dramatically from year to year, but whose meanings
are altered slowly and subtlyas generation succeeds generation.
Id.

327.

Id. at 264.

328. Id.
329. Id.

330. Id. at 265.
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point, lawyers were no longer entitled to rely on the continuing vitality
of the old rule, and it would not necessarily have been improper for
a lower court to have declined to follow it.31
Thus, Harlan's test for determining when a decision announced
a new rule for purposes of a habeas petitioner's case was that the rule
should be considered the prevailing law from the time that one could
not say with assurance that the Supreme Court would have decided
the issue differently if the case had come before it.332 In applying this
test, Harlan recognized that states must be held to the duty of applying not only the letter of the law, but its spirit as well. Although
he acknowledged that this flexible approach would create difficulties,
he rejected the alternative of a hard and fast rule:
It is doubtless true that a habeas court encounters difficult and complex problems if it is required to chart out the proper implications
of the governing precedents at the time of a petitioner's conviction.
One may well argue that it is of paramount importance to make the
"choice of law" problem on habeas as simple as possible, applying
each "new" rule only to those cases pending at the time it is announced. While this would obviously be simpler, simplicity would
be purchased at the cost of compromising the principle that a habeas
constitutional standards
petitioner is to have his case judged by the
3 33
dominant at the time of his conviction.
Although Harlan reaffirmed this discussion from Desist in
Mackey, 334 the Teague plurality did not even mention Harlan's test
for determining whether a decision in fact would announce a new rule
or merely would confirm what already had been the prevailing law.
Instead, the plurality stated that
In general ...a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground
or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government. To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result
existing at the time the defendant's
was not dictated by precedent
33
conviction became final.
Justice Brennan predicted that the breadth of this "dictated" test
would mean that federal habeas courts could hear a great many cases
only if the rule urged by the petitioner fell within one of the two
narrow exceptions to nonretroactive application on habeas because
"[flew decisions on appeal or collateral review are 'dictated' by what
came before"; rather, "[m]ost such cases involve a question of law
that is at least debatable, permitting a rational judge to resolve the
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Id.
See id. at 266-68.
Id. at 268.
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 695 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (citations omitted).
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case in more than one way. 336 The Court's refinement of the dictated
337
test in its decisions of last Term, beginning with Butler v. McKellar,
has made it clear that Brennan's prediction was correct.
In establishing the dictated test as the standard for determining
when a rule is "new" for purposes of retroactivity doctrine, the Court
started with Harlan's proposition that the main purpose of habeas
is deterrence. 338 The consequences, however, that the Court finds flow
from that proposition are very different from those Justice Harlan
found. Harlan believed that this deterrent purpose led logically to the
conclusion that a rule should not be considered a new rule unless one
could say witlr assurance that the Supreme Court would have ruled
differently at the time the petitioner's conviction became final. The
current Court concludes that the deterrent purpose of habeas leads
to the opposite presumption: a rule should be considered "new" unless it can be said with assurance that the Supreme Court would not
presented to it, as the rule
have held otherwise if the case had3 been
39
was "dictated" by prior precedent.
The difference in the Court's and Harlan's conclusions is based
on their different conceptions of the deterrent function of the habeas
court. 340 For Harlan, deterrence went beyond merely ensuring that
state courts comply with the principle of stare decisis. Stare decisis
was not always a complete answer to the retroactivity problem because the concept of "prevailing law" required the state and lower
federal courts to do more than simply apply the principles explicitly
announced by the Supreme Court. For Harlan, stare decisis also required courts to apply the spirit of those principles and to predict the
future course of the law, even if that prediction went against stare
decisis in the form of an extant, but discredited, Supreme Court prec3 41
edent.
For the present Court, however, "'[d]eterrence' ... is a meaningless concept[] as applied to a situation in which the law is so uncertain that a judge acting in all good faith and with the greatest of
care could reasonably read [Supreme Court] precedents as permitting
336.
337.
338.

Id. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110 S, Ct. 1212 (1990).
Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1260 (1990) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 306) ("the

threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout
the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional
standards") (citations omitted).
339.
340.

Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1223-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Cf. id. at 1222 (The Court's deterrence rationale begs the central question of "deterrence

of what"?).
341. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 264 (1969).
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the result the habeas petitioner contends is wrong. ' 3 42 Thus, the definition of what constitutes a new rule should "validate[] reasonable,
good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts
even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions. ' 3 43 Pursuant to this "functional view," the Court should assess whether at
the time the petitioner's conviction became final the state court should
have felt compelled by existing precedent to find that the rule the
petitioner sought to have applied to her case was constitutionally required.3 44 The fact that the rule is "controlled" or within the "logical
compass" of prior precedent is insufficient to confer "new rule" status
even if the Court made these statements in announcing the new rule,
as "courts frequently view their decisions as being 'controlled' or
'governed' by prior opinions even when aware of reasonable contrary
conclusions reached by other courts.

3 45

The dictated standard re-

quires that the outcome of the claim is not "susceptible to debate
3 46
among reasonable minds."
342. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2964 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
343. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217; accord Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1260 (1990). The
Butler Court referenced United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), as support for this
proposition. In Leon, the Court held that the deterrent function of the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule was not served when the police officer conducting the search was acting in
objective good faith but pursuant to a technically invalid search warrant. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at
1217; see Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-21. Brennan's dissent in Butler points out that the act of a
police officer complying with a warrant is not analogous to that of a state court interpreting the
United States Constitution. The state court's obligation to apply the spirit as well as the letter
of the law makes unsound "[tihe Court's analogy between the deterrent function of federal
habeas and the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule." Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1223 n.6
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan explained:
In Leon, the Court explained the threat of evidentiary exclusion ordinarily cannot deter
a search that turns out to be illegal due to a technically invalid warrant "when an
officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge
or magistrate and acted within its scope." This is because the assigned task of the
police officer is to execute the warrant, not independently to evaluate its compliance
with substantive Fourth Amendment standards ....
In contrast, ...
state courts entertaining constitutional challenges to criminal proceedings are expected independently to evaluate these challenges in light of their best
understanding of prevailing legal standards embodied in precedent. Hence, selecting
any reasonable legal rule without flouting directly applicable precedent cannot be
described as "objectively reasonable [judicial] activity." Given the difference between
the nature of police conduct at issue in Leon and judicial interpretation, the majority's
proffered analogy is flawed. It ultimately does no more than borrow language from
Leon, and in so doing, fails to justify the majority's decision to embrace a "reasonableness" test as the appropriate objective of state-court adjudication.
Id. (citations omitted).
344. Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1260.
345. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217.
346. Id. at 1217-18.
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This view of what state courts must do to implement the principles announced by the Supreme Court not only is at odds with Harlan's view of that role, but also
betrays a vision of adjudication fundamentally at odds with any [the]
Court has previously recognized. As every first-year law student
learns, adjudication according to prevailing law means far more than
obeying precedent by perfunctorily applying holdings in previous
cases to virtually identical fact patterns. Rather, such adjudication
requires a judge to evaluate both the content of previously enunciated legal rules and the breadth of their application. A judge must
thereby discern whether the principles applied to specific fact patterns in prior cases fairly extend to govern analogous factual patterns. In Justice Harlan's view, adjudication according to prevailing
law demands that a court exhibit "conceptual faithfulness" to the
principles underlying prior precedents, not just "decisional obedi3 47
ence" to precise holdings based upon their unique factual patterns.
Indeed, one wonders if Harlan's balancing of the need for relitigation pursuant to new constitutional standards versus the need for
finality would have led him to the same conclusion if he had been
required to perform that balancing against the background of the
Teague/Butler definition of what constitutes a new rule. An underlying assumption of Harlan's balancing was that the conviction the
habeas court would review under new rules was a conviction "perfectly free from error when made final. '

348

Based on his own ex-

pression of what he considered to be prevailing law, it is clear Harlan
meant a conviction that the Supreme Court would agree was perfectly
free from error at that point in time. As Brennan's dissent in Butler
points out, however, the Teague/Butler dictated test significantly
changes the equation:
It is one thing to preclude federal habeas petitioners from asserting
claims based on legal principles contrary to or at least significantly
dissimilar from those in existence at the time their convictions became final; such a basis for habeas relief engenders the possibility
of "continually forc[ing] the States to marshal resources in order
to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals conformed
to then-existing constitutional standards." It is a far different thing
to say that concerns for repose and resource scarcity justify [the]
...decision to protect States from the consequences of retrying or
resentencing defendants whose trials and appeals did not conform
to then-existing constitutional standards
but are viewed as suffering
3 49
from only "reasonable"

defects.

347. Id. at 1222 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
348. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
349. Butler, 110 S.Ct. at 1226 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 306 (1989)). Moreover, according to Brennan "[the inability of lower courts to predict
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In Brown v. Allen,350 the Court considered the effect of the state
court's legal determinations on the habeas court's subsequent consideration of the same claims. The Brown Court held that "the state
adjudication carries the weight that federal practice gives to the conclusion of a court of last resort of another jurisdiction on federal
constitutional issues." 3 5' In his separate opinion, Justice Frankfurter
elaborated on the rationale for this rule. The prior state court adjudication did not foreclose reconsideration on habeas because such
a rule would give the state courts the "final say" when Congress indicated that the conclusive determination should be that of the federal
courts. 5 2 Accepting state court adjudications of constitutional questions as binding thus would be inconsistent with the habeas statute,
as "[i]t is precisely these questions that the federal judge is commanded to decide." 3'53 Therefore, Frankfurter concluded, no binding
weight attaches to the state determination because "[t]he State court
cannot have the last say when it, though on fair consideration and
what procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have misconceived
3' 54
a federal constitutional right.
It is clear that the Teague/Butler dictated test de facto overrules
Brown, although neither the plurality opinion in Teague nor the majority opinion in Butler mentions the Brown decision. The dictated
test replaces the federal habeas court's de novo consideration of issues
of constitutional law recognized in Brown with what amounts to a
"clearly erroneous" standard of review of the state court's legal analysis of constitutional issues. As Brennan stated in his Butler dissent:
"[a] federal court may no longer consider the merits of the petitioner's claim based on its best interpretation and application of the
law prevailing at the time her conviction became final; rather, it must
defer to the state court's decision rejecting the claim unless that decision is patently unreasonable.""35 Thus, the consequence of the dictated rule is that the state court determination of constitutional law
has "binding weight" and constitutes the "last say" unless that determination cannot be distinguished from prior precedent "on any
356
conceivable basis, legal or factual.
significant reformulations by [the] Court of the principles underlying prior precedents [should
not] excuse them from the obligation to draw reasoned conclusions from principles that are well
established at the time of their decisions." Id. at 1222 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
350. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
351. Id. at 458.
352. Id. at 499-500 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
353. Id. at 506.
354. Id. at 508.
355. Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1221 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
356. Id.
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c. The Teague Threshold Test
The third significant difference from Harlan's proposal is the
Teague.plurality's determination that the decision as to retroactivity
of a new rule on collateral review should be made as a threshold issue
before the Court considers the merits of the claim. 357 Harlan never
explicitly addressed the issue of the timing of the retroactivity decision
in his proposals. On some prior occasions the Court had determined
the extent of retroactive application of a rule in the case announcing
it, while on other occasions it had not done soy The rule that emerges
from Teague, however, goes far beyond simply requiring that the Court
determine the extent of retroactive application of a constitutional rule
in the same case in which the rule is announced. The Teague threshold
test requires the Court's determination that the new rule, if adopted,
would be applied retroactively before it can decide the merits of
whether or not that new rule in fact exists. Thus, in Teague, the plurality declined to reach the merits of Teague's constitutional claim
because it found that, if it held in his favor with regard to that claim,
its holding would constitute a new rule that it would not apply ret35 9
roactively in a habeas proceeding.
It seems unlikely that Harlan could have contemplated this rule,
which makes the legal existence of a right dependent on the temporal
scope of its application. Indeed, his discussion in Mackey v. United
Statese 6 takes for granted the existence of a new rule with regard to
which the retroactivity determination must be made. 361 Nor does such
a rule logically follow from Harlan's theory. The Teague plurality
argued that the rule is necessary in order to assure that similarly-situated individuals are treated alike: "[o]nce a new rule is applied to
the defendant in the case announcing the rule, even-handed justice
requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated. "362 Harlan, however, had discussed the need for like treatment
as a rationale for his theory only with regard to cases pending before
the Court on direct review. 363 He believed that equal treatment was
357.

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989).

358.

See id. at 299-300 (citing cases).

359.

Id. at 301.

360. 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
361. See, e.g., id. at 681 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("Inquiry into the nature, purposes, and
scope of a particular constitutional rule is essential to the task of deciding whether that rule

should be made the law of the land. That inquiry is, however, quite simply irrelevant in deciding,
once a rule has been adopted as part of our legal fabric, which cases then pending in this Court
should be governed by it.") (emphasis added).
362. Teague, 489 U.S. at 300 (plurality opimon).
363. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258-59 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see supra
text accompanying note 274.
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required with regard to cases in that posture by the rationale for judicial review itself.364 Harlan's belief that this obligation was not implicated with regard to cases pending on habeas review was critical
to his theory that retroactive application could be treated differently
on habeas than on direct review. This belief is clearly reflected in
Harlan's concurrence in Mackey:
While the entire theoretical underpinnings of judicial review and
constitutional supremacy dictate that federal courts having jurisdiction on direct review adjudicate every issue of law, including federal constitutional issues, fairly implicated by the trial process below
and properly presented on appeal, federal
courts have never had a
3 65
similar obligation on habeas corpus.
The Teague plurality also based its rule on the need for federal
courts to avoid rendering advisory opinions.3 66 In Stovall v. Denno, 67
the Court stated that the disparity in treatment (which results when
a case is applied retroactively only with regard to the defendant in
the case in which the rule is announced) was "an unavoidable consequence of the necessity that constitutional adjudications not stand
as mere dictum. 3 68 According to Stovall, "[s]ound policies of decision-making, rooted in the command of Article III of the Constitution that we resolve issues solely in concrete cases or controversies,
and in the possible effect upon the incentive of counsel to advance
contentions requiring a change in the law, militate against denying"
litigants in the case in which the rule is announced the benefit of the
new decision. 69 Although the Stovall Court acknowledged the resulting inequity, it also noted that "the fact that the parties involved
are chance beneficiaries [is] an insignificant cost for adherence to sound
principles of decision-making.' '370 The Teague plurality stated that
[I]f there were no other way to avoid rendering advisory opinions,
we might well agree that the inequitable treatment . .. is "an in-

significant cost for adherence to sound principles of decision-making." But there is a more principled way of dealing with the problem.
We can simply refuse to announce a new rule in a given case unless
the rule would be applied retroactively to the defendant in the case
and to all others similarly situated. We think this approach is a sound
one. Not only does it eliminate any problems of rendering advisory
opinions, it also avoids the inequity resulting from the uneven ap364.

Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679, 682 (Harlan, J., concurring).

365.

Id. at 682.

366.
367.

Teague, 489 U.S. at 316 (plurality opinion).
388 U.S. 293 (1967).

368.

Id. at 301.

369. Id.
370. Id.
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plication of new rules to similarly situated defendants.3 1'

The Teague threshold test, however, neither avoids treating similarly-situated defendants differently, nor avoids rendering advisory
opinions. Instead of eliminating inequitable treatment, the threshold
test merely redefines the class of those discriminated against by focusing on different characteristics to make the defendants similarly
situated. Under the old retroactivity doctrine, the primary focus was
on the nature of the right involved. The disparity caused by drawing
a line between those who could and could not benefit from the new
rule therefore naturally focused on the new rule's differing treatment
of those with the same right. For instance, at almost every opportunity for a number of years Justices Douglas and Black pointed out
the inequity that resulted from not applying a new rule retroactively
to those similarly situated with the defendant in the case in which it
was announced.37 2 By similarly situated, however, they meant individuals with the same type of constitutional claim, not with a case
in the same procedural posture. In fact, defining similarly situated
in this manner, Justice Black used the disparity argument in his dissent in Linkletter v. Walker3 73 to point out the arbitrariness of the
very distinction that Teague adopts (that between direct and collateral
review) because it treated those with the same claim differently based
on the fortuity of how quickly the criminal court docket in the state
trying them moved. 374 These Justices drew the logical conclusion that
all constitutional rules should be applied retroactively,
as this would
75
then treat all those with the same claim similarly.
371. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
372. See, e.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 714 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("[When the defendants in ... cases [announcing new rules] are given the benefit of a new
constitutional rule forged by the Court, it is not comprehensible, if justice rather than the
fortuitous circumstances of the time of the trial is the standard, why all victims of the old
unconstitutional rule should not be treated equally."); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,
255-56 (1969) (Douglas; J., dissenting) ("It still remains a mystery how some convicted people
are given new trials for unconstitutional convictions and others are kept in jail without any hope
of relief though their complaints are equally meritorious."); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 304
(1967) (Black, J., dissenting) ("To deny this petitioner and others like him the benefit of the
new rule deprives them of a constitutional trial and perpetrates a rank discrimination against
them.")..
373. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
374. Id. at 641-42 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black pointed out that Mapp's offense was
committed before Linkletter's, and that the only reason Linkletter's case was not still pending
on appeal when Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), was decided was because the courts of his
state moved faster than those of Mapp's state. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 641-42 (Black, J.,
dissenting). In light of these facts, Black asserted that the differing treatment of Mapp and
Linkletter points up the arbitrariness of the Court's retroactivity doctrine: the "Court offers no
defense based on any known principle of justice for discriminating among defendants who were
similarly convicted by use of evidence unconstitutionally seized." Id. at 641 (Black, J., dissenting).
375. See, e.g., Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 642; Mackey, 401 U.S. at 713 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
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The new retroactivity focuses on the procedural posture of the
case, and concomitantly, the Teague plurality defines similarly situated defendants as those whose cases are in a similar procedural
posture. The Teague plurality then draws from this the conclusion
that no one should receive the benefit of a new rule. The Court's
change in the definition of "similarly situated" does not do away with
the inequality resulting from prospective application of new rules. As
with any doctrine that draws artificial lines in the name of finality,
76
inequality and arbitrariness are inherent in retroactivity doctrine.1
The Teague threshold test does not avoid these problems; it merely
shifts the lines.
Further, even if one accepted that the Court should not apply
a nonretroactive new rule to the petitioner in the case in which it is
announced (because to do so would be treating that petitioner differently from other similarly situated petitioners) the problem of rendering an advisory opinion will not necessarily be avoided. The
advisory opinion quandary, to the extent it exists at all, cannot be
resolved by requiring courts to decide whether a new rule will be applied retroactively before they decide whether the rule exists. Initially,
it seems doubtful that the failure to apply a new rule to the petitioner
in the case in which it is announced would render the decision announcing that rule advisory. An advisory opinion is one rendered with
regard to an issue that does not constitute "a real and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the
law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 3 77 It involves a situation in which the decision does not touch "the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests. 37 The fact that the petitioner
in a case establishing a rule does not receive the relief she seeks, however, does not necessarily render that opinion advisory. Indeed, traditionally, establishing a legal claim has been a prerequisite to the
determination of whether a party is entitled to relief. As Justice Stevens pointed out in Teague, the retroactivity issue could be analogized
to harmless error. 79 In the harmless error situation, the Court first
("I had assumed that all criminal and civil decisions involving constitutional defenses which go
in favor of the defendant were necessarily retroactive.").
376. Cf. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 689 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("Some discrimination must
always exist in the legal treatment of criminal convicts within a system where the governing law
is continuously subject to change.").
377. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 12, at 53 (4th ed. 1983).
378. Id.
379. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 318-19 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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determines whether error occurred, and then whether that error requires reversal or is harmless.38 Similarly, when a novel claim is presented on habeas, the Court can determine whether the trial process
violated any of the petitioner's constitutional rights, and then determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief through retroactive
application of the new rule. 381 Thus, it seems to be more the Court's
functional definition of rights-which treats the existence of a right
as inextricably bound up with whether its claimant will be granted
redress-than the case or controversy requirements of Article III, that
caused the Court to adopt a rule that "inverts the proper order of
adjudication.' '382 Indeed, if it were otherwise, one would have to seriously question the Court's holding in Linkletter v. Walker38' that
"the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect. "34
Further, as a practical matter, the Teague plurality's solution not
only does not avoid advisory opinions, but makes it much more likely
that such opinions will occur. In order to decide whether the petitioner's claim would be a new rule at all, and if it is a new rule, whether
it should apply retroactively on habeas, the Court necessarily must
establish the content of the proposed rule and the extent to which the
rule was dictated by prior precedent. As Justice Scalia has acknowledged, the merits of a constitutional claim and the issue as to whether
it constitutes a new rule are "obviously interrelated." 38 5 As the Court
has applied these concepts in subsequent cases, it has rendered a number of advisory opinions and created an extensive amount of dicta
about putative new rules-dicta that itself sends a very strong message
as to how the Court would decide the merits of the cases.
387
6
The Court's decisions in Penry v. Lynaugh38 and Saffle v. Parks
illustrate its application of this approach. In Penry, the Court split
five-to-four on whether a claim that the Texas death penalty statute
as applied to Penry had violated the eighth amendment by not allowing the jury to consider certain mitigating evidence in making its
sentencing recommendation should constitute a new rule.388 The ma380.
381.

Id.
Id.

382. Id. at 314 n.2.
383.

381 U.S. 618 (1965).

384. Id. at 629.
385.

Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2964 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part).
386.
387.
388.

109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990).
Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2945.

1006

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42

jority found that Penry's claim was dictated by prior precedent. In
Jurek v. Texas,38 9 the Court upheld the Texas death penalty statute
with the understanding that its structure would be interpreted in a
manner that would "permit the sentencer to consider all of the relevant mitigating evidence a defendant might present in imposing sentence." 390 The Court's subsequent decisions in Lockett v. Ohio3 91 and
Eddings v. Oklahoma 92 "reaffirmed that the Eighth Amendment
mandates an individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the
death penalty." 3 93 The rule that Penry sought was merely a request
that Texas "fulfill the assurance upon which Jurek was based" and
394
was "dictated by Eddings and Lockett.
The four dissenters believed that the rule Penry sought was a new
rule under Teague based on their differing interpretation of Jurek.
They asserted that "if there is any available contention that our prior
cases compelled a particular result, it is the contention that petitioner's claim was considered and rejected by Jurek v. Texas. "39 Further,
even if that were not the case, they believed it was "utterly impossible
to say that a judge acting in good faith and with care should have
known the rule announced today, and that future fault similar to that
of which the Texas courts have been guilty must be deterred by mak' 396
ing good on the 'threat' of habeas corpus.
Although at this point in the Penry decision the Court purportedly had not undertaken consideration of the merits of the claim
at all, one could easily predict how each side would decide the merits
of whether the rule Penry sought should be adopted. Because a claim
dictated by prior precedent obviously is going to be held to be a constitutional requirement, the majority's decision that the rule Penry
sought was required by the eighth amendment is a foregone conclusion. Clearly the dissenters' differing interpretation, not only of Jurek, but presumably of Lockett and Eddings as well, would likely lead
them to a different result as to the merits of the claim. In fact, the
majority found that Penry's claim had merit, 397 while Justice Scalia,
writing for the dissenters, went on to explain why the rule sought was
not required by Lockett and Eddings and why the claim was without
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

428 U.S. 262 (1976).
Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2945.
438 U.S. 586 (1978).
455 U.S. 104 (1982).
Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2946.

394.

Id. at 2945, 2947.

395. Id. at 2965 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
396. Id.
397. Id. at 2952.
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merit.39 8 According to Scalia, Lockett and Eddings require that "all
mitigating factors must be able to be considered by the sentencer, but
need not be able to be considered for all purposes. ' 399 Accordingly,
the decisions in Lockett and Eddings did not necessarily prohibit a
state from establishing the manner in which mitigating factors could
be considered, but rather merely prohibited it from establishing a
scheme that gave those factors no weight at all. 400
The Court revisited these differing interpretations of Lockett and
Eddings in Saffle v. Parks,401 and this time Scalia's interpretation prevailed. Because of the Teague threshold test, however, that change
in interpretation remained dicta. Parks argued that an instruction to
the jury during the sentencing phase that they should avoid any influence of sympathy had affected the jurors' consideration of his mitigating evidence in a way that violated the eighth amendment. 40 2 In
finding that this claim constituted a new rule because it was not dictated by prior precedent, the majority stated that Lockett and Eddings
did not speak to the issue of whether the state can control how a jury
considers mitigating evidence, but only to the issue of what evidence
the jury must be allowed to consider. 40 3 The Court stated "there is
a simple and logical difference between rules that govern what factors
the jury must be permitted to consider in making its sentencing decision, and rules that govern how the State may guide the jury in
considering and weighing those factors in reaching a decision."404 Thus,
the Court could not say that upholding a sympathy instruction was
unreasonable. 405 Moreover, the Court stated, "Even were we to agree
with Parks' assertion that our decisions in Lockett and Eddings inform, or even control or govern, the analysis of his. claim, it does not
follow that they compel the rule that Parks seeks."'
Clearly a significant development in the interpretation of a state's
obligation to allow consideration of mitigating evidence in the sentencing phase of a death penalty case occurred between Penry and
Parks.A majority of the Court now believes that there is a significant
distinction between those.limits on mitigating evidence that exclude
it altogether as opposed to those that merely limit the ways in which
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

Id. at 2967-68 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2968.
Id. at 2967.
110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990). Saffle was another five-to-four decision.
Id. at 1257-58.
Id. at 1261.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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it can be considered. This is clear after Parks. But, because the Teague
threshold test inverts the order of adjudication, Parks does not tell
us the critical element needed to understand the contours and implications of this development: how this distinction applies to a particular set of facts in a concrete controversy. In short, Parks suffers
from the central evil at which the rule against advisory opinions is
aimed-the creation of law in the abstract. Indeed, one is reminded
of Justice Blackmun's statement about the Court's disposition in
Dugger v. Adams:4°7 "In this way, the Court both leaves the law in
shambles and reinstates respondent's death sentence without ever
bothering to determine what legal principle actually governs his
case."

408

Thus, the Teague threshold test does not avoid the creation of
"dicta" through "advisory opinions." It avoids only the actual holding with regard to the existence of a new rule, and in the process,
it creates a level of hypothetical adjudication that is perhaps unparalleled. One cannot help but wonder about the future consequences
of this new form of adjudication. It seems that the uncertainty created
can only cause confusion in both state and federal lower courts, among
defense attorneys and prosecutors, and among other officials whose
job it is to make good faith attempts to comply with the requirements
of the Constitution. Working out the implications of the principles
announced in Supreme Court decisions is difficult enough when one
has the starting point of the Court's concrete application in the case
in which the principle is announced. Without that initial guidepost,
the task can only be more difficult.
Further, one wonders what effect hypothetical adjudication may
have on the Court's pronouncements themselves. The traditional model
of adjudication is analysis of precedent and adoption of rules in light
of the particular facts of a particular case, and judicial review traditionally has been justified only as a necessary consequence of this
activity. 409 If the Court cuts itself loose from this model through the
Teague threshold test, will the resulting adjudication be the same, or
will the release from the boundaries of announcing principles in the
context of a concrete decision change even the content of the principles announced? It is perhaps not insignificant that in two out of
the five cases that the Court adjudicated under the Teague threshold
test through the end of the 1990 Term, including Teague itself, the
dissent accused the majority of having misstated the nature of the
407.
408.
409.

109 S. Ct. 1211 (1989).
Id. at 1224 n.15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
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petitioner's claim. 410 The Teague threshold test hardly seems a "more
principled way" of dealing with the problem of advisory opinions.
The rationales of evenhandedness and avoidance of advisory opinions thus are inadequate to explain the Court's choice of a procedure that requires federal habeas courts to decide whether a proposed
rule will be applied retroactively before they decide whether the rule
even exists. This is particularly true in light of the consequences that
are likely to result from turning the order of adjudication on its head
in this fashion.
Further, the Court does not address at all the other rationale
articulated in Stovall v. Denno411 for applying a new rule to the petitioner in the case in which the rule is announced: allowing the petitioner to benefit from the rule operates as an incentive to encourage
counsel to advance contentions requiring a change in the law. The
Teague threshold test clearly has the opposite effect. As Justice Brennan argued in dissent, the threshold test not only deprives the Court
of the ability "to check constitutional violations and to further the
evolution of our thinking in some area of the law" by decision of
cases on habeas, but it also discourages the litigation of claims in
habeas proceedings, thereby depriving the Court and society of the
benefit of decisions by the lower federal courts when the Court later
41 2
must resolve the issue.
If one looks at the result of the Teague threshold test, however,*
one once again finds the explanation for the Court's actions not in
its rhetoric, but in its preference for finality of state court adjudications. For, as the Teague plurality states, the result of the threshold
test is that "habeas corpus cannot be used as a vehicle to create new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless those rules would be
applied retroactively to all defendants on collateral review through

one of the two exceptions.'

'413

The Teague brand of retroactivity has the effect of removing the
lower federal courts from participation in the development of constitutional doctrine in all but a few cases, and the requirement that
the retroactivity decision be made as a threshold matter is the capstone of this achievement. The narrowness of the exceptions to the
nonretroactivity rule in habeas proceedings ensures that few new rules
410. See Saffle, 110 S. Ct. at 1265 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Most of the majority opinion
addresses the retroactivity of a claim not even raised by respondent."); Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 340 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The plurality seeks to give its decision a less
startling aspect than it wears by repeatedly mischaracterizing Teague's Sixth Amendment claim.").
411. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).

412.

Teague, 489 U.S. at 338 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

413.

Id. at 316 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
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will apply on habeas. The breadth of the dictated test's definition of
a new rule ensures that every state court decision that involves something other than the application of "binding precedents to factual
disputes that cannot be distinguished from prior cases in any imaginable way ' 414 will constitute a new rule that must come within one
of the two narrow exceptions in order to be considered on the merits
by a federal habeas court. And, finally, the requirement that the retroactivity determination be made as a threshold matter before the rule
can be announced ensures that these restrictions will apply not only
to the traditional retroactivity situation in which the habeas court is
determining whether to apply previously announced doctrine to a subsequent case, but also to the situation in which the habeas court is
asked to interpret or elucidate existing doctrine in light of a new factual situation. The threshold test thus ensures that, unless the new
rule relates to one of the two exceptions, the lower federal courts
sitting in habeas not only will have no say with regard to how constitutional principles should be interpreted and applied in state criminal proceedings, but also will have no say as to whether such principles
even exist.
With the Teague retroactivity doctrine, the Court's development
of the new habeas seems complete. 415 With Teague, the Court has
found a way to eliminate habeas reconsideration of the merits of constitutional claims that were actually adjudicated in the state courts.
As with previous cases in which the Court has limited the scope of
habeas jurisdiction, this feat was accomplished through an amalgam
of Friendly's rationale of innocence and Bator's test for finality. The
rationale of innocence, this time used in conjunction with another
deeply held value in our society-equality of treatment-is utilized
to come up with a result that furthers neither value.
As discussed above, 416 the amalgam of the approaches of Friendly
and Bator to create the second exception to non-retroactivity means
that "[a] rule that qualifies under this exception must not only improve accuracy, but also 'alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements' essential to the fairness of a proceeding. '4 7 Thus,
the fact that a new rule relates to innocence does not result in its
application in habeas proceedings. The Court's argument that its ret414. Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1221 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
415. Justice Brennan stated it somewhat more forcefully: "With this requirement, the Court
has finally succeeded in its thinly veiled crusade to eviscerate Congress' habeas corpus regime."
Id. at 1219 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
416. See supra text accompanying notes 320-325.
417. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2831 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311
(1989) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971))).
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roactivity doctrine treats similarly situated defendants alike is an illusion: the doctrine simply singles out a different group of individuals
for discriminatory treatment. The value actually furthered is that of
finality, and the test that is created for finality is strikingly similar
to that proposed by Bator.
In Part I of this Article, I discussed the two assumptions that
underlie Bator's theory: habeas must be justified in functional terms
because it is an epistemological error to attempt to justify it in terms
of "correct" results, and the presumption should be against relitigation, because if a job can be done well once, it should not be done
again.418 Based on these assumptions, Bator determined that habeas
jurisdiction should be limited to what he viewed as its historical limits:
situations in which the state court lacks jurisdiction or in which there
419
has been a failure of process in the state courts.
The Rehnquist Court's adoption of a habeas that "validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by
state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later
decisions ' 420 clearly is based on similar assumptions. The validation
of reasonable, though "wrong," state court interpretations must be
based on the idea that one interpretation of constitutional doctrine
is as good as another, as long as it is not irrational. This nihilistic
view of constitutional adjudication is one logical conclusion that can
follow from the proposition that the "correct" answer is unknowable.
If it is an epistemological error to assume that a court can make an
ultimately correct determination of law or fact, there is no intrinsic
reason why a federal court determination will be more correct than
the state court's determination. 421
The idea that, because one interpretation of constitutional doctrine is as good as another the first such interpretation should be given
conclusive effect, clearly follows from Bator's second presumption
against relitigation. The Rehnquist Court's exceptions to the finality
of the state court adjudication also reflect Bator's exceptions. When
"primary, private individual conduct.., is beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to proscribe, ' ' 422 there is a lack, not
only of judicial jurisdiction, but of legislative jurisdiction as well. As
discussed above, the accuracy prong of the second exception theo418. See supra Part I.A.
419. .Id.
420. Butler v. McKellar, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 1217 (1990).
421. See Bator, supra note 13, at 509.
422. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S.
667, 692 (1973)) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part).
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retically could create a difference between Bator's second exception
and that recognized in Teague.4 23 The Court, however, gives the very
same situations as examples of its second exception for watershed
rules of criminal procedure that significantly enhance the accuracy
of criminal proceedings as Bator gives as classic examples of failure
of process.

424

The old habeas was built on Brown v. Allen's 425 broad interpretation of the scope of habeas jurisdiction, which allowed federal
courts to have the "last say" with regard to allegations of constitutional violations, and on Fay v. Noia's426 willingness to allow federal
courts to hear such claims, even if they were procedurally defaulted
under state law. Wainwright v. Sykes 427 did away with Fay; Teague
and its progeny do away with Brown. The next Part looks at the nature of the new habeas the Court has erected in their place.
III.

The New Habeas: Remembrance of Things Past

In looking at the characteristics of the new habeas and its implications for constitutional adjudication of state prisoner claims, it
is helpful to start by considering the structure created by the habeas
that it replaced. In their article, DialecticalFederalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, Robert Cover and Alexander Aleinikoff describe
the way in which the Warren Court used the habeas of Brown and
Fay to implement its decisions selectively incorporating portions of
the Bill of Rights into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 428 Instead of using a direct method of enforcement, such as the
federal court injunction it utilized to impose its civil rights rulings on
the states, the Warren Court chose the indirection of habeas review
to enforce state compliance with the new criminal process requirements.4 29 Because habeas acts not on "those persons whose behavior
is the target of reform but upon institutional outcomes," this means
of enforcement was less efficient than would have been a remedial
system that fined police for illegal searches or enjoined the state courts
to establish an adequate system for provision of counsel to felony

defendants .430
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.

See supra text accompanying notes 317-324.
Id.
344 U.S. 443 (1953).
372 U.S. 391 (1963).
433 U.S. 72 (1977).
Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 11.
Id. at 1038-41.
Id. at 1039, 1041.
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Enforcement through the indirection and redundancy of federal
habeas review of state court constitutional determinations, however,
had its advantages. This system for determining how the constitutional principles of criminal procedure announced by the Warren Court
would be interpreted and implemented was more flexible than a system based on direct enforcement because it permitted and encouraged
a dialogue between the state and federal courts that allowed both to
431
participate in the development of federal constitutional rights.
According to Cover and Aleinikoff, three characteristics were
necessary for this dialogue to be effective. First, in order for the participants to check one another, they must be independent of each other
"in the sense that malfunction of one does not affect the functioning
of the other. ' 43 2 Brown v. Alien433 and Fay v. Noi 434 guaranteed this
independence for the federal courts. They established that state court
adjudication could not estop independent federal court adjudication
of the merits of constitutional claims raised by state prisoners, even
when the prisoner was deemed to have waived the claim in the state
court system, unless that waiver amounted to intentional bypass on
the part of the prisoner. 435 These decisions thus ensured that the federal court could conduct an independent legal analysis of federal constitutional claims, and that "deficiencies of counsel and forum in the
state proceeding could not, by inadvertence or design, create a situation in which the federal right had to be forgone in the federal court
as well. ' 436 Moreover, independence of the state courts was ensured
because constitutional interpretations, of the lower federal courts are
437
not binding on state courts.
Second, in order for the dialogue between federal and state courts
to be useful, there had to be two distinct voices. In broad terms, be431. Id. at 1044. The relitigation of constitutional claims provided by habeas also increased
the reliability of constitutional determinations-by the law of probabilities, the probability that
two courts will uphold a conviction despite a constitutional error is much less than the probability
that one will do so. Id. at 1045. As Cover has pointed out, this fact shows the error of Bator's
assumption that mere reiteration of process has no value. Cover, supra note 38, at 654 n.51.
Habeas also encouraged the "vindication of federal rights by isolating them from other elements
in 'the criminal process and making them the special concern of a special forum." Cover &
Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1045.
432. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1042.
433. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
434. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
435. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1042. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963),
provided this independence with regard to fact-finding by holding that the district court could
conduct its own independent evidentiary hearing if the state factual record was inadequate. Cover
& Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1043 & n.52.
436. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1043.
437. Id.
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cause of the differing conditions under which the state and federal
courts considered the same constitutional issue, they provided these
alternative perspectives. State courts, in general, represent the "pragmatic" perspective, which tends to read into the Constitution "only
ad hoc, though important, strictures upon egregious behavior by presumptively legitimate, historically validated structures of authority." ' 438 Pursuant to that view, "constitutional principle defines a
perimeter; within that perimeter administrative, managerial, and efficiency concerns can hold sway. ' 43 9 State courts tend to have this
pragmatic approach because of their position on "the firing line"
where they must determine "which cases will be processed, how many
will be processed at what rate of speed, what resources will be expended on these cases, by what procedures the cases will be decided,
and . . . what the decision will be." 440 These tasks involve coordination of all the actors in the criminal justice system and the courts
themselves, as well as all the difficulties involved in guilt/innocence
and sentencing determinations." 1 Constitutional rights operate as constraints that "permeate the ways in which these tasks may permissibly
be carried out," thereby hindering efficiency; thus their elimination
or loose interpretation facilitates the state courts' ability to carry out
their duties. 44 2 Lower federal courts tend to have a more "utopian"
perspective, which "reads a more or less comprehensive order of fair
and limited government into the Constitution, usually focusing on the
Bill of Rights or some provision of the Fourteenth Amendment." 443
They are removed from the practical realities of the administration
of the state criminal process, as well as from questions of the guilt
or innocence of the petitioner." The very definition of their jurisdiction to consider state prisoner claims means that for them the constitutional inquiry will be the most important issue. 445
Third, the two parties to the dialogue must have approximately
equal power, "or at least mutual ability to frustrate," in order to
446
encourage compromise between the parties' differing perspectives.
The old habeas satisfied this characteristic as well. The federal courts'
power lay in their ability to release particular state prisoners and to
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1050.
at 1051.

at
at
at
at

1050.
1051-52.
1052.
1053.
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threaten the release of others if they did not agree with the state court's
determinations on constitutional questions. 447 State courts, however,
have the power to ignore the constitutional pronouncements of the
lower federal courts if they are willing to pay the price in released
prisoners and thus also have the power to frustrate the federal courts'
objectives in the majority of cases in which no habeas petition is
filed."" Further, because of the sequential nature of the two proceedings, federal courts must deal with the state courts' adjudications
of fact and also with their expressions of the practical constraints
under which state criminal systems operate. 449 Thus, each side has an
incentive "to acknowledge and, if possible, satisfy some of the more
reasonable demands of the other. ' 4 0 Even if such an accommodation
is not achieved in the development of constitutional rules, then the
the reSupreme Court at least has the benefit of the elaboration of
451
conflict.
the
resolves
ultimately
it
when
positions
spective
This dialogue between the state and federal courts occurred in
the areas in which there are "no foreordained answers to the relevant
questions"-that is, in the areas of constitutional law in which the
Supreme Court has not definitively spoken. 45 2 In these cases, the interaction between federal and state courts in individual cases operated
to give definite form to the broad constitutional principles announced
by the Supreme Court. The dialogue followed a common. pattern. The
Supreme Court would announce a decision that "set an agenda" by
designating issues or values of particular concern, the federal court
of appeals opinions became the "leading cases" elucidating these
principles, the state courts reacted to these federal court opinions, and
the federal courts responded to the state court articulations of the
relevant practical constraints on the criminal justice system by shaping
rules to accommodate them or by not pressing constitutional de453
mands.
Cover and Aleinikoff describe two traditional paradigms for the
federal role in altering state institutions. The first involves the hi447. Id. at 1052.
448. Id. at 1053. Although the Court's opinions developing the new habeas give one the
sense that every state prisoner files at least one habeas petition, in fact, the number of habeas
petitions.filed per capita is very small. Professor Resnik did a study of per capita filings in 1983
that showed that 5.74 prisoners per hundred filed habeas petitions in 1971, and the per capita
rate declined after that to 2.68 petitions per hundred prisoners in 1983. Resnik, supra note 189,

at 945.
449. Cover & Aleinikoff, surra note 11, at 1052-53.
450.

Id. at 1053.

451.

Id.

452.
453.

Id. at 1049.
Id. at 1054.
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erarchical imposition of federally determined values, in which the Supreme Court articulates the value, the lower federal courts define the
rights that flow from the value, and the rights so defined are imposed
on the state through direct and coercive federal court action. The
second paradigm is characterized by fragmentation, justifying value
choices by the individual states, in which the states "retain the major
role in evolving rights subject only to some vague limits on arbitrariness and irrationality. ' 45 4 Both of these models "create a sense
that conflict and indeterminacy are dysfunctional. ' 45 5 In the hierarchical model, conflict is labelled "resistance or interposition" that
violates the supremacy clause; in the fragmentation model, conflict
is described as "federal interference with states' rights. ' 45 6 Both theor preeminent voice as
ories give one system or the other "exclusive
' 45 7
to the value to be chosen or imposed.
The "dialectical federalism" created by the choice of federal habeas as the means of enforcing constitutional rights relating to state
criminal process does not fit either of these models. It posits conflict
and indeterminacy as the norm, and it provides the mechanism through
overlapping jurisdictions for resolution of differing interpretations of
Supreme Court requirements by roughly equal political actors.458
It is clear that dialectical federalism does not survive in the new
habeas. Under the new habeas, federal district courts hearing habeas
petitions are not independent of the state courts. Wainwright v. Sykes 59
ensures that the deficiencies of counsel and forum in the state proceedings carry over into the habeas proceeding to bar federal consideration as well, unless the state chooses otherwise by waiving the
procedural default and hearing the merits of the claim. Thus the state
courts are left free to have the final say as to whether these defaulted
constitutional claims are sufficiently important to be heard, subject
only to the narrow control of the cause and prejudice standard.
Teague v. Lane4 60 and its progeny ensure that a state court's determination on the merits will control the subsequent federal court
consideration of the merits as well. The federal court can only make
an independent determination of the merits of proposed rules if the
state court determination of the constitutional issue was unreasonable. Indeed, the only area in which the new habeas allows the district
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.

Id. at 1047.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1047-48.
Id. at 1048.
433 U.S. 72 (1977).
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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court to make an independent determination is in the area in which
the dialogue is useless: when the appropriate rule is "dictated" by
Supreme Court precedent. The state courts thus are for the most part
left free to work out the implications of the federal constitutional
principles announced by the Supreme Court for themselves, without
having to take account of the separate voice of the federal courts.
As Justice Brennan argued, the Court's rule requiring only "strict
'decisional obedience' to existing precedents" means that
at best, the threat of habeas review will deter state courts only from
completely indefensible rejections of federal claims. State courts essentially are told ...that, save for outright "illogical" defiance of
a binding precedent precisely on point, their interpretations of federal constitutional guarantees-no matter how cramped and unfaithful to the principles underlying existing precedent-will no longer
be subject to oversight through the federal habeas system. State prosecutors surely will offer every conceivable basis in each case for
distinguishing our prior precedents, and state courts will be free to
"disregard the plain purport of our decisions and to adopt a let'swait-until-it's-decided [by the Supreme Court] approach."' 461
The state courts, of course, also are free to apply the spirit as well
as the letter of constitutional law. Yet one can predict that nevertheless the content of the constitutional rules they develop will be
significantly different from that which would result from a federalstate dialogue. For, in determining the "spirit" of the constitutional
principles announced by the Supreme Court, the state courts no longer
will have the benefit of the differing perspective of the lower federal
courts with regard to these issues. Thus, given the pragmatic perspective that institutional pressures are likely to create in most state
courts 4 62 the interpretations they come up with are likely to be biased
in favor of less stringent constitutional requirements.
As with the cause and prejudice standard's limit on state court
freedom to decide the effect of procedural defaults, this freedom to
develop federal constitutional doctrine free from federal court influence is loosely circumscribed by the exceptions to nonretroactivity for
new rules that place a class of private conduct or a type of punishment
beyond the power of the state to proscribe or are "watershed rules
of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.' '463 It is further circumscribed by
the potential for Supreme Court direct review of state court constitutional decisions.
461. Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1222 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
462. See supra text accompanying notes 438-442.
463. Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1263 (1990).
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Neither of these limits, however, places a very broad restraint
on the state court articulation of federal constitutional principles. Few
rules will involve a substantive due process challenge of the type contemplated by the first exception, and the Court made clear in Teague
how narrow it intended the second exception to be. 464 Further, the
Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction on direct review clearly cannot
adequately insert a "federal voice" into state court constitutional adjudication. The 'Supreme Court's burden and responsibility are too
great to permit it to review and correct every misstep made by the
lower courts in the application of accepted principles," and, thus,
"the Court generally will not grant certiorari just because the decision
below may be erroneous.' ' ' 465 Indeed, the Court itself has admitted
466
its inadequacy for performing this task.
The new habeas thus structures federal-state relationships in the
area of state compliance with federal constitutional rules of criminal
procedure in a manner that, subject to relatively minor restrictions,
leaves state courts free of federal influence in the development and
application of those rules. The lower federal courts' role is simply to
monitor the state courts to make sure that they do not engage in egregious conduct by plainly ignoring clearly binding Supreme Court precedent, by attempting to punish conduct that cannot constitutionally
be punished, or by denying state prisoners process that is at least fundamentally fair. In all other situations, the system is essentially a unitary one, with decisions as to the meaning of constitutional rights
relating to criminal procedure being made by those who must live with
the restrictions placed on efficient administration of justice by those
rights, and the Supreme Court at the top keeping its oar in through
its ability to grant certiorari on direct review.
The new habeas thus creates a very different structuring of federal-state relations in the area of state criminal proceedings from that
of the old habeas. It is not, however, an unfamiliar structure. Indeed,
it is quite similar, although by no means identical, to the way that
federal-state relations in this area were structured prior to Mapp v.
Ohio467 and the ascendancy of selective incorporation. For the first
464. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (rules removing primary conduct
from the reach of the criminal law "are rare" and "rules that would require 'new procedures
without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished are not appreciably
more common'); id. at 313 ("we believe it unlikely that many such components of basic due
process have yet to emerge").
E. GRassMAN &
465. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1225 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting R. STa,
S. SHImo, SUPtREM COURT PRACICE § 4.17, at 221 (6th ed. 1986)).
466. "As a practical matter ... we cannot hear each case pending on direct review and
apply the new rule." Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987).
467. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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hundred years after passage of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court held that the due process clause of that amendment only
prohibited state action that violated those rights of an individual that
were deemed "fundamental." 46s Fundamental rights were those that
were "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," that were 'so rooted
in the traditions'and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental,' and that 'lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. "46 The due process clause prohibited "those state actions
that 'offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the
notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those
charged with the most heinous offenses,' that are 'repugnant to the
conscience of mankind,' or that deprive the defendant of 'that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice."'470
Under the fundamental fairness test, due process had no necessary correlation with the Bill of Rights, which had been held to
apply only to actions of the federal government. 47' The rights required
to be recognized by a state under the fundamental fairness test might
overlap with rights contained in the Bill of Rights, but that was because those rights were "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"
not because they were in the Bill of Rights. 472 Further, the funda-

mental fairness test was applied on a fact specific, case-by-case basis.
When a defendant argued that the state had denied her due process
by its failure to recognize a right, the court's inquiry "was not whether
that right, viewed in the abstract, was implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," but rather "whether the state's action had resulted in
a denial of fundamental fairness in the context of the particular
case." 473 Thus, for instance, in Palko v. Connecticut474 the Court found
that a claim that a state could not be allowed to appeal an acquittal
and gain a retrial based on error in the first trial consistent with double jeopardy did not constitute a rule implicit in the concept of ordered liberty because the state was not trying to wear the accused out
through a multitude of trials, but rather was seeking to obtain one
W.
469. Id.
468.

470.

LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 260, § 2.4, at 41.

Id. The basic objective of the due process clause was "to provide 'respect enforced by

law for that feeling of just treatment which has evolved through centuries of Anglo-American
constitutional history and civilization."' Id. Its content was rooted in a natural law background
that extended its protection "beyond procedural fairness and imposed limits as well on the
substance of state regulation." Id.
471. Id. § 2.2, at 34; see Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
472. W. LAFAvB & J. Is.AEL, supra note 260, § 2.4, at 42-43.
473. Id. at 43.
474. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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error-free trial. 475 The Court declined to decide whether the answer
might be different "if the state were permitted after a trial free from
476
error to try the accused over again.
This regime is the structural analogy to what Cover and Aleinikoff describe as the pragmatic approach to constitutional interpretation: it places "only ad hoc, though important, strictures upon
egregious behavior by presumptively legitimate, historically validated
structures of authority" - that is, the states. 477 Federal review of state
action defines a perimeter of fundamental fairness, within which the
states have a large degree of freedom to provide to criminal defendants whatever process the states deem best in light of their concerns
for efficient administration and management of their criminal justice
system. Indeed, the Court's decisions under the fundamental fairness
doctrine noted the need "to respect the 'sovereign character of the
several states' by giving the states the widest latitude consistent with
assuring fundamental fairness, '478 and one of the major justifications
given for the fundamental fairness standard was that it provided
"ample room for diversity (and thus experimentation) in state procedure. 4 7 9
On the other hand, one of the major criticisms of the selective
incorporation doctrine was that it restricted the states' ability to develop their systems of criminal procedure as they saw fit.4 10 Selective
incorporation focused not on the particular aspect of a right implicated by a specific case, but rather on the "fundamental nature of
the guarantee as a whole." '481 As a result, when the Court found a
right to be "fundamental," its ruling "encompasse[d] the full scope
of the guarantee," and all the standards previously developed in applying that guarantee to federal criminal prosecutions became applicable to the states.4 8 2 A body of federal constitutional interpretation
thus was incorporated with each right incorporated. Further, selective
incorporation used a different standard for determining whether a
right was fundamental. While under the fundamental fairness standard the Court would consider "whether a 'fair and enlightened system of justice' would be 'impossible' without a particular safeguard,"
475.
476.
477.
478.

Id.
Id. at 328.
Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1050.
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 260, § 2.5, at 53 (quoting Allen, The Supreme

Court, Federalism and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 DE PAuL L. REv. 213, 251 (1959)).

479.
480.
481.
482.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 2.5, at 55.
§ 2.6, at 58-59.
§ 2.5, at 49.
at 50.
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selective incorporation directed courts "to test the fundamental nature of a right within the context of that common law system of justice, rather than against some hypothesized 'civilized system."'' 483 The
proper frame of reference thus was "the Anglo-American regime of
ordered liberty," and the fact that a right was within the Bill of Rights
was given considerable weight in making this determination. 484 Application of this standard ultimately led to the incorporation of most
of the first eight amendments of the Bill5of Rights into the due process
48
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The similarities between the way federal-state relations in the
criminal process area are structured by the new habeas and the way
they were structured under the fundamental fairness standard are obvious. As in pre-incorporation days, the federal courts under the new
habeas cannot restrict the state courts beyond the limits of denial of
substantive due process and "watershed" rules of criminal procedure
essential to the fundamental fairness of the trial process. 48 6 As was
the case under the fundamental fairness test, this leaves the states with
considerable freedom to structure their criminal process as they see
fit.
It seems unlikely that the similarity between the structure of federalism created by the new habeas and that prior to incorporation of
the Bill of Rights is unintentional; indeed, given the philosophical
background utilized in developing the new habeas, this similarity was
almost inevitable. The "historic" scope of habeas jurisdiction that
Bator looked to in formulating his test for finality was the scope of
habeas prior to Brown v. Allen487 and Fay v. Noia4 8 and the advent
of selective incorporation. Similarly, Justice Harlan derived his two
exceptions to nonretroactivity from the fundamental fairness interpretation of the requirements of due process, explicitly incorporating
49
Palko v. Connecticut4 9 into his second exception. 0
. The federal-state relationship created by the new habeas,
however, also differs from the pre-incorporation structure in significant*
ways. Most obviously, the system it deals with is not the pre-incorporation system. The new habeas has developed in a world of criminal
procedure very different from that existing before the Warren Court.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id. § 2.6, at 56-58.
486. See Saffle v. Parks, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 1263 (1990)..
487. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
488. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
489. 304 U.S. 319 (1937).
490. See supra text accompanying notes 290-294.
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Application of most of the Bill of Rights protections to state criminal
processes is an historical fact. The constitutional rights created during
the last thirty years permeate state criminal procedure, and the development and articulation of the consequences of those protections
are recorded in the annals of state court precedent as well as federal.
Rights such as the right to counsel recognized in Gideon v.
Wainwright491 have become as talismanic a requirement of fundamental fairness as freedom from a mob-dominated trial had been under the pre-incorporation regime.
Thus, while the new habeas removes the federal courts from the
state criminal process, it leaves behind a significant body of constitutional rules, many of which have become basic to every state's conception of what process requires. This fact leads to at least two
consequences that make the new habeas structure very different from
the pre-incorporation structure. First, it means that, although the new
habeas gives control over state criminal procedure back to the states,
their freedom to structure it as they will is significantly more circumscribed than it was before incorporation of the Bill of Rights.
Thus, while states may interpret away the "spirit" of some of those
constitutional rights, their "letter" still will remain. Further, because
many of these constitutional process rights have become incorporated
into the basics of state criminal justice, the impact of the new habeas
on constitutional interpretation is likely to be greatest with regard to
the newest and most controversial of rights, such as the rights flowing
from the eighth amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Second, because state criminal procedure has become "constitutionalized" through selective incorporation, what the new habeas
leaves the states free to "experiment" with is the interpretation of
federal constitutional law.
Another apparent difference between the new habeas structure
and the pre-incorporation structure lies in the interpretation of fundamental fairness. The Teague v. Lane 92 plurality made it clear that
it did not intend to adopt the specifics of the fundamental fairness
test when it rejected the Palko test as "unnecessarily anachronistic." 493 It is equally clear that it did not apply a selective incorporation
analysis, as the claims that were being considered derived from constitutional rights that already had been found fundamental by virtue
of their incorporation into the due process clause. The test seems to
combine the fact-specific approach of the fundamental fairness test
with the standard of the selective incorporation test. That is, the in491.
492.
493.

372 U.S. 335 (1963).
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
Id. at 312.
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quiry focuses 'on whether fundamental fairness requires a particular
aspect of a constitutional guarantee, but the standard for that determination is whether that guarantee is fundamental to an American
criminal justice system.
A third difference is that the Supreme Court itself is not subject
to the system that it has created. Under the fundamental fairness regime, the Supreme Court, as well as the lower federal courts, was
limited in its control of state actions by the fundamental fairness standard. Because of the constitutional nature of current state criminal
procedure, however, the Court is exempt from the restrictions of the
new habeas by virtue of its power of direct review over state court
constitutional determinations. Thus, while the lower federal courts
can only tell state courts that they are unreasonable, the Supreme
Court can still tell them that they are wrong. This means that the
states still will have the broad check of certiorari review over their
pronouncements of constitutional principle, although not over their
day-to-day applications of constitutional doctrine. It also means that
the Supreme Court remains free to continue to develop new constitutional doctrine in an environment that cuts it loose from the practical consequences that normally flow from
its decisions in a way not
494
Court.
Warren
the
by
of
dreamed
even
The most intriguing difference between the new habeas regime
and the pre-incorporation regime lies in the different rationale for
each. The federal-state relationship that the fundamental fairness test
created was the function of a substantive legal interpretation of the
requirements of the due process clause. It resulted from an interpretation of the intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment
as to the meaning of the requirement that states not deny due process.
The new habeas on the other hand is not based on an interpretation
of the scope of the fourteenth amendment. Nor is it based on an interpretation of congressional intent as embodied in the jurisdictional
grant of section 2254, which gives the federal courts jurisdiction over
the claims of those alleging that they are held in state custody in violation of the Constitution. Rather, the new habeas is purely the creation of judicial discretion.
The consequence of this discretionary rationale is that the new
habeas exists side-by-side with the old habeas that it replaced. Thus,
section 2254 still provides for federal review of allegations of state
494. Cf. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 680-81 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(Court's retroactivity doctrine tended "to cut [the] Court loose from the force of precedent,
allowing [it] to restructure artificially those expectations legitimately created by extant law and
thereby mitigate the practical force of stare decisis, a force which ought properly to bear on the

judicial resolution of any legal problem") (citation omitted).
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custody in violation of the Constitution, and Brown and Fay still provide the definitive analysis of the congressional intent as to the scope
of the power of federal courts to hear state prisoner claims pursuant
to that jurisdictional grant. The structuring of federal-state relations
in the area of state criminal procedure created by section 2254, as
interpreted by Brown and Fay, still exists as a shining edifice that
demonstrates the importance our society places on the vindication of
constitutional rights. It exists, however, as one of those "ghosts that
are seen in the law but that are elusive to the grasp, ' 495 while the new
habeas provides the de facto limits of habeas jurisdiction.
One way to explain the development of the new habeas is to view
the cases that developed it as attempts to return the federal-state balance in the area of state criminal process to something approximating
the pre-Warren Court status. The Burger Court, however, inherited
an impressive edifice of rights applicable to state prisoners. Although
it could chip away at the more controversial of those rights-and
did 496-it

could not return to a time when those rights did not exist,

even if it wanted to, without creating an unacceptable degree of disruption to the continuity of constitutional law.
Yet, where the Warren Court had closed a door, the Burger and
Rehnquist courts found windows. While the fundamental fairness interpretation of the due process clause had left control with the states
through substantive interpretation, these courts used procedure as the
means of returning control over the criminal process to the states.
This use of procedure had the advantage of leaving the edifice of
rights intact, and even subject to expansion by the Supreme Court,
while placing significant restrictions on expansive interpretation and
extensive enforcement of those rights by lower federal courts. By focusing on discretionary as opposed to jurisdictional doctrine, the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts also were able to avoid the problems
occasioned by prior interpretations of the fairly plain language of the
habeas statute's jurisdictional grant. If this was the institutional goal
of the Supreme Court over this time period, then it finally has been
achieved. The new habeas leaves the edifice of rights seemingly untouched, while it also makes them untouchable by many who would
seek to claim them. Part IV of this Article looks at some of the costs
of this process.

497

495. The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922) (Holmes, J.) ("Legal obligations that exist
but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive to the grasp.").
496. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (establishing a "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule).
497. Professor Resnik has argued that, although federalism concerns are not irrelevant to the
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IV.

Costs of the Process

As discussed in previous Parts, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts'
decisions developing the new habeas justified the limits they placed
on habeas in part by stressing the "costs" to the values of finality
that resulted from a broad scope of federal court review of state prisoner constitutional claims. This part attempts to "turn the tables"
somewhat on the Court by examining the costs of its own process of
developing the new habeas through the use of discretionary doctrines

rationalized in terms of a cost-benefit analysis and imposed upon the
lower federal courts as mandatory limits on their habeas jurisdiction.
A.

The Loss of the Federal-State Dialogue

The first cost one might argue results from the new habeas is the
loss of the old. The dialectical federalism that expansive habeas jurisdiction created is an appealing structure for developing legal rules
that impact both federal and state interests. The demarcating of the
lines of state and federal power through this type of give-and-take
is consistent with the Court's recognition that the federalist structure
embodied in the Constitution allocates power between the states and
the national government in ways that do not lend themselves easily
498
to judicial line-drawing.
Court's decisions in the habeas area, they are insufficient to explain the Court's preference for
finality in these decisions. She points to the fact that the habeas doctrines the Court has developed
to limit habeas review extend to federal prisoner actions as well as those brought by state
prisoners, and that its concerns for finality and deference to the decisions of initial decisionmakers
have influenced its application of procedural doctrine in areas outside the criminal context.
Resnik, supra note 189, at 907. She asserts that federalism concerns have been used "as a
justification for decisions made for other rea-ons." Id. I do not necessarily disagree with her
conclusions. It is often perhaps more convenient than accurate to speak in terms of the "motives"
of the Supreme Court, particularly when one is dealing with a Court as ideologically divided as
the Supreme Court has been during the years covered by this Article. Certainly it is true that
the Court's federalism concerns, as expressed in its opinions creating the new habeas, were often
only imperfectly served by the doctrines it developed. Indeed, as discussed elsewhere, the innocence
standard intrudes more on issues within the primary province of the states than does the old
habeas, which restricted the federal courts to consideration of federal constitutional issues. See
infra note 512. At the same time, the new habeas has not achieved absolute finality of state
court determinations of federal constitutional issues either. Instead, the role of the lower federal
courts has been recast to reflect an area of much broader state freedom to develop their own
constitutional law of criminal procedure. Whether the primary driving force behind this development was the Court's view of federalism or its desire for finality probably depends on which
Justice one asks. In this area, the two principles work hand-in-hand. In any event, it is clear
that the Court adopted philosophical positions that necessarily would and did lead it to restructure
federa-state relations in a manner similar to the structure of those relations prior to the advent
of selective incorporation.
498. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (structure of the
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Dialectical federalism provides an answer to Professor Bator's

search for a justification for expanded habeas beyond mere reiteration
of process. Bator rejected the idea that the differing perspective of
federal judges was sufficient to outweigh the costs of finality. He did
so in large part because his epistemological position led him to conclude that, as one can never say what answer is "correct" in an ul-

timate sense, one cannot say that a federal court's answer is intrinsically
better. 499 If habeas review is viewed, however, as part of an interactive
process that allows both state and federal participation in the development of constitutional principles, then expansive habeas jurisdiction becomes just as logical a conclusion to reach from Bator's
epistemological position.as is the conclusion the Court reached in Butler v. McKellar.5 0 The important point becomes not that a federal
court decision is "better," but that it is made by a court that brings
a different perspective to the issue. If it is assumed that one cannot
know the truth and thus must develop a set of institutional arrangements that society will accept as establishing the truth, it makes at
least as much sense to develop a system that allows different viewpoints to go into that development as it does to simply allocate final

competence to one viewpoint from the start. Indeed, a structure that
allows the interaction of different versions of the truth as a means
of developing the concepts that will be deemed "true" seems more
acceptable than a system in which only one voice is ever heard.5 0'
Constitution reflects that the measure of state sovereignty normally should be determined through
the give and take of the federal political process, in which the states were given a significant
voice, rather than through judicial line drawing; the extent of national regulation of the states
through the commerce clause should be a product of this process rather than of rigid interpretation
of constitutional provisions); cf. Resnik, supra note 189, at 955 (noting that it was state
representatives that created the habeas statutes and these representatives have not seen fit to alter
them despite continuing assertions of serious intrusions upon state authority).
499. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
500. 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
501. Professor Cover argues that jurisdictional overlap is a useful structure for dealing with
the systemic differences that can cause divergent outcomes. He identifies three characteristics that
can cause such differences: (1) self-interest of the decision-makers; (2) ideology of the decisionmakers in the form of more or less unconsciously held values and perspectives that tend to serve
and justify the existing social order in which those decision-makers are part of the elite; and (3)
innovation, in the form of policies determined by a governing elite "especially insofar as they
depart from traditional, common cultural norms and expectations." Cover, supra note 38, at
657. Thus, for instance, allowing relitigation of an issue by a forum viewed as having a different
ideology from the first forum can alleviate concerns that the first forum "decisionmaker's
construction of reality was distorted by the social determinants of [her] mental world." Id. at
664. If the second forum confirms the decision of the first, that confirmation tends to alleviate
suspicion with regard to the basis of the first decision. Id. at 671. If the second forum reaches
a different outcome, that result can make explicit the way in which differing ideology renders
the "social realities of one group problematic to another." Id. at 671-72. Knowledge of the
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Viewed in the context of dialectical federalism, the job of constitutional adjudication cannot be done well by the state courts without
their interaction with federal courts because the job is not simply the
decision of particular cases. Rather, it involves the development of
constitutional principles to govern the criminal trial process in a way
that accommodates (to the extent possible) both the high ideals those
principles embody and the practical reality of that process. Constitutional adjudication involves both dispute resolution and norm articulation.502 Given the elusive nature of "truth," the acceptability of
the results of both of these functions is enhanced by a system that
builds the expression of differing views into the decisional process.
Further, by silencing the voice of the lower federal courts, the
new habeas not only deprives the state courts of the benefit of lower
federal court rulings when they are making constitutional decisions,
but also deprives the Supreme Court of that benefit, thereby disrupting the Court's "ability to structure a contemplative process of
constitutional decisionmaking." 50 3 When deciding constitutional issues, the Court often allows those issues to "percolate" in the lower
federal and state courts to give the Court the benefit of this "period
of exploratory consideration and experimentation by lower courts before the Supreme Court ends the process with a nationally binding
rule." ' 504 The new habeas, however, will deprive the Court of this ability "to await the treatment of difficult and novel legal problems by
both state and federal courts before having to address such issues,"
as under the new habeas "sensitive issues of criminal procedure will
be litigated by lower federal courts only when adjudicating federal
criminal prosecutions (a relatively small category of cases) and by
state courts that ...

are not inclined institutionally to interpret and

' 50 5
apply federal constitutional principles expansively.
The loss of the federal-state dialogue and the flexibility that it
provided for accommodating state and federal interests in the area

impasse between differing versions of social reality and right conduct can affect sentencing and
pardoning decisions with regard to the specific case, as well as future political decisions regarding
enforcement policy and norm articulation. Id. at 672; cf. Resnik, supra note 189, at 1025-26

(habeas review is justified not because a second or third consideration of an issue is better in
the sense of producing more correct results, but because it involves more decision-makers in the
process and thus diffuses power and increases the perception of legitimacy of the decisions
rendered).
502. Cover, supra note 38, at 643.
503.

Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1226 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

504. Id. (citation omitted).
505.

Id. Thus, instead of having "the benefit of numerous and varied rulings on particular

issues," the Court under the new habeas is likely to have "the benefit of only a few state cases
embracing narrow constitutional interpretations" before it when it decides an issue. Id.
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of criminal procedure is a high price to pay for avoiding the disruption of state criminal processes caused by habeas review. Indeed,
under the interactive federalism created by the old habeas, that disruption was an integral part of the development and articulation of
constitutional principles.
Whether one believes that "the inner logic of 'our federalism'
seems . . . to point . . . insistently to the social value of institutions
in conflict with one another" 5°6 or believes, as does a majority of the
current Court, that federalism embodies a doctrine of deference to
the interests of the state is, however, in large part a question of policy
and individual political viewpoint. Other costs of the new habeas,
however, are troubling even if one agrees with the way in which the
new habeas structures federal-state relations. These costs arise not
from the result of the Court's decisions establishing the new habeas,
but rather from the process by which the Court reached that result:
by developing discretionary doctrine through a functional cost-benefit
analysis that employs the rhetoric of innocence to reach the result of
finality.
B.

The Loss of Principled Adjudication

As discussed in Part III, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts did
not overrule the Warren Court's interpretations of the scope of habeas jurisdiction in developing the new habeas. Brown v. Allen10 7 and
Fay v. Noia0 still provide the definitive statement of the scope of
federal court power under section 2254 and of Congress' intent in
granting federal courts jurisdiction over state prisoner allegations of
custody in violation of the Constitution. Instead, the Court developed
a series of "discretionary" limits on the ability of the federal courts
to exercise their jurisdictional grant. Because these limits were "discretionary," they allowed the Court to avoid confronting the language of section 2254 and the interpretations of the intent of that
language contained in the Court's prior precedent.
Thus, the Court's decisions in this area typically contain little,
if any, discussion of how the doctrines they develop fit with the Brown
and Fay interpretations of section 2254 and Congressional intent. For
instance, Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Stone v. Powel/r°9
neither attempts to explain how the elimination of federal habeas re506.
507.
508.
509.

Cover, supra note 38, at 682.
433 U.S. 72 (1977).
372 U.S. 391 (1963).
428 U.S. 465 (1975).
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view of fourth amendment claims follows from the Court's prior precedent indicating'that the federal courts are to have the final say with
regard to state prisoner's constitutional claims, nor how that interpretation is consistent with the language of section 2254 (as it was
interpreted in Fay to extend to any allegation of custody in violation

of the Constitution). 10 Further, the use of the rhetoric of innocence
to limit habeas clearly is without precedential support-even the proponents of the innocence standard admit that the innocence of the

petitioner was simply irrelevant to habeas review prior to Stone v.
Powell.5 1"Indeed, the contrary position would be totally inconsistent
with their adoption of Bator's theory that the scope of habeas tra-

ditionally was limited to claims of lack of jurisdiction and failure of
process.

51 2

510. The absence of this type of analysis in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1975), is
particularly striking, as Justice Powell had attempted to tie limiting review of fourth amendment
claims in this fashion to congressional intent in his earlier concurring opinion in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 271-74 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). However, as the best argument
Powell could come up with in Bustamonte for the consistency of his approach with the language
of § 2254 was an assertion that "nothing in § 2254(a), the state of the law at the time of its
adoption, or the historical uses of the language ... from which § 2254(a) is derived, compels a
holding that rulings of state courts on claims of unlawful search and seizure must be reviewed
and redetermined in collateral proceedings," id. at 237-74, his Bustamonte concurrence may itself
explain why he did not make a second attempt in Stone. Cf. Stone, 428 U.S. at 522 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (arguing that neither the language nor the history of the habeas statute provides
any support for distinguishing between types of claims).
511. See, e.g., Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 265-66 (Powell, J., concurring) (recognizing that
there is no historical basis for a tie between habeas jurisdiction and constitutional claims relating
to innocence, but arguing that innocence should be used to accommodate the expanded scope of
the writ with the historic respect for finality); Friendly, supra note 14, at 159 n.87; cf. Kaufman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 234 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (Justice Black adopts a novel
reinterpretation of Fay to support the proposition that, although the former rule was that
"judgments were so impervious to collateral attack that a defendant could not collaterally attack
his conviction even after the Government had admitted his innocence," that rule had been
"finally put to rest in Fay v. Noa.").
512. Bator, supra note 13, at 453-62. The argument that the writ was available historically
only for lack of jurisdiction and failure of process claims clearly supports the proposition that
the writ was about power, notr about moral worthiness. The innocence of the petitioner was
totally irrelevant to the power of the court to adjudicate the case. Bator and Friendly find it
ironic that this should be so-that an allegation of violation of a constitutional right opens the
doors to the federal courts when an allegation that someone else has confessed to the crime does
not. Id. at 505-09; Friendly, supra note 14, at 145. But this circumstance is ironic only if one
focuses on the petitioner rather than on the state action. If the .purpose of habeas is that
recognized in Brown v. Allen-to give the "last say" to the federal courts on federal law, and
concomitantly, to allow those courts to monitor the state's compliance with the mandates of the
Constitution, Brown, 344 U.S. at 508 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)-then there is no irony in this
situation at all.
In fact, establishing a standard that, essentially, requires the federal court to make an
independent determination as to the petitioner's guilt would be much more clearly disruptive of
the proper balance of federal and state concerns in state criminal proceedings than the delay and

1030
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My point, however, is not that the doctrines the Court has developed could not be reconciled with prior precedent or with congressional intent, but rather that the Court's opinions in this area have
shown an increasing tendency not to even make the gesture. Thus,
for instance, in Wainwright v. Sykes,"' although the Court notes that
it has before it a question of statutory interpretation 1 4 it does not
bad feelings occasioned by allowing the federal court to redetermine constitutional issues on
habeas. After all, the federal court under the old habeas redetermined federal constitutional
issues, issues that by definition involve legitimate federal interests. The guilt or innocence of the
defendant in a state criminal prosecution, however, is truly only the business of the state. The
elements of the crime have been defined by state law, the decision to prosecute has been
determined by state enforcement officials, and the verdict has been rendered by a state decisionmaking body. The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Whenever Article III grants
them jurisdiction, it is with a national purpose in mind, even when that jurisdiction compels
them to review issues of state law. Diversity and alienage jurisdiction, for example, have as their
justification the "federal interest" of a need to guarantee equal treatment for out-of-state litigants.
Thus, the minimum justificatory touchstone for federal jurisdiction always must be that there is
a federal interest involved. Although incarceration of an innocent person may concern all of
society, it does not peculiarly concern the federal courts when the incarceration is pursuant to a
state criminal proceeding applying state criminal law.
Further, as Judge Posner has pointed out, constitutional rights designed to minimize the
probability of convicting an innocent person are those least in need of federal court protection
from improper application by the states. R. PosNER, Tim FEDERAL. COURTS: CRasis AND REFORM
186-87 (1985). The state must prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt,
and, Posner argues, "[T]he danger of an innocent person's being convicted under the American
system of criminal justice ... is actually much smaller than the reasonable-doubt standard
implies (though not zero), mainly because other rules of criminal procedure prevent the jury
from even considering a great deal of highly probative evidence of guilt." Id. at 186-87 (citation
omitted). Further, "today the state courts in all areas of the country can ... be trusted to
protect the innocent of whatever race, creed, national origin, or income, with exceptions too few
and isolated to justify federal judicial intervention." Id. at 187.
Instead, rights that do not involve protecting the innocent are most likely to be disfavored at
the state level; thus, federal supervision is most justified: "In most states the rights of the guilty
enjoy little political favor, and it is therefore quite possible that in the absence of effective federal
judicial review, many state judges would give those rights less protection than the Constitution,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court, tells them to." Id. Justice Brennan made a similar argument
in his dissent in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1975):
[E]nforcement of federal constitutional rights that redress constitutional violations
directed against the "guilty" is a particular function of federal habeas review, lest
judges trying the "morally unworthy" be tempted not to execute the supreme law of
the land. State judges popularly elected may have difficulty resisting popular pressures
not experienced by federal judges given lifetime tenure designed to immunize them
from such influences, and the federal habeas statutes reflect the congressional judgment
that such detached federal review is a salutary safeguard against any detention of an
individual "in violation of the Constitution or laws ... of the United States."
Id. at 525 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Therefore, a structural analysis of habeas indicates that
innocence is quite legitimately irrelevant to the appropriate concerns of the habeas court in the
exercise of that jurisdiction.
513. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
514. Id. at 77 ("The simple legal question before the Court calls for a construction of the
language of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).").
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attempt to interpret section 2254, but instead merely asserts the
"Court's historic willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views
of the scope of the writ, even where the statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged. ' 515 The culmination of
this process is shown in Butler v. McKellar5 1 6 which de facto overruled Brown without ever addressing that decision or the interpre51 7
tation of the federal habeas statute that it embodies.
Proponents of the new habeas grounded this discretionary ap5 18
proach in Fay's recognition of an equitable component to habeas
and in the language of section 2243 of the habeas statute admonishing
judges to "dispose of the matter as law and justice require. ' 51 9 Thus,
for instance, the plurality in Kuhlmann v. Wilson 520 cites Fay for the
proposition that
[t]he Court never has defined the scope of the writ simply by reference to a perceived need to assure that an individual accused of
crime is afforded a trial free of constitutional error[; r]ather, the
Court has performed its statutory task through a sensitive weighing
of the interests implicated by federal habeas corpus adjudication of
constitutional claims determined adversely to the prisoner by the
state courts.521
Neither Fay nor section 2243, however, provide precedent for the
rules that the Court has created to limit the exercise of habeas jurisdiction. Both Fay and section 2243 contemplate the exercise of discretion by the federal district judge sitting in habeas on the facts of
the particular case before her. That discretion has little, if any, relation to the type of mandatory rules the Court has developed in the
name of discretion as a means of limiting habeas jurisdiction. The.
only court that exercises discretion under the Court's discretionary
doctrines limiting the scope of habeas review is the Supreme Court,
and the discretion that it exercises is more legislative than judicial.
515. Id. at 81.
516. 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
517. Cf. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 326, 332 (1989) (Brennan,,J., dissenting) (noting that
the plurality had adopted its new retroactivity doctrine "without regard for-indeed, without
even mentioning-[the Court's] contrary decisions over the past 35 years delineating the broad
scope of habeas relief" and that "[n]one of the reasons [the Court had] hitherto deemed necessary
for departing from the doctrine of stare decisis" were present).
518. E.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 448 n.8 (1986) (plurality opinion) (Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), made a "practical appraisal of the state interest in a system of
procedural forfeitures, weighing that interest against the other interests implicated by federal
collateral review of procedurally, defaulted claims") (citation omitted).
519. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1988); see, e.g., Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 449 n.11 ("Sensitivity to the
interests implicated by federal habeas corpus review is implicit in the statutory command that
the federal courts 'shall ...

dispose of the matter as law and justice require.' ").

520. 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
521. Id. at 447-48 (plurality opinion).
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A comparison of Fay and Wainwright v. Sykes5 22 illustrates the
difference between a judicial exercise of discretion based on equitable
principles and the type of "discretion" utilized by the Court in developing the new habeas. In Fay, the Court determined that, although
52 3
federal courts have the power to hear procedurally defaulted claims
they also possess a limited discretion to decline to grant habeas relief
when the petitioner deliberately has bypassed state procedures.124 The
Fay Court found this discretion implicit in the command of section
2243 and in its belief that "habeas corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by equitable principles," one of which is that "a
suitor's conduct in relation to the matter at hand may disentitle him
to the relief he seeks. 5 25 The Court thus concluded that "the federal
habeas judge may in his discretion deny relief to an applicant who
has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts
5' 2 6
and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies.
Although Sykes merely purports to change the discretionary standard for denying habeas relief on a procedurally defaulted claim, the
Sykes holding is significantly different from that of Fay. Fay holds
that the district court has discretion to dismiss a petition for deliberate
bypass; the Sykes Court holds that federal habeas review is barred
"absent a showing of 'cause' and 'prejudice' attendant to a state procedural waiver." 5 27 The Fay holding limits the district court's discretion; the Sykes holding destroys it. Sykes is not providing a guide
to the exercise of discretion, it is providing a rule that requires the
district court not to hear the claim if certain circumstances exist. Equity is a flexible doctrine, providing for discretionary balancing on
a case-by-case basis.52 8 Similarly, comity is a discretionary, not a mandatory doctrine; "[i]t is largely a matter of courtesy and politeness,
applied on a case by case basis. ' 52 9 While Sykes purportedly is
grounded in equity and comity, its creation of a rigid rule is entirely
53 0
inconsistent with those principles.
522. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
523. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 434 (1963).
524. Id. at 438.
525. Id.
526. Id. (emphasis added).
527. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
528. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in
the Federal Courts, 38 HASTnNGs L.J. 665, 689 (1987).
529. Id. at 688.
530. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 541 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (The Court's
application of the cause and prejudice standard as a "rigid bar to review of fundamental
constitutional violations has no support in the statute" and "the standard thus represents judicial
lawmaking of the most unabashed form."); cf. Soifer & Macgill, The Younger Doctrine:
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This use of purportedly discretionary rules to eliminate the discretion and independent judgment of the lower federal courts to entertain state prisoner petitions on the merits is one of the themes that
runs through the cases developing the new habeas. Thus, in Murray
v. Carrier5 31 the Court eliminates lower court discretion to hear defaulted claims in order to avoid manifest injustice and replaces that
discretion with a rigid rule: those claims can be heard absent a showing of cause and prejudice only if the petitioner makes a showing 5of33
actual innocence.5 32 Similarly, the plurality in Kuhlmann v. Wilson
sought to replace the district court's discretion to hear successive petitions if the ends of justice would be served with a rule that those
petitions could be heard only if the petitioner made a colorable showing of factual innocence.5 34 This trend again culminates in Butler v.
McKellar.-3- The Butler dictated test for what constitutes a new rule
takes away the lower federal courts'"ability to make independent judgof constitutional principles
ments even on the proper interpretation5 36
as applied in state criminal proceedings.
The method by which the Court derived its rules limiting habeas
review not only has no relation to the traditional use of discretionary
principles, it also has little relation to "traditional" ideas of the way
in which courts adjudicate. It is perhaps naive to criticize the Court
for "legislating" in the post-realist world. Yet, while courts may
"make law," they still normally do so by a process that is distinctively
judicial-they develop and apply a rule in the context of the specific
facts of the case being decided and justify that rule in terms of its
consistency with precedent and (if it involves statutory interpretation)
Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEx. L. REv. 1141, 1143 (1977) ("The considerations of equity
and comity developed through decades by the Court to accommodate the tensions among state

power, federal power, and individual rights, have been turned into a single, rigid commandment
of federal judicial inaction that violates even such rules as equity and comity could be said to

have contained."); Zeigler, supra note 528, at 687-89 (making these points in the context of
abstention doctrine).
Although the discretion recognized in Fay, thus does not support the approach taken in Sykes,
in one sense Fay still can be viewed as providing the opening that led to Sykes by having

acknowledged that the conduct of the petitioner may be relevant to the availability of habeas
review. See Resnik, supra note 189, at 881 ("In retrospect, because the deliberate bypass standard

of Fay v. Noia calls into question a litigant's moral worthiness to request revision of earlier
decisions, Fay v. Noia provided an avenue for the demise of the habeas model that the opinion

crafted.").
531. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
532. See supra text accompanying notes 180-184.
533. 472 U.S. 436 (1987).

534. See supra text accompanying notes 245-247.
535. 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
536. See supra text accompanying notes 355-356.
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with legislative intent. This is not the model of adjudication that the
Court has followed in developing the new habeas.
The difference between courts making law and legislating is, in
broad terms, the difference between a decision made pursuant to principle and a decision made pursuant to policy. "Arguments of policy
justify a political decision by showing that the decision advances or
protects some collective goal of the community, as a whole," while
"[a]rguments of principle justify a political decision by showing that
5 37
the decision respects or secures some individual or group right.
The justification for many legislative programs will involve both sorts
of arguments, but while "[it is plainly competent for the legislature
to pursue arguments of policy and to adopt programs that are generated by such arguments," characteristically judicial decisions "are
and should be generated by principle not policy." 5 38 So long as judges
adhere to decisions based on principle in making law, they tend to
539
avoid charges that they are engaging in antimajoritarian legislation.
Judicial decisions based on principle are not as subject to antimajoritarian concerns because "an argument of principle does not often
rest on assumptions about the nature and intensity of the different
54
demands and concerns distributed throughout the community. '' 0
Equitable doctrines involve the balancing of the respective interests of particular parties in a particular case. The "balancing" utilized by the Court to come up with limits on habeas review, however,
is an entirely different kind of balancing. The Court "balances" the
generic interests of a class of individuals-habeas petitioners-against
the generic interests of the states in order to define the limits on habeas review and formulate a rule that then is applied as a mandatory
requirement in all cases. This type of "balancing of interests" is an
537. R. DwoaxN, supra note 160, at 82.
538. Id. at 83-84.
539. As Professor Dworkin explains:
The . .. objection that law should be made by elected and responsible officials seems
unexceptionable when we think of law as policy; that is, as a compromise among
individual goals and purposes in search of the welfare of the community as a whole.
It is far from clear that interpersonal comparisons of utility or preference, through
which such compromises might be made objectively, make sense even in theory; but
in any case no proper calculus is available in practice. Policy decisions must therefore
be made through the operation of some political process designed to produce an
accurate expression of the different interests that should be taken into account. The
political system of representative democracy may work only indifferently in this respect,
but it works better than a system that allows nonelected judges, who have no mail
bag or lobbyists or pressure groups, to compromise competing interests in their
chambers.
Id. at 84-85.
540. Id. at 85.
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argument of policy, not of principle. It does not involve consideration
of, and decision regarding, rights of the parties before the court, but
rather a utilitarian compromise of individual rights in light of broader
societal goals.
Further, the Court's opinions in this area illustrate the problems
that a Court encounters when it attempts to "legislate." In basing
the scope of habeas review on policy concerns, the Court has attempted to compromise competing societal interests without employing a fact-finding process geared toward making these determinations.
The Court thus has been compelled to make a number of assumptions
about "the nature and intensity of different demands and concerns ' ' 54
without the benefit of the facilities it needs to carry out the sort of
empirical inquiry necessary to provide the data to back up those assumptions. The consequence is that those assumptions are in large
part merely intuitive guesses.
For instance, central to the Stone v. Powell5 42 balancing of competing interests is the assumption that the deterrent effect of enforcement of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule in habeas
proceedings is minimal.5 43 How does the Court know this? Where are
the empirical data to establish it? Where are the hearings at which
relevant experts testified? An equally logical assumption is that, because police officers are most likely to have contact with the proceedings in trial level courts, the deterrent effect of application of the
exclusionary rule declines through state appellate and Supreme Court
direct certiorari review, but then "jumps markedly when a federal
district judge grants an application for habeas. ' 544 The conclusions
that would follow from this equally logical assumption would be quite
different from those reached by Justice Powell in Stone. This assumption would suggest that habeas review serves a very important
function in furthering the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule:
it provides the only effective federal forum for its enforcement. 545
The Court's balancing of policy interests in its decisions limiting
the scope of habeas is riddled with these factual assumptions unsupported by empirical data, but presented as though they were established fact. 546 All of these assumptions are necessarily nothing more
541.

Id.

542. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
543. Id. at 493-94.
544. Tushnet, JudicialRevision of the Habeas Corpus Statutes: A Note on Scbnecldoth v.
Bustamonte, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 484, 499.
545. Id.

546.

Indeed, as empirical data become available, they frequently seems to contradict the
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than the intuitions of individual justices, and some of them do not
even seem to be very good intuitions. Indeed, a number of them fly
in the face of human nature. Perhaps the most well-known of these
is the Court's assumption that strict procedural default rules are needed
to prevent "sandbagging" -the deliberate withholding of a potentially meritorious claim from consideration by the state courts for the
purpose of presenting it to the federal courts to gain release should
the state trial result in a verdict of guilty. Prevention of sandbagging
is one of the rationales put forward by the Court in Wainwright v.
Sykes 47 to justify abandoning the intentional by-pass standard for
forgiving procedural defaults.148 Yet, as Justice Brennan pointed out
in his dissent in Sykes, not only did the Sykes Court have no empirical
data to support this assertion, but the opinion was downright illogical.
The lawyer would have everything to gain by raising meritorious claims
at trial and nothing to lose: if the state trial court ruled in her favor,
then the prosecution would likely be weakened, if not precluded; if
the trial court denied the objection, then the defense had lost nothing,
as state appellate review had been preserved, and federal habeas review of the merits of the claim would be de novo under Brown v
Allen.149 On the other hand, if the attorney held back the claim, then
not only would conviction be more likely, but the defendant would
lose the opportunity to have state court review of the claim, and the
attorney would have to convince the district court on habeas that there
had not been an intentional abandonment of the claim under the Fay
55
v. Noiass0 standard. 1
Court's assumptions. For instance, the assumption that the exclusionary rule often frees the
guilty-central to the Stone analysis-seems open to challenge in light of recent studies which
indicate that few cases are dismissed because of application of the rule, and that it has not
significantly hindered conviction. Jacoby, Fighting Crime by the Rules, NEWSwEEK, July 18,
1988, at 53 (no study has shown an effect on more than 1.5% of cases). Further, studies indicate
that most police officers view the exclusionary rule, as well as the prophylactic warnings required
by the Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), favorably because they
believe these rules enhance the professionalism of police departments and the respect accorded
police officers. Id. Another common assumption behind the new habeas-that the possibility of
habeas release frustrates deterrence-also is called into question by available information. A
study of Florida prisoners whose terms were cut short by the Court's ruling in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), indicated that they had, a recidivism rate of 13%, while
prisoners who served their full terms had a recidivism rate of 25%. Seidman, supra note 15, at
440 n.14.
547. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
548. Id. at 89.
549. Id. at 103 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
550. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
551. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 103 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Judge Friendly also thought the
sandbagging argument was a loser. Friendly, supra note 14, at 158 ("Save for the rare instance
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Further, not only does the Court engage in assumptions that seem
counterintuitive, sometimes it engages in inconsistent assumptions as
when the state is known to have evidence to refute a claim which it may not have later, it is
exceedingly hard to visualize a case where a defendant or his lawyer would deliberately lay aside
a meritorious claim so as to raise it after the defendant was jailed."); see also Resnik, supra
note 189, at 897 (sandbagging "assumes a fantastically risk-prone pool of defendants 'and
attorneys").
Despite its counterintuitiveness, proponents of the new habeas also have used versions of the
sandbagging contention to support the argument that claims that were not procedurally defaulted
should nevertheless not be heard by the federal habeas court. For instance, Justice Powell argued
in Vasquez v. Hiliery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986), that a balancing process should determine whether
habeas relief is an appropriate remedy for racial bias in the selection of a grand jury. This
balancing process included as a crucial element weighing against the petitioner the length of time
between conviction and when the issue was raised in the habeas proceedings. Id. at 277, 279-80
(Powell J., dissenting). As support for this proposed rule, Powell suggested that there is a risk
that a prisoner might sit on her presumably meritorious claim until she determined that the state
no longer would be able to reconvict her upon her release by the federal habeas court due to
the death of witnesses and loss of evidence. Id. at 280 n.14. This was not, of course, the case
with the petitioner in Hillery, whom the Court noted had raised his equal protection claim "at
every opportunity." Id. at 256. Powell apparently viewed the potential for this type of "sandbagging" as a legitimate concern nevertheless. See Resnik, supra note 189, at 928-29 (discussing
use of a similar rationale to support a proposed amendment to habeas rules to allow dismissal
of petition if state could show prejudice in its ability to retry the petitioner).
If the Report of the Commission that he chaired can be taken as expressing his views, however,
Powell appears to have modified his opinion on this point, at least with regard to those individuals
sentenced to a term of years rather than death. The only justification given by the Powell
Commission for the distinction that its proposed habeas scheme makes between death penalty
prisoners and others, which would result in those sentenced to death receiving less process than
those sentenced to a term of years, see supra note 247, is based on a presumed difference in
incentives between these two categories of prisoners. The Report states that
[s]eparate procedures for capital cases are appropriate in light of the special problems
of capital litigation. The incentives facing the capital litigant are unique. The inmate
under capital sentence, whose guilt frequently is never in question, has every incentive
to delay the proceedings that must take place before that sentence is carried out. Such
an inmate is avoiding the punishment prescribed by the law of the State. In contrast,
prisonersserving an ordinary term of years have every incentive to bring their claims
to resolution as soon as possible in order to gain relief. And they are serving their
sentences while litigation takes place.
Powell Commission Report, supra note 247, at 3239-40 (emphasis added).
Based on my limited experience with habeas review of death penalty cases as a law clerk for
the Eleventh Circuit, and my somewhat broader experience of human nature, my intuition (and
here we are apparently dealing mostly with intuitions) is that those sentenced to death are at
least as anxious as those sentenced for life to have, if not their conviction, then at least their
sentence, altered as quickly as possible; therefore, death penalty prisoners seek to raise all the
potentially meritorious claims of which they are aware at the first opportunity. Indeed, the Powell
Commission itself seems to adopt my contrary assumption as the justification for not allowing
capital petitioners to raise sentencing challenges in second petitions, stating that the prisoner and
her counsel "have every incentive to ask whether all relevant information in mitigation of
punishment was presented and whether the sentencing phase of the trial was otherwise conducted
in a constitutionally unfair manner." Id. at 3244.
It is interesting to note the shifts in underlying assumptions that accompany the varying
presumptions of Hillery and the Powell Commission Report. The underlying assumption of
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well. Consider, for instance, the conflicting assumptions about the
effect of habeas review on state court judges reflected in Engle v.
2 versus Teague v. Lane553
Isaac"1
and Butler v. McKellar.5 4 In Engle,
Justice O'Connor cites as one of the "costs" of habeas review the
undermining of the morale and sense of responsibility of state court
judges caused by the knowledge that their decisions will be subjected
to habeas review.5 55 This demoralizing effect means that
"[i]ndiscriminate federal intrusions may simply diminish the fervor
of state judges to root out constitutional errors on their own. ' 55 6 On
the other hand, the idea that habeas serves "a necessary additional
incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct
their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards" is central to the Teague and Butler Court's determinations that only prevailing law, as defined by the "dictated" test,
need be applied on habeas 5 7 Does habeas cause state judges to be
Justice Powell's statement in Hillery is necessarily that the petitioner has a claim likely to prevail.
The underlying assumption of the Powell Commission Report is that the claim is likely to be
found meritless, and thus has as its main value stalling execution (that is, except when it is a
claim relating to sentencing). Available statistics show that death penalty petitioners prevail in
most of the federal habeas cases decided on the merits. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 915 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (death penalty petitioners prevailed in 7006 of the
habeas cases heard on the merits by federal appellate courts between 1976 and 1983); Rehnquist
Urges Curb on Appeals of Death Penalty, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1990, at Al, col. 3 ("[iun recent
years, more than half of all state court death sentences have been overturned by Federal courts
during habeas corpus proceedings"). Thus, the assumption that the constitutional claims of those
sentenced to death lack merit, while a comforting one to support a scheme that denies consideration of those claims, is wrong in the majority of cases. See Resnik, supra note 189, at 936
(case law suggests assumption that capital petitioners' claims are frivolous is untrue). Indeed, as
Professor Resnik has pointed out, the assumption that death penalty prisoners have a greater
incentive to "sandbag" than do others is based on an entire set of highly unlikely assumptions
about the behavior of those prisoners:
To substantiate this belief, one must assume that (a) the probability of retrial diminishes
over time; (b) death-sentenced prisoners believe that, if retried, they are likely to be
reconvicted, but not sentenced to death; (c) death-sentenced prisoners would prefer to
spend a life in prison rather than be executed; (d) death-sentenced prisoners have
knowledge of several possible claims and of the likelihood of the success of each; (e)
death-sentenced prisoners have control over their (usually) volunteer counsel and direct
their attorneys as to which claims to file and in what order; and (f) death-sentenced
prisoners are able to predict the interval from sentencing to execution so as to decide
when to file the "best" claims. Under such conditions, it would indeed be possible to
demonstrate that a rational, utilitarian death-sentenced prisoner would be more likely
to "sandbag" than would a utilitarian prisoner not sentenced to death. However,
many of the foregoing assumptions are highly problematic if not false.
Id. at 935-36.
552. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
553. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
554. 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
555. Engle, 456 U.S. at 128 n.33 (citing Bator, supra note 13, at 451).
556. Id.
557. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 304).
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more diligent in following constitutional commands or does it cause
them to slough off their constitutional duties? The only answer that
reconciles these cases is that it depends on which assumption enforces
finality. For, although these cases are inconsistent with regard to their
assumptions about the behavior of state court judges, they are consistent in reaching the result of finality of state court determinations.
Presumptions are a procedural mechanism for allocating the litigation risks of uncertainty in accordance with a substantive preference.558 Presumptions need not be based on assumptions that are
consistent with probabilities or consistent with each other in order to
serve this function. Although presumptions usually are based on an
assessment of the probabilities, they also tend to reflect policy preferences, and in fact a policy preference may be the sole rationale for
a given presumption. 559 Thus, for instance, the presumption of innocence in criminal trials is more easily explained in terms of an initial
allocation of the burden of uncertainty always involved in litigation'
than in terms of probabilities. 560 It represents a judgment that, because of the seriousness of the consequences of a criminal conviction,
society wishes to be more than usually certain that those consequences
are warranted before imposing them.5 61 Similarly, the presumptions
against the federal habeas enforcement of constitutional rights that
the Court has created through its series of discretionary doctrines seem
more explicable in terms of policy preferences than in terms of the
Court's belief that the underlying assumptions these doctrines implicate in fact comport with probable realities. These presumptions
seem to represent a judgment that, despite the seriousness of the consequences of a criminal conviction, society should allocate the risk
of uncertainty to the petitioner in the interests of finality:
The type of generic balancing in which the proponents of the new
habeas have engaged also destroys whatever efficacy a balancing approach has as the rationale for a judicial decision. A balancing methodology for rationalizing judicial decisions is inherently suspect because
it is in large part subjective and easily manipulable. The one performing the balancing gets to pick the relevant interests, and thus can
effectively determine the outcome by the interests that are deemed
relevant. The persuasive force of a balancing approach thus in large
part lies in the comprehensiveness of its consideration of the competing interests.5 62 Without this, its use as the rationale for a decision
558. Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading'of the Rules, 84 YALE
L.J. 718, 727 (1975).
559. Id. at 730.
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. Tushnet, supra note 544, at 501.
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is unlikely to persuade those who were not previously convinced.163
The generic balancing utilized by the Court in limiting the scope
of habeas jurisdiction makes thorough consideration of competing
interests impossible. The Court no longer is weighing concrete interests of two competing parties, but rather is weighing broad generic
interests that may not be relevant in any particular case and only are
assumed to be the most relevant considerations. Thus, for instance,
5 64 emphasizes
while Stone v. Powell
that the exclusionary rule often
excludes evidence highly probative of guilt, the evidence introduced
at a particular defendant's trial in violation of the fourth amendment
may in fact have no probative value, and that defendant may in fact
be innocent. Further, in a given case the state may have very little
interest in finality, the state court judge may not be distressed, but
appreciative of the definitive guidance given by the federal court, or,
even affirmed in her own decision, the delay may not have been substantial, and the state may be perfectly capable of retrying the defendant. Thus, the Court not only picks the interests that will be
deemed relevant, but also does so in the abstract, rather than in the
context of the interests in fact implicated in the particular case before
it. In this context it is extremely easy for "disputable assertions of
fact" to be asserted "as indisputable statements of interests to be
weighed.' 1'5 5 Replacing factual evidence with generic assumption hardly
seems likely to persuade.
This is especially true in light of the way in which the Court's
generic balancing approach clearly is weighted against the petitioner.
In conducting its balancing of societal interests, the Court maximizes
the states' interests by giving them every possible interest they might
have in any conceivable case, without considering whether that interest has any relevance in the case actually before the Court. On the
other hand, the Court diminishes the possible interests of petitioners
by making individual petitioners suffer for the perceived characteristics of their class, whether or not the individual petitioner in fact
has that characteristic herself.
The plurality opinion in Kuhlmann v. Wilson 66 exemplifies the
problems resulting from the use of this generic balancing approach.
The Kuhlmann plurality stated that its task was to accommodate congressional intent-which it found counseled in favor of finality of the
first set of habeas proceedings-with "the historic function of habeas
563.
564.
565.
566.

Id.
428 U.S. 465 (1976).
Tushnet, supra note 544, at 502.
477 U.S. 436 (1986).
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corpus to provide relief from unjust incarceration. " 567 To accomplish
this accommodation, the plurality weighed "the interests of the prisoner in relitigating [a] constitutional claimll held meritless on a prior
petition" against the "countervailing interests served by according
finality to the prior judgment."'56 Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, found six interests served by finality: (1) deterrence of crime,
which is frustrated when those contemplating crime believe there is
a possibility they will escape punishment through repeated collateral
attacks; (2) rehabilitation, which cannot effectively begin until the
prisoner realizes she is justly subject to sanction; (3) punishment of
criminals, which is frustrated when a prisoner is released and the state
may not be able successfully to retry her; (4) avoidance of the burden
placed on the criminal justice system by diverting the time of court
personnel from "the important task of trying criminal cases"; (5)
avoidance of friction between the state and federal courts caused by
setting aside state court judgments; and (6) avoidance of federal intrusions into state trials that "frustrate both the States' sovereign
power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor
constitutional rights.' '569
On the other hand, Justice Powell found only one interest the
prisoner has in obtaining reconsideration of a constitutional claim
decided adversely in a first habeas proceeding:
Even where, as here, the many judges who have reviewed the prisoner's claims in several proceedings provided by the State and on
his first petition for federal habeas corpus have determined that his
trial was free from constitutional error, a prisoner retains a powerful
and legitimate interest in obtaining his release from custody if he
is innocent of the charge for which he was incarcerated. 57 0

Of course, by definition, that interest does not extend to the guilty.
Indeed, according to Justice Powell, the guilty prisoner desires "'the
certainty that comes with an end to litigation, and that attention will
ultimately be focused not on whether a conviction was free from error
but rather on whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place
in the community.' '5 7 Not too surprisingly, Powell concludes from
this analysis that the federal courts are required to entertain successive
habeas petitions "only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence." 572
567.
568.
569.
570.
571.
572.

Id. at 451-52.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 452-53 & n.16.
Id. at 452.
Id. (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 454.
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Why is the only valid interest of a petitioner in having a successive petition considered that she is innocent? Why did the petitioner in Kuhlmann, who filed a second petition because of a new
decision of the Supreme Court relevant to his claim, not have a cognizable interest in having the constitutionality of his conviction determined under current doctrine? 53 Why does a petitioner who files
a second petition because of newly-discovered evidence not have a
sufficient interest in having the constitutionality of her conviction
determined based on all the relevant facts? Why does a petitioner
challenging her death sentence rather than her conviction not have
an interest in being executed only in accordance with current constitutional standards or only on the basis of full consideration of all
relevant facts regarding mitigation? Moreover, if the second petition
is based on newly discovered evidence that previously was not available because of the misconduct of state officials, why does the state
have any valid interest in the finality of a conviction obtained through
such misconduct? 74 Indeed, why is the state's legitimate interest in
cases alleging unconstitutional actions not the vindication of constitutional rights rather than the finality of unconstitutional proceed75
ings?
It seems impossible to come up with principled answers to these
kinds of questions. Certainly, the Court does not do so in Kuhlmann
v. Wilson,176 Stone v. Powell,5 77 Murray v. Carrier,78 Smith v. Murray,579 or any of the other decisions in which the Court has used its
own assumptions about the appropriate values to be served by habeas
review to limit that jurisdiction. Essentially, the Court has been legislating based on its view of the appropriate policy considerations to
''compromise among individual goals and purposes in search of the
welfare of the community as a whole. ' 5 0 And these essentially leg573. Cf. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 689 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(recognizing the interests served by application of new constitutional doctrine to habeas petitioners).
574. Cf. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2833 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[s]tate
has no legitimate interest in finality of the death sentence it obtained through intentional
misconduct").
575. Cf. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 652 (Black, J.,dissenting) ("No state should
be considered to have a vested interest in keeping prisoners in jail who were convicted because
of lawless conduct by the State's officials."); Brilmayer, State Forfeiture Rules and Federal
Review of State Criminal Convictions, 49 U. Ci. L. RE. 741, 756-57 (1982) ("states arguably
do not acquire vested rights in wrongful convictions because they have an independent interest
in seeing justice done").
576. 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
577. 428 U.S. 465 (1975).
578. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
579. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
580. R. DwoRmN, supra note 160, at 85.
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islative compromises were made despite an interpretation of section
2254 that evidences congressional intent to compromise these com-

peting interests in a very different fashion.581
Proponents of the new habeas sometimes have justified their lack
of concern for stare decisis and congressional intent by arguing that
the Warren Court itself did not respect either of these in its decisions
originally establishing a broad scope for habeas jurisdiction.58 2 Yet,
even if one assumes that these allegations are true, this argument is
hardly persuasive unless the Court's philosophy is that two wrongs

make a right. If Brown v. Allen583 and Fay v. Noia584 were wrongly
decided, then the Court should explain why those decisions erred in

their interpretations of congressional intent and overrule them. It is

nof sound adjudication to simply ignore them while creating standards inconsistent with their holdings as to Congress' intent in granting federal courts jurisdiction to review state prisoner claims on habeas.
One final aspect of the Court's procedure in developing the new
habeas deserves mention. Although it may be true, as Justice Scalia
says, that it is a "tradition" in "a system based on precedent and
stare decisis, . .. to find each decision 'inherent' in earlier cases (how-

ever well concealed its presence might have been),' '585 the doctrine of
stare decisis is more than mere tradition. It also serves important purposes:
581. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 433, 499-500 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (Congress
could have left enforcement of federal constitutional rights in this area exclusively to state courts,
but chose instead to give the lower federal courts this power, and thus it would go against
congressional intent to deny state prisoners access to federal courts.). See Justice Brennan's
statement in Butler v. McKellar, 110 S.Ct. 1212 (1990):
It is Congress and not this Court who is .'responsible for defining the scope of the
writ."' Yet the majority, whose Members often pride themselves on their reluctance
to play an "activist" judicial role by infringing upon legislative prerogatives, does not
hesitate today to dismantle Congress' extension of federal habeas to state prisoners....
"Under the guise of fashioning a procedural rule, we are not justified in wiping 'out
the practical efficacy of a jurisdiction conferred by Congress on the District Courts."
Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1226-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
582. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989):
The dissent's charges of "judicial activism" and its assertion that "Congress has
determined" that collateral review of claims like those at issue in this case outweighs
any interest in bringing a final resolution to the criminal process ring quite hollow
indeed in the context of the federal habeas statute. The scope of federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction has undergone a substantial judicial expansion, and a return to what
"Congress intended" would reduce the scope of habeas jurisdiction far beyond the
extension of Stone v. Powell to Miranda claims.
Id. at 2885 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 252 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring) (Fay represents "a revisionist view of the historic function that [the]
writ was meant to perform").
583. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
584. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).'"
585. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2965 (1989) (Scalia, J.,concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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[I]t enhances the efficiency of judicial decisionmaking, allowing
judges to rely on settled law without having to reconsider the wisdom
of prior decisions in every case they confront, and ... fosters predictability in the law, permitting litigants and potential litigants to
act in the knowledge that precedent will not be overturned lightly
and ensuring that they will not be treated unfairly
as a result of
86
frequent or unanticipated changes in the law.
In light of these values, the Court's disregard for stare decisis
and continuity in its decisions developing the new habeas is particularly troubling, as these decisions deal with procedure. Procedure
is supposed to facilitate adjudication. It is the system of rules for
adjudication, and those who utilize the court system rely heavily on
those rules not changing midstream. This is particularly so when the
structure of adjudication is one as complicated as that involved in
habeas, which requires state prisoners who seek to have constitutional
claims adjudicated to negotiate not only several tiers of courts, but
two separate court systems. The Court itself has recognized this reliance interest in other contexts and applied new procedural rules pro58 7
spectively.
Yet, in its cases developing the new habeas, the Court has shown
surprisingly little concern for the detrimental reliance of habeas petitioners. Thus, in Stone v. Powell5 88 the Burger Court refused to give
prospective operation to its rule barring habeas review of fourth
amendment claims, despite clear reliance by the state prisoners in that
case upon the availability of habeas review in electing not to file a
petition for certiorari review on direct appeal.58 9 The Court, in dismissing their request that the new rule be applied prospectively, only
devoted a footnote to the discussion, noting that although the petitioners were not required to pursue direct review before the Court
before filing a habeas petition, they could have done so.19 They also
could have been prescient.
This tendency to change the rules without notice has increased
dramatically in the decisions of the Rehnquist Court. At least in Stone,
the Court gave the parties a chance to argue the merits of the proposed procedural change. Recent habeas decisions, however, do not
afford the petitioner even that opportunity. Thus, in Teague v. Lane,591
586. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 322 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
587. See England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422 (1964) (applying
holding regarding preclusive effect of litigating federal issue in state court in abstention case
prospectively only because of appellants' mistaken, but reasonable, interpretation of abstention
procedure).
588. 428 U.S. 465 (1975).
589. Id. at 495 n.38.
590. Id.
591. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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the plurality announced that habeas courts would only consider claims
that would constitute new rules of law if the rule at issue would apply
retroactively and established a new test both for what it means for
a claim to constitute a new rule and for determining whether such
a claim will be applied retroactively on habeas, all without the benefit
of any briefing or oral argument by the parties.5 92 This treatment is
particularly ironic in a case in which one major rationale for the
Court's decision is the need to treat similarly situated defendants
alike.5 93 Similarly, in Penry v. Lynaugh 9 4 the Court resolved a question that it had left open in Teague-whether its new retroactivity
approach would be applied in capital cases-with a three sentence
statement that the new approach would apply, 595 despite the fact that
the Court already had heard oral argument in Penry at the time that
the Court announced its decision in Teague, and, thus, there was no
opportunity at all for anyone to brief or argue the issue. 596 Indeed,
it appears that the only new retroactivity case from the 1990 Term
in which the Court had the benefit of full briefing and argument by
the parties with regard to the applicability of its new retroactivity
doctrine was Sawyer v. Smith- 97
The Court's lack of concern for the interests of petitioners and
for the impact that changing the applicable rules and procedures midstream has on these individuals stands in stark contrast to the concern
for certainty and protection of reliance interests with regard to the
states and their criminal procedures that the Court expresses in these
very same decisions.5 98 It suggests that the Court's main concern in
592. Id. at 300. The only discussion of retroactivity with regard to the fair cross section
claim raised by Teague was three pages in the amicus brief filed by the Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation, and that brief apparently did not urge the departures from Harlan's proposals
adopted by the plurality. Id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
593. Id. at 315.
594. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).

595. Id. at 2944. Justice O'Connor stated for the Court that
Teague was not a capital case, and the plurality opinion expressed no views regarding

how the retroactivity approach adopted in Teague would be applied in the capital
senteficing context. The plurality noted, however, that a criminal judgment necessarily
includes the sentence imposed and that collateral challenges to sentences "delay the
enforcement of the judgment at issue and decrease the possibility that 'there will at

some point be the certainty that comes with an end to litigation."' In our view, the
finality concerns underlying Justice Harlan's approach to retroactivity are applicable
in the capital sentencing context, as are the two exceptions to his general rule of

nonretroactivity.
Id. (citations omitted).

596. Id. at 2959 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf. Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 413-14 & n.3 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (because Stone had been
decided after the appellate court ruling in Brewer and its applicability had only been raised at

oral argument, consideration of its applicability would be inappropriate).
597.
598.

110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
See, e.g., Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1990) (noting that changes in
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the cases developing the new habeas has not been to render a principled decision in the particular case, but rather to use each case as
a vehicle for rewriting its jurisdictional statutes.
C. The Functional Analysis of Rights
The analysis the Court adopted to limit habeas also potentially
has profound consequences for the Court's philosophy of rights.
Writing for the Court in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
Unitedfor Separation of Church and State, Inc.,5 99 then Justice Rehnquist rejected the idea that citizen standing could be conferred based
on the importance of the constitutional right involved: "We know
of no principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of constitutional
values or a complementary 'sliding scale' of standing which might
permit respondents to invoke the judicial power of the United
States. ' " w In Stone v. Powell,601 he already had joined a decision that
did so. As discussed in Part III, the old habeas was established as
the primary federal remedy for errors in the criminal process and the
major vehicle for articulation and refinement of federal constitutional
rights. 60 2 Thus, an analysis of the scope of habeas jurisdiction that
limits that jurisdiction to enforcement of rights that are guilt-related,
or that possess some other salient characteristic, without any concomitant expansion of other remedies available for their enforcement,
necessarily creates "a hierarchy of constitutional rights for purposes
both of enforcement and of substantive articulation." 3 The hierapplicable law intrude on states by forcing them to continually marshall resources to keep state
prisoners in prison whose convictions were constitutional under law prevailing when those
convictions became final, and that "[sitate courts are understandably frustrated when they
faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to have a federal court discover, during a [habeas]
proceeding, new constitutional commands.") (citations omitted). Imagine how frustrated the state
judge would be if she were placed in the petitioner's position so that the newly-discovered rule
was going to result in her continued incarceration or execution because the procedure for
vindicating her rights in habeas proceedings had suddenly disappeared.
599. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
600. Id. at 484.
601. 428 U.S. 465 (1975).
602. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1087.
603. Id. The Court has not shown a tendency to provide alternative federal remedies for the
vindication of those constitutional rights for which it has denied habeas review. For instance,
the Court has held that a state criminal court determination of a fourth amendment search and
seizure issue on a motion to suppress precludes relitigation of this issue in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action by the state prisoner against the police officers involved. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90
(1980). In so holding, the Court not only applied preclusion principles to a claim that otherwise
could not be heard in the lower federal courts because of Stone, but in fact extended those
principles by allowing the police officers (who were not in privity with the state) to use the
state's prior victory. Resnik, supra note 189, at 970-71. Thus, the only vehicle for federal review

April 1991]

THE NEW HABEAS

archy created by the Stone analysis was not the one that might have
been predicted from Stone's emphasis on guilt-related rights. As discussed above, the Court was unwilling to adopt a position that rights
could not serve important values unrelated to guilt.6 4 Thus, for instance, in Rose v. Mitchell,605 the Court upheld enforcement of the
right to be indicted by a grand jury whose foreman was chosen without racial bias although that right was not guilt-related. 60 6 Rose, however, illustrates that Stone did indeed create a hierarchy of rights, for
one important way in which the Rose Court distinguished Stone was
by finding that a "more important" right than the right to have illegally-seized evidence excluded was involved in Rose.
While the fourth amendment exclusionary rule at issue in Stone
was "a judicially created remedy rather than a personal constitutional
right," the equal protection claim involved in Rose concerned "the
direct command of the Fourteenth Amendment, and federal statutes
passed under that Amendment."6w From its inception the fourteenth
amendment directly forbade discrimination in state selection of grand
jury members, while the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule
"only recently have been applied fully to the States." 60 Thus, the
"constitutional interests" that the federal habeas court seeks to vindicate in a case involving grand jury discrimination are "substantially
more compelling than those at issue in Stone, "6 and therefore, "the
strong interest in making available federal habeas corpus relief outweighs the costs associated with such relief.' '610 The Stone analysis
made it inevitable that rights would become prioritized; the Court
simply has done so in a more ad hoc fashion than it would have if
it had accepted innocence as the only value worth furthering through
habeas proceedings.
The Court's view that some constitutional rights are not as important or worthy of enforcement as others has its origins in the philosophies of Bator and Friendly and in their apparent disagreement
of fourth amendment claims is the slight possibility that the Supreme Court will grant a petition
for certiorari on direct review. Fourth amendment claims clearly have become a category of
constitutional rights that are "disfavored" for purposes of federal review. See geherally id. at
968-74 (discussing McCurry).
604. See supra text accompanying notes 249-254.
605. 443 U.S. 545 (1978).
606. Id. at 559.
607. * Id. at 561-62.
608. Id.
609. Id. at 564.
610. Id.; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374-76 (1986) (rejecting application
of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1975), to ineffective assistance of counsel claim because of
differences in nature of fourth and sixth amendment claims).
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with the doctrine of selective incorporation. Bator's epistemological
position led him to assert that the vindication of rights existing in
some ultimate sense could not serve as a justification for habeas review.61 ' Indeed, Bator suggests that the very existence of a right "apart
from the institutional processes which we create to determine whether
612
the right has been violated in a particular case" is problematic.
Further, Bator believed that just because a right was labelled "constitutional" did not necessarily mean that it was important. 61 According to Bator, because
the "existence" of a right often turns on the narrowest kind of difference arising between judges in highly particularistic assessments
of evidence or in judgments as to the proper application of the law
to the evidence ...

it is hard to see the result as automatically crucial

in opinion is formulated
to justice merely because that difference
6 14
as a holding as to constitutional rights.
Similarly, after selective incorporation, Friendly believed that "the
'constitutional' label no longer assists in appraising how far society
should go in permitting relitigation of criminal convictions" because
constitutional violations no longer carry "a connotation of outrage." , 5 The incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights into the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment meant that the number
of claims of error in state criminal proceedings that could be cast in
constitutional terms had expanded vastly, and that, therefore, issues
deemed constitutional no longer were necessarily of great impor61 6
tance.
The conception that constitutional rights have no intrinsic value
and, therefore, must be justified in functional terms (as it was imported from Bator's and Friendly's proposals into the Court's analysis in Stone and its progeny) has much more serious consequences
for the Court's philosophy of rights than merely their prioritization.
As discussed in Part II, the Stone analysis marked a shift in philosophical focus from the discourse of rights to the discourse of interests. In establishing the new habeas, Stone and the cases that
followed it required that enforcement of constitutional rights in habeas proceedings serve some functional purpose before the federal
court could consider the merits of state prisoner constitutional claims.
This functional judgment as to the utility of particular rights based
on their guilt-relatedness or other purpose
611.
612.

Bator, supra note 13, at 450.
Id. at 449.

613.

Id.at 508.

614.
615.
616.

Id.
Friendly, supra note 14, at 156-57.
Id. at 155-57.
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entails a serious risk of impoverishment of the symbolic qualities of
the rights. . . . [P]art of the evocative quality of a right such as the
privilege against self-incrimination is its capacity to resonate simultaneously with interests in personal autonomy, limited government, fair (in the sense of balanced) process, and accurate guilt/
innocence determinations. The power of the right inheres in its capacity to evoke a broad range of potential
applications even as it
61 7
is applied in only a single instance.

The Court's mode of analysis, which focuses on a single value (such
as accuracy of the guilt determination) as the only value important
enough to justify federal court intrusion into state criminal proceedings, ignores the broader purposes served by rights in our constitutional scheme, replacing the rich complex of values reflected in
constitutional rights with "a functionalist reduction of the right's con618
tent."

At the same time, this focus on a particular value as the important one to be served by rights often does not result in even the
617. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1091.
618. Id. at 1092; cf. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 544-45 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(footnotes omitted):
The majority's reformulation of the traditional understanding of habeas corpus appears
to be premised on the notion that only constitutional violations which go to guilt or
innocence are sufficiently serious to implicate ...

"fundamental fairness." ...

If

accuracy is the only value [of our criminal justice system], then many of our constitutional protections-such as the Fifth Amendment rights against compelled selfincrimination and the Eighth Amendment tight against cruel and unusual punishment
.. -are not only irrelevant, but possibly counter-productive. Our Constitution, however, and our decision to adopt an "accusatorial," rather than an "inquisitorial"
system of justice, reflect a different choice. That choice is to afford the individual
certain protections ... even if those rights do not necessarily implicate the accuracy
of the truth-finding proceedings. Rather, those protections are an aspect of the
fundamental fairness, liberty, and individual dignity that our society affords to all,
even those charged with heinous crimes.
Compare Justice Brennan's statement in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1975):
This denigration of constitutional guarantees and constitutionallymandatedprocedures,
relegated by the Court to the status of mere utilitarian tools, must appall citizens
taught to expect judicial respect and support for their constitutional rights. Even if
punishment of the "guilty" were society's highest value-and procedural safeguards
denigrated to this end-in a constitution that a majority of the Members of this Court
would prefer, that is not the ordering of priorities under the Constitution forged by
the Framers, and this Court's sworn duty is to uphold that Constitution and not to
frame its own. The procedural safeguards mandated in the Framers' Constitution. are
not admonitions to be tolerated only to the extent they serve functional purposes that
ensure that the "guilty" are punished and the "innocent" freed; rather every guarantee
enshrined in the Constitution ... is by it endowed with an independent vitality and
value, and this Court is not free to curtail those constitutional guarantees even to
punish the most obviously guilty.... To sanction disrespect and disregard for the
Constitution in the name of protecting society from lawbreakers is to make the
government itself lawless and to subvert those values upon which our ultimate freedom
and liberty depend.
Id. at 523-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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furtherance of the value chosen, as often the real value being furthered is the procedural value of finality. Thus, the symbolic quality
and moral force of rights often is sacrificed in the service of nothing
more than rhetoric.
Further, a functional analysis of rights does not merely denigrate
the moral force of rights; it is inconsistent with the very existence of
that moral force. 61 9 The moral, as opposed to legal, force of rights
arises from their justification in terms of an overall philosophy. 620 The
moral force of a right creates a moral presumption in favor of respecting that right, even though it may not be useful to exercise the
right in a particular case or may be useful in a particular case to interfere with the right. 62' This moral force constitutes a justificatory
threshold for the protection of the right. It requires a showing of
would be served
something other than just the mere net utility that
622
denied.
be
may
right
the
of
before enforcement
While a utilitarian theory can create legal rights that have moral
force as part of a normative theory, a utilitarian analysis cannot accommodate that moral force. Thus, a cost-benefit analysis might lead
to the establishment of a certain system of legal rules based on their
utility, and the rights conferred by those rules would have a moral
force because they would be justified. 623 Their utilitarian justification,
however, would not preclude a direct utilitarian argument that in a
given case net utility in fact would not be served by enforcing those
rights. 624 Yet, the justificatory threshold created by the moral force
of the rights requires a higher showing for interference with their exercise. Utilitarian theories thus suffer from an internal incoherence
with regard to rights. Utility-based normative theories regard legal
rules and institutions as justified if they are supported by utilitarian
arguments, and therefore consider the rights that they generate as
having moral force. Yet those normative theories do not logically generate any obligation to adhere to those rules in particular cases in
which utility is not served. 625
The Court's functionalist approach to the enforcement of constitutional rights, which requires a demonstration of net utility before
the right will be enforced, destroys the moral force 626 that is an es619.
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.

Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1092.
Lyons, Utility and Rights, in Timoims oF RIGHTs 110, 113 (J. Waldron ed. 1984).
Id.
Id. at 119-20.
Id. at 113, 121.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 123-28.
Cf. R. DwoUUN, supra note 160, at 185 ("The Constitution fuses legal and moral
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sential component of constitutional rights. Under that approach, a
constitutional right has no force beyond the utility of its enforcement
in particular cases. Thus, it loses its separate existence and collapses
into whatever remedy a particular court is willing to provide for its
enforcement. This denigration of the moral force of constitutional
rights, and the concomitant collapsing of right into remedy, is another
theme that runs through the cases establishing the new habeas. Once
again, this trend culminates in the Court's new retroactivity doctrine.
Under the Teague v. Lane627 threshold test, the Court refuses to recognize the existence of a new constitutional right unless it is willing
to enforce that right in the case before it by applying it retroactively
to that petitioner. The Court's threshold test for retroactivity thus
expresses its view that the existence of constitutional rights is a function of the willingness of a court to provide a remedy for their violation in a particular case. 62s
D.

The Loss of the Neutrality of Procedure

Collapsing the constitutional right into its remedy not only destroys the moral force of rights, it also destroys the neutrality of procedure. Under the Court's functional analysis of habeas jurisdiction,
the availability of habeas is inextricably bound up with the particular
right the petitioner is seeking to enforce. Habeas is no longer a neutral
procedural mechanism for litigating issues regarding the violation of
constitutional rights; instead it is a part of the substantive scope of
some rights. Again, the Court's new retroactivity doctrine illustrates
this proposition. Just as under the Teague threshold test a court will
not announce a right if it will not enforce that right on habeas, habeas
review itself is not part of the bundle of protected interests that makes
up constitutional rights not subject to retroactive application.
The neutrality of procedure implies several things. First, it implies that procedure will be content neutral-that its rules will apply
equally to all disputes without regard to the substantive claim involved. 6 9 Discussions of procedure assume "that it is both possible
issues, by making the validity of a law depend on the answer to complex moral problems, like
the problem of whether a particular statute respects the inherent equality of all men.")
627. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
628. Cf. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 380 (1986) ("We decline to hold that the
scope of the right to effective assistance of counsel is altered ... simply because the right is

asserted on federal habeas review rather than on direct review.").
629. I do not mean to suggest that procedure and substance are not intimately interrelated.
Indeed, it is an underlying assumption of this Article that the procedures available for adjudication
of claims necessarily will affect the nature of the substantive rights that evolve through the
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and intelligent to consider process rules and principles apart from
particular substantive objectives.' '630 Clearly, these assumptions no
longer can be made with regard to habeas jurisdiction. Habeas has
become a procedural mechanism with a substance-specific content
rather than a trans-substantive mechanism for the consideration of
allegations of unconstitutional incarceration.
Second, the neutrality of procedure implies that the structure of
procedure serves its own set of societal values, and that these values
go beyond its use merely as a mechanism to reach a particular result
in a given case. Procedural systems reflect many "valued features"
that society believes important: autonomy; provision of persuasion
opportunities; concentration, diffusion, and reallocation of power;
impartiality; rationality and norm enforcement; ritual and formality;
finality; revisionism; economy; consistency; and differentiation. 63'
Each of these important and sometimes conflicting characteristics in
turn reflects values that resonate on moral, political and symbolic,
as well as practical levels. Thus, for instance, litigant autonomy stresses
the importance of individualism, expresses society's concern for individual dignity, legitimates the coercive power of the state by creating
at least the illusion of consent, and expresses the belief that self-interest of the parties will lead to more accurate outcomes. 6 2 Revisionism expresses the hope of being able to correct error, of altering
outcomes based on changed circumstances, of underlining the importance of some decisions by having them made repeatedly and by
important actors, and of creating the sense of a full and fair hearing
of claims. 633 It expresses a political preference for diffusion of power
and the state's serious evaluation of the rights of individuals. Procedure thus serves as "a mechanism for expressing political and social
relationships ... and embodies deeply held, albeit often unarticulated, views of human relationships, of the importance and difficulty
of passing judgments on individuals' conduct, and of the place of
government in citizens' lives." 63 4 Choices of procedural structures that
adjudicatory process. Cf. Scott, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule lOb-5, in R. COVER & 0.
Fss, TnE STRuCTURE oF PROCEDURE 86 (1979) (discussing way in which FED. R. Crv. P. 23 has
affected the development of the substantive elements of securities fraud). Nevertheless, while
procedure and substance are intimately, and inevitably, related, there still are proper and improper
ways in which the desire to reach a particular result can influence decisions as to the way in
which process is structured, Cover, supra note 558, at 721, and this proper relationship between
procedure and substance is grounded in the independence and neutrality of procedure.
630. R. COVER & 0. FIss, supra note 629, at 75.
631. Resnik, supra note 189, at 859.
632. Id. at 845-47.
633. Id. at 855.
634. Id. at 840; cf. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (opinion of Frankfurter,
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reflect or deny various valued features are moral and political choices
as to the values society deems important.
Just as the Court has failed to acknowledge the complexity of
the values reflected in constitutional rights, it also has failed to acknowledge and address the political, social, and moral values reflected
in procedural structures. In the habeas area, the Court has made decisions based on a particular procedural value-that of finality. Yet,
the Court's choice of that value has been made in a vacuum, rather
than in light of the many other competing procedural values implicated by the complex litigation structure established by federal habeas
corpus review of state court determinations. Thus, the Court treats
economy, finality, and respect for the decisions of state courts as
though they were the only values implicated. The very structure
through which the Court makes its habeas decisions, however, reflects
the importance of a very different set of procedural values:
The [Supreme Court's] majority opinions read as if differentiation,
diffusion of power, deliberate norm enforcement, additional persuasion opportunities, and revisionism command little or no respect.
Yet these valued features of procedural models are the very reasons
that the Court has had to decide these cases. Almost all the lawsuits
arose because Congress or the courts had created litigation schemes
that incorporated those features. The Supreme Court's decisions to
eliminate them do not address why
such complex procedures were
635
made available in the first place.
Thus, just as the Court's functional analysis of constitutional rights
has led it to denigrate the moral force of those rights, the Court's
result-oriented analysis of the scope of habeas jurisdiction has led it
to denigrate the values reflected in the habeas procedure itself. For
proponents of the new habeas, habeas corpus does not embody "the
manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal
liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary
federal judicial review; ' 63 6 it is merely a mechanism for reaching a
result.
The Court's failure to deal with the implications of either the
procedural structures of the old habeas or the new habeas again emphasizes that, in developing the new habeas, the Court failed to address the inconsistency of the doctrines it created with its prior decisions
in Brown v. Allen63 7 and Fay v. Noi, 6 38 and the procedural values
J.), quoted in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 525 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The history
of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure.").
635.

Resnik, supra note 189, at 982 (discussing Court's use of preclusion principles to limit

review).
636.
637.
638.

Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1968).
344 U.S. 443 (1953).
372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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that those decisions found reflected in the congressional grant of jurisdiction embodied in section 2254. This argument also points up
another cost of the use of the indirection of discretionary doctrine
and the uncertainty of policy argument to develop the new habeas.
The world of criminal trials hypothesized in the Court's procedural doctrines creating the new habeas is a quite remarkable one.
In this world, prisoners are always capable of making intelligent and
well-informed procedural decisions and are always represented by
counsel that is competent and free from time pressures. State courts
in this hypothetical world are able to devote all the time needed for
in-depth consideration of claims and do so free from political and
societal pressures. In this world, not only is the failure to raise meritorious constitutional claims always the result of a deliberate and
informed decision (and few claims are meritorious anyway), but the
law rarely changes in ways that are crucial to the fairness of convictions. 639 This world, of course, is not the real world of criminal
law at all. The methodology the Court used to develop the new habeas, however, allows both the Court and society to pretend that it
is.
The Warren Court's vision of the state criminal justice system
differed greatly from the vision reflected in the current Court's focus
on finality. The Warren Court assumed that criminal defendants were
at a serious disadvantage in a system controlled by the state, and that
they often lacked the basic tools for effective litigation. These assumptions underlie both the Warren Court's substantive doctrine of
selective incorporation and its procedural doctrine of expansive habeas review. 640
We all assume that the current criminal law system is not the one
that the Warren Court confronted; indeed, this is so in large part
because of the internalization of many of the Warren Court era reforms by the states and their officials.64 1 We also know, however, that
the current criminal justice process is not the utopia posited by doctrines such as procedural bar and the Rehnquist Court's retroactivity
doctrine. Instead of confronting the procedural system that the Warren Court established and the procedural values that it reflected, the
638. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
639. Cf. Resnik, supra note 189, at 1007 ("Some Supreme Court decisions imply that the
first tier is always staffed by able decisionmakers who render judgments on the basis of
information provided by autonomous, competent, fully informed litigants and their attorneys,
who in turn make well-considered choices as they wend their way through well-delineated
procedural paths.").
640. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1037 (dominant theme of the Warren Court
innovations was equality).
641. See supra text accompanying note 491.
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Burger and Rehnquist Courts used discretionary doctrine and unsupported assumptions to create a system, with very different values
from those fostered by the Warren Court, and with only accidental
relation to the real nature of the state criminal process. As Professor
Resnik has stated: "The difficulty is that the Court has no information about the actual costs of any procedural models. The Court's
utilitarian calculus is only pseudoscientific. All the relevant variables
are blanks, filled in by intuition." 642 Thus, the Court's failure to confront the procedural values reflected in the structure of habeas review
has deprived both the Court and society of the opportunity to make
an informed choice about the appropriate process for making determinations as to the constitutional incarceration and execution of state
prisoners.
The principle of procedural neutrality also implies that a court
normally will make procedural decisions based on the procedural values reflected in particular procedural rules rather than on the desire
to reach a particular result. Although this ideal does not mean that,
given a choice between two necessarily conflicting procedural values,
the Court's choice cannot be guided by a consideration of whether
the result it obtains by picking one value or the other is favored, it
does mean that a court should make procedural decisions initially
(and to the extent possible) in terms of the applicable procedural val643
ues reflected by the procedural rules.
Procedural decisions that are not based on generalized principles
derived from procedural values, but on hostility to enforcement of
the underlying claim, subvert the adjudicatory process. Such decisions
do not further any "consistent, coherent substantive policy, given
64
what is presumed to be the operative rule of law to be applied,"
because the only reason given for the procedural decision is a hostility
to the substantive rule at issue. A procedural decision directly based
on a distaste for enforcement of the underlying substantive claim thus
creates uncertainty in the substantive law by leaving a claim formally
recognized, but purposefully rendered insecure6 45 Result-oriented
procedural decisions also fail to treat litigants equally because they
provide no "generalizable, trans-substantive principle which would
presumably benefit and burden parties regardless of their positions
on the matter before the court." ' Further, they give no guidance as
to how to predict the impact of the decision on future decisions re642.
643.
644.
645.

Resnik, supra note 189, at 1013 (citation omitted).
Cover, supra note 558, at 726.
Id.
Id. at 727.

646. Id.
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garding process: if the disfavored nature of the claim justifies one
procedural decision against the claimant, what other further unfavorable procedural decisions will it justify as well? "[T]he sum effect
of calling an action disfavored seems to be that lightning may strike
'' 7
at any time or in any way; we know only which party it will strike. 16
Finally, such decisions explicitly point to the lack of justification for
the decision in terms of procedural values.64r8
The Court's mode of analysis in establishing the new habeas
clearly has created these effects. Time and again the Court has established a test for making procedural decisions based not on a consideration of the procedural values implicated by the structure of
habeas established by Congress, but on the basis of the nature of the
substantive claim involved, and the nature of the litigants. 6 9 Does the
constitutional claim go to the accuracy of the fact-finding process,
or is it one that should otherwise be valued because of some functional purpose that it serves? Can the petitioner show factual innocence? Does past precedent dictate the claim or does the claim
remove primary conduct from the power of the state to punish or
create a watershed rule of criminal procedure?
As this Article has attempted to convey, this type of analysis has
created considerable uncertainty as to the status of substantive constitutional principles regarding criminal process and their enforceability in habeas proceedings. Certain types of claims, such as those
regarding the fourth amendment, clearly have become disfavored,
thereby rendering their status and the status of similar claims uncertain. 6 0 Certain types of litigants-those unable to show satisfactorily their "innocence" -have become disfavored as well, thereby
destroying the equality of treatment implied by the neutrality of procedure. At. the same time, the Court's procedural decisions have left
647. Id. at 728.
648. Id.
649. It appears that the Court has extended this habit of making procedural decisions on the
basis of substantive considerations to areas outside habeas, at least when the decisions relate to
the scope of federal court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson,
478 U.S. 804 (1986) (suggesting that whether or not federal question jurisdiction exists should
be determined by an evaluation of the nature of the federal interest at stake); Franchise Tax Bd.
v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1 (1983) (finding no federal
question jurisdiction because state was plaintiff).
650. Consider, for example, Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1986), in which
the state used the disfavored status of fourth amendment claims to construct an argument that
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in which the primary allegation of ineffective assistance
was the failure to properly challenge an illegal search and seizure should not be cognizable on
habeas because to do so would allow the habeas court to consider the underlying fourth
amendment claim.

April 1991]

THE NEW HABEAS

1057

petitioners that followed with little guidance as to the future course
the Court's procedural decisions might take, a circumstance that
sometimes has operated to their distinct detriment. For example, if
a non-guilt-related claim was disfavored in Stone v. Powell,6 51 did that
mean that other petitioners whose claims might be categorized as nonguilt-related would have to meet a similar threshold? Or did Stone
really only express a specific distaste for fourth amendment claims?
Does a factual innocence standard somehow apply to the consideration of challenges to death sentences, and if so, how? The Court's
analysis in developing the new habeas has the appearance of a "purposeful, result-oriented refusal to permit process to play its accustomed rule of reducing uncertainty with no countervailing procedural
objective to justify that refusal.' '652
Procedure facilitates the adjudicatory process. Based on the
maxim that "where the law gives a right, it also gives a remedy," new
procedures have developed in response to the need for the effective
enforcement of rights. 653 Thus, it is assumed that procedure will occupy "a simple and natural relation with substantive law. ' 654 In the
hands of proponents of the new habeas, however, procedure has not
been used to facilitate adjudication of claims of constitutional violations, but rather to throw stumbling blocks in the path of effective
federal enforcement of constitutional rights raised in state criminal
proceedings.655 The Court's decisions have turned habeas into "a law
of closure, of complex procedural obstacles that preclude adjudica' 656
tion on the merits.
E.

The Devaluation of the Importance of the Individual

The Court's analysis in the cases creating the new habeas also
has devalued the importance of the individual in her relationship with
the state. This is a necessary result of the utilitarian choices against
the enforcement of individual rights and the provision of procedure
as a mechanism to protect the individual frbm denial of those rights
by the state that these decisions represent. A procedural system that
651.
652.

428 U.S. 465 (1975).
Cover, supra note 558, at 731.

653. Zeigler, supra note 528, at 667-71 (discussing development of equity jurisdiction in
response to need for more effective procedure for enforcement of rights).
654. Id. at 670 (quoting C. HEPBuRN, THE IsroxucAL DEvEoPmErr OF CODE PLEADING IN
AMmMCA AND ENGImD 21 (1897)).
655. Cf. id. at 665 (chief legacy of Burger Court may be its creation of impediments to the

enforcement of rights).
656.

Resnik, supra note 189, at 874.
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allows review and revision favors expending society's resources in order to underscore the worth of the individual. 6 7 A procedural system
that denies opportunities for revision, however, favors concentration
of power, finality, and economy over such concerns as impartiality
and symbolic valuing of the individual.6 58 The Court's choice of a
habeas structure that values finality rather than one that values revision opportunities thus represents a choice to diminish the importance of the individual in the structuring of criminal process.
The Court's use of the rhetoric of innocence to reach this result
has troubling consequences of its own for the value of the individual
within the system. By using an innocence standard as the basis for
apportioning access to the federal courts, the Court translates what
is essentially an allocation decision into a worthiness decision.6 5 9 In
large part, this characteristic is what makes the innocence standard
a powerful rhetorical device. Instead of making an explicit decision
about allocation of a resource, a worthiness decision makes the resource apparently available to everyone who is worthy of it." ° In practice, however, "worthiness" is defined in such a way that sufficient
applicants will be found wanting to satisfy the constraints imposed
by society's determination as to the amount of resources that it is
willing to allocate. 6 ' At the same time, a worthiness standard creates
the illusion that society is not making a choice as to how much of
the resource to make available: it is theoretically possible that every
petitioner could be found worthy and the implication is that all would
then receive the scarce resource.6 62 A worthiness decision thus allows
society to avoid facing the fact that it is denying fundamental values
through its choice. It allows society to say that it is not choosing to
sacrifice fundamental rights, and "the sacrifices which do occur are
due not to a societal unwillingness to forgo other goods but to individual failings. ' 66 3 Use of an innocence standard thus allows the
Court to allocate access to habeas review in such a way that convicted
criminals rarely will be able to gain federal review, while simultaneously allowing society to ignore the choice that is being made to
deny access to individuals who have meritorious constitutional claims,
657. Id. at 857.
658. Id. at 857, 860.
659. See generally G. CALABREsI & P. BoBBITT, TRAGIC CHOicEs72-73 (1978) (discussing the
conversion of the allocation decision from one based on relative worthiness to one based on
absolute worthiness).
660. Id. at 73.
661. Id.
662. Id. at 74.
663. Id. at 77.
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and the consequences of that choice in terms of unconstitutional incarceration, and, in many cases, death.
The moral worthiness approach to allocation of resources "debases honesty" and "adds to the tragic outcome borne by the chosen
victim and his family much of the cost of the process as well."6' In
this Article, I have suggested some of the ways in which the Court's
analysis in cases establishing the new habeas stacks the deck against
the petitioner. 665 The Court has made assumptions about the utopian
nature of current state criminal proceedings and has based its habeaslimiting doctrines on those assumptions. Through these doctrines, the
Court (and, through it, society) has allocated the risks of the actual
inadequacies of the state criminal justice system to the petitioner, who
has no control over the criminal justice system and normally has little
control over her processing through it. Surely this allocation makes
no sense in a system that purports to grant these same petitioners
constitutional rights as protections from the inadequacies of process.
Certainly, it is demeaning to blame individuals for the deficiencies
of a process over which they have little or no control.
If society desires to continuously improve the criminal justice
system, then the risk of loss from its failures should be placed on the
state as the party who has control of that process and the ability to
change it. If, in fact, the judgment being made is that prisoners are
not entitled to constitutional treatment, then honesty dictates that we
say this is so.
Moral worthiness allocations are also suspect in that they "often
simply reflect[] a hidden political choice to prefer 6ne group to another, which avoids affronting egalitarian conceptions because the
responsible decision was cast in terms which seemed to make the pre664. Id.
665. There are many other instances that I have not addressed. Consider, for example, Justice
Brennan's statement regarding the effect of the Court's new retroactivity doctrine:

This limitation of the federal courts' function creates a systemic bias within the habeas
system in favor of narrow interpretations of criminal procedure protections. Habeas
petitioners may no longer benefit from legal rulings that expand required procedural

protections. But under the Court's regime, habeas petitioners who have valid claims
under "prevailing" law even as defined today may nevertheless lose their claims should
a federal court on habeas review decide to issue a "new" rule of law in favor of the

State ....
Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1221 n.4 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Sawyer
v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 2836 n.l (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court has
relied on diversity of opinion ainong lower state courts as indicating that a rule was not
"dictated," but refuses in Sawyer to consider agreement of state courts with a federal rule as
evidence that the rule was "dictated"; "State decisions cannot be deemed relevant to the Teague
inquiry only to the extent that they disprove the rootedness of a constitutional right").
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ferred position open to anyone. ' 666 Troubling as it seems, use of the
innocence standard may, at least at an unconscious level, suffer from
this failing as well. Who are the guilty? They certainly are not a completely homogeneous group. They are embezzlers, tax evaders, robbers, drug dealers, and persons who have committed acts of violence
so far beyond the pale of what we consider human as to render them
incomprehensible. But, some things we do know about the guiltythey are disproportionately poor, disproportionately lower class, and
disproportionately minorities.6 67 Clearly, few of them have much clout
with their congressional representatives, or much in common with
members of the Supreme Court. They are disproportionately "powerless and inarticulate. ' 668 Given these characteristics of the guilty,
the rhetoric of innocence takes on potentially uncomfortable political
connotations as well.
One might ask, however, why society should allocate resources
to underscore the individual worth and protect the rights of the morally unworthy through the provision of habeas review? After all, they
have not respected the rights of others. The level of violence in our
society today means that few of us have escaped completely the experience of violent crime; we all have been touched by it, if not personally, then through our friends or relatives. Few of us do not know,
or at least sympathize with, the fear, humiliation, sense of powerlessness, and desire for revenge that violent crime inflicts upon its
victims, as well as the physical pain and emotional scars that it leaves
behind. Yet, legal decisions in their consequences are just as surely
acts of violence as are robbery and murder. 6 9 What differentiates
legal decision from violent crime is process. If we deny the morally
unworthy access to the very process that we have deemed essential
to the making of the official determination of unworthiness, do we
not as a society in some sense become robbers and murderers as well?
F. The Trivialization of the Role of Federal Courts
The final cost that flows from the process used to develop the
new habeas is the waste of federal court resources. I have suggested
666.
667.

G. CALABRSI & P. BoBalrr, supra note 659, at 73.

Seidman, supra note 15, at 501 (the group subjected to punishment is a subpopulation

that may be predisposed to blame anyway because of deviant lifestyle or racial or class
characteristics, and the system proceeds on the assumption that they have committed many
crimes).
668. Id.
669. Cf. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1608 (1986) (the legal interpretation that is a precondition for violent incarceration is itself an implement of violence).
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in this Article that the new habeas silences the voice of the lower federal courts. More accurately, perhaps, the new habeas trivializes the
voice of the lower federal courts by changing the terms of the dialogue. Because the Court has restricted the new habeas through indirection rather than reinterpretation of section 2254, federal courts
still have jurisdiction over state prisoner petitions alleging unconstitutional incarceration, and petitioners no doubt will continue to seek
review. Eventually, state prisoners may view habeas review as so futile
that they will stop seeking it, but at least for the immediate future,
this seems unlikely. Thus, the new habeas does not achieve finality
and economy in the sense of an end to litigation and to the accompanying expenditure of judicial resources.
While the new habeas thus has not stopped habeas litigation, it
has "reshaped and diluted the utility of the questions litigated. 670
Under the new habeas, the federal courts' time will be spent, not deciding the merits of the constitutional issues raised by state prisoners,
but rather deciding issues relating to the discretionary procedures that
the new habeas places as obstacles in the path of reaching the merits.
Was there cause and prejudice for procedural default of a claim? Does
the petitioner satisfy the criterion of actual innocence, whatever they
may be? Is the petitioner's claim dictated by prior precedent? If not,
is it one involving constitutionally protected primary conduct or a
punishment that the state cannot impose, or should it be considered
a "watershed" rule of criminal procedure substantially likely to increase the accuracy of the trial process?
A thorough consideration of these issues often will involve at
least as much time as would simply deciding the merits of.the constitutional claim. Indeed, as discussed in Part II, determining some
of these issues requires an analysis that is almost the functional equivalent of a determination of the merits. Yet, nothing that furthers the
purposes of constitutional adjudication-dispute resolution and norm
articulation-will come of these efforts. The federal courts normally
will not be able to make a decision as to the constitutionality of a
state prisoner's incarceration; rather, they merely will make a decision
that the state court's determination of that issue must be considered
final. Similarly, the federal courts' opinions will say little that constitutes an actual decision about the appropriate normative interpretation of constitutional principles applicable to the criminal process
because their decisions will rarely decide the merits of a constitutional
claim (although, under Teague v. Lane,671 they may often discuss those
670.
671.

Resnik, supra note 189, at 963.
489 U.S. 288 (1987).
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claims extensively at the level of dicta).67 2 Clearly, much of what lower
federal courts will do under the new habeas will be a colossal waste
of their time. The final irony of the Court's cost-benefit analysis of
habeas review is that the habeas structure it has led the Court to create
wastes the very judicial resources that the Court purports to conserve.
Further, it seems unlikely that the lower federal courts will give
up their ability to decide the merits of federal constitutional claims
without a fight. Those courts will no doubt feel the need to reach the
merits of constitutional claims that appear meritorious. In order to
do so under the new habeas, however, federal judges will be forced
to make rigid conclusions about the requirements of constitutional
law and the actions of state courts. They will have to find developments in constitutional law "dictated" by past precedent and state
court analyses of constitutional issues "unreasonable." Forcing the
federal courts into these types of extreme doctrinal commitments can
only further harm the process of constitutional adjudication.

Conclusion
The history of the development of the new habeas provides a
good illustration of the process by which a Court, faced with the precedent of an ideologically incompatible Court, goes about changing
legal doctrine, and the consequences of its choice of procedure as the
means for doing so. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts have developed
a habeas jurisdiction totally inconsistent with the habeas of Brown
v. A len673 and Fay v. Noia,67 4 not by directly confronting those precedents, but rather by ignoring them. Through a combination of
Friendly's rhetoric of innocence and Bator's test for finality, those
Courts developed a series of purportedly discretionary limits on the
federal courts' exercise of their habeas jurisdiction which have de facto
altered that jurisdiction beyond recognition. Indeed, the result of the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts' efforts is the restructuring of federalstate relations in the area of state criminal procedure in a manner
similar to, though by no means identical with, the way those relations
were structured prior to the Warren Court era and the advent of selective incorporation. Moreover, by altering the process by which constitutional adjudication takes place-by moving from a system of
dialectical federalism to one of deference to state court constitutional
672. Cf.
information
673. 344
674. 372

Resnik, supra note 189, at 962 (efforts of lower federal courts "give[] us little
about public norms other than the desire for first tier power and finality").
U.S. 443 (1953).
U.S. 391 (1963).
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determinations-those Courts necessarily have altered the future shape
of the substantive content of constitutional doctrine as well.
Even if one agrees with the result of this process, which returns
control over criminal procedure to the courts who are most intimately
involved with the administration of the state criminal justice system,
the costs of the means utilized by the Court to bring about this result
have been substantial. The methodology developed by the Court to
curtail habeas jurisdiction has changed the entire complexion of constitutional adjudication. Principled decision based on the facts of individual cases has been replaced by policy analysis based on
unsupported, and often unwarranted, policy assumptions; analysis of
constitutional rights has been replaced by utilitarian weighing of interests; and trans-substantive procedural rules have been replaced by
content specific ones. The value placed on the importance of the individual in her relationship with the state, implicit in the idea of a
Bill of Rights, has been diminished. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the importance of the lower federal courts as participants
in the development of constitutional doctrine has not merely been
curtailed, but has been trivialized.
The history of the development of the new habeas also provides
an exegesis on the value of procedure as part of an adjudicatory system, for the value of procedure is called into sharp question by the
debate over habeas jurisdiction. The rights applied to the states through
selective incorporation and enforced through habeas proceedings were
procedural rights. They reflected the Warren Court's belief that procedure was important, and that the provision of constitutional procedure was the provision of justice. Justice Brennan championed this
view long after the Warren Court was gone. Professor Bator, too,
believed in the value of procedure in a world where truth cannot be
known. He, however, found no intrinsic value in process; procedure
was only valuable when it served some functional goal. The Burger
and Rehnquist Courts, in adopting Bator's measure of finality, have
adopted a similar view of the value of procedure as well. Judge Friendly
and those Justices-such as Justices Powell and Black-who shared
his belief in the innocence standard valued procedure less, believing
that result was more important, and, apparently, believing as well that
correct results could be determined independently of acceptable procedures. For them, procedure sometimes hindered justice, for justice
was conviction of the guilty and acquittal of the innocent.
The value of procedure is not easily measured. If review of the
Court's decisions in this area demonstrates nothing else, it demonstrates that. Bator's task of defining "a set of arrangements and pro-
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cedures which provide a reasoned and acceptable probability that
justice will be done, that the facts found will be 'true' and the law
applied 'correct,' " a set of institutional arrangements that provide
''an assurance of justice deemed acceptable by society,'' 675 is not an
easy one. Bator only made it so by adopting a functional analysis that
allowed him to deny the social, moral, and political implications of
such a choice-and, even then, he did not find the task that easy.
I have my own belief as to acceptable process in this area: I like
the old habeas rather than the new. I believe that federal courts sitting
in habeas serve an important function in the protection and development of constitutional rights applicable to the state criminal process. I also believe that the shared responsibility for adjudication and
articulation of constitutional claims that the old habeas structure creates appropriately divides judicial power in an area that implicates
both state criminal law and federal constitutional principles, and is
entirely consistent with the general scheme of federal court jurisdiction. 676 Further, I do not premise my belief in the importance of federal habeas corpus review on a distrust of the states, but on the belief
that we are all the prisoners of our basic assumptions, and that, therefore, it is always healthy to be confronted by differing views. Thus,
for me, the choice of procedural values to be stressed in this area,
as evidenced by the structure of the old habeas, represents the correct
choice: differentiation, diffusion of power, deliberate norm enforcement, additional persuasion opportunities, and revisionism.
More importantly, however, I do not believe that it is appropriate
for the Supreme Court to tell me otherwise. As Justice Stevens has
stated in another context, in an area involving balancing of complex
competing policies with regard to the protection of individual rights
and the furtherance of efficient government operations, the Court
should "identify the proper decisionmaker before trying to make the
proper decision. ' 677 In the area of federal habeas review of state prisoner claims of custody in violation of the constitution, this task should
be an easy one. For, lost somewhere in the midst of the Court's discretionary doctrines is a statute-section 2254-which evidences a
congressional intent that the federal courts have jurisdiction over those
held in state custody in violation of the Constitution. Although one
might quibble over the exact scope of the jurisdictional grant contained in section 2254, the very existence of section 2254 seems in675.
676.
677.
(federal

Bator, supra note 13, at 448.
See supra note 512.
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 531 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
common law).
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consistent with the present Court's focus on finality of state court
constitutional determinations.
The Court, however, has spoken. The new habeas is a fait accompli. Only Congress, it seems, can change it now, and given the
unremitting silence of Congress with regard to its intent in section
679
2254 from before Brown v. Allen68 until after Butler v. McKellar,
a plea for Congressional action seems somewhat futile. Although numerous bills have been introduced to address the appropriate scope
of federal habeas review of state court constitutional determinations, 80 Congress itself has not been able to agree on an appropriate
value to place upon procedure. Yet, the fact is that the Court has
picked a policy for society. In the absence of congressional action,
the Court has chosen the values that our procedure for the adjudication of state prisoner constitutional claims will reflect. Congressional silence in the face of that choice is, in its results, just as an
effective (albeit an unintentional) adoption of that policy as would
be legislation explicitly affirming that choice.
I began this Article with a quote: "Procedure is the blindfold
of Justice." The quote comes from the recital of a myth, attributed
to Professor Cover, describing the way in which Justice acquired her
blindfold. Professor Cover understood the value of myths as ways
of imparting the complexities and contradictions of legal concepts.
To me, this myth imparts some of the complexities involved in attempting to place an appropriate value on procedure:
Each God's hand is set against her neighbor. The Gods, amidst heated
disputes leading to a cosmogonic crisis, search for the route to peace
and with it the end of the cosmic travail. The obvious solution, an
impartial arbiter to the various differences, is proposed but is dashed
on the rocks of personalities as each and every applicant for the job
678. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
679. 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
680. The most recent proposals were based on the Powell Commission Report. See supra
note 247. These proposals, which were included in an omnibus crime bill, S. REP. No. 3266,

101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), were among the controversial elements eliminated from the bill in
conference committee during last minute maneuvering. 48 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1130 (Nov. 7,

1990). For discussions of other earlier habeas legislation proposals, see Remington, Restricting
Access to Federal Habeas Corpus: Justice Sacrificed on the Alters of Expediency, Federalism
and Deterrence, 16 N.Y.U. R-v. L. & Soc. C-'s cE 339 (1987-88); Yackle, The Reagan
Administration's Habeas Corpus Proposals, 68 IowA L. Rnv. 609 (1983); Note, Proposed
Modification of Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners-Reform or Revocation? 61 GEo.

L.J. 1221 (1973). Because most of these proposals have sought to curtail significantly the scope
of habeas jurisdiction, one could argue that their rejection evidences Congress' satisfaction with
the old habeas. Now that the old habeas has been eviscerated through judicial action, however,
Congress' refusal to legislate similar limits is insufficient to protect the habeas jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts. Affirmative congressional action is required.
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is put to the test. . . . The tests go on until Justitia steps forward.
Self-consciously, she ties her scarf to her eyes and with that effort
of will she sees not. Seeing not, she fears not. No form attracts her.
Her very invention of the gesture has a superficial attractiveness about
it. She is obviously attuned to the need to keep much from herself
and the very fact that she is cognizant of the import of keeping out
information makes her a more suitable candidate than one who rashly
or stupidly tries to overcome.
Justitia is chosen as their judge and her story portrays the
"paradigmatic gesture" repeated by all judges who are worthy of
the name. It is a tale of purposeful interposition of a makeshift screen
between reality and decision, an interposition which obstructs direct
knowledge.
The richness of the concreteness of our icon lies in its incapacity
to be reduced "merely" to an idea like impartiality. Justitia in our
tale has put on the blindfold to avoid the pitfalls of fear or favor;
she has rendered it necessary to produce by indirection. If she has
removed the possibility of even the subtleties of unconscious favor,
she has also removed the possibility of less than conscious insight.
Our icon, however, is Justitia blindfolded, not Justitia blind,
and therein is suggested a critical dimension for procedure. Political
cartoonists have often seized upon this dimension of the icon and
portrayed Justitia "peeking" in order to illustrate the willful failure
of impaftiality. The blindfold (as opposed to blindness) suggests an
act of self-restraint. She could act otherwise and there is, thus, an
ever-present element of choice in assuming the posture. The temptation to raise the blindfold may not be the temptation to cheat.
Indeed, the strongest temptation for persons of quality is the temptation to see-to overcome the elusiveness6 8of indirection.
Procedure is the blindfold of Justice. '

681.

Curtis & Resnik, supra note 1, at 1727-28.

